Conclusion Without first properly exhausting his remedies, Ramirez cannot maintain this suit against Defendant Feazel as he cannot satisfy the mandates of the PLRA 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). He also has failed to state claims for retaliation, assault, and violations of 18 U.S.C §242 and Texas Penal Code §§ 39.03 and 39.04. For these reasons, Defendant Feazel respectfully requests the Court grant his Motion for Summary Judgment and dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against him based on Plaintiff’s failure to exhaust his administrative remedies, failure to overcome Defendant Feazel’s entitlement to sovereign immunity, and failure to state claims for relief. Respectfully submitted, KEN PAXTON Attorney General of Texas CHARLES E. ROY First Assistant Attorney General JAMES E. DAVIS Deputy Attorney General for Civil Litigation KAREN D. MATLOCK Assistant Attorney General Chief, Law Enforcement Defense Division /s/ Kimberly L. Kauffman KIMBERLY L. KAUFFMAN Assistant Attorney General Attorney-In-Charge State Bar No. 24089255 Kimberly.Kauffman@texasattorneygeneral.gov Case 5:15-cv-00333-RP Document 27 Filed 11/06/15 Page 13 of 14 14 P. O. Box 12548, Capitol Station Austi

Ali v. Shabazz, 8 F.3d 22, 22 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding that inmate plaintiffs, who alleged defendants deprived them of their constitutional rights under the First and Eighth Amendment without due process, had no cause of action under 18 U.S.C. § 242). Thus, Ramirez’s claim under Section 242 has no arguable basis in law or fact and should be dismissed. E. The Texas Penal Code does not give rise to private causes of action.

Case 1:13-cv-02618-JRS Document 16 Filed 02/07/14 Page 15 of 23 -16- #23167586 v5 70. Because no private cause of action exists under 18 U.S.C. § 242, Count V of plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a claim for which relief can be granted and, therefore, must be dismissed.

" 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5)). 17 The alleged violations of 18 U.S.C. § 495, 18 U.S.C. § 242, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and 42 U.S.C. § 1985 do not qualify as predicate acts for purposes of establishing a pattern of racketeering activity because they are not listed in 18 U.S.C. 1961(1). See Gordon v. Neugebauer, No. 1:14-CV-0093-J, 2014 WL 6611991, at *9 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 21, 2014) ("For federal predicate acts, only those federal statutes specifically listed in section 1961(1) qualify as predicate acts for purposes of establishing a pattern of racketeering activity.

of Columbia, 961 F.Supp.2d 169, 174 (D.D.C. 2013) (“Still, a complaint that is excessively long, rambling, disjointed, incoherent, or full of irrelevant and confusing material” will patently fail the Rule’s standard) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Courts have found that failure to comply with Rule 8 is valid grounds for dismissal. Ciralsky, 355 F.3d at 669 (explaining that “Rule 41(b) authorizes the court to dismiss either a claim or an action because of the plaintiff’s failure to comply with” Rule 8). Case 1:17-cv-00278-JEB Document 8-1 Filed 05/30/17 Page 3 of 6 4 5324, 2005 WL 375623, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 16, 2005) (“…appellant cannot assert any claim pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 4, 241, and 242, because, as criminal statutes, these statutes do not convey a private right of action.”); Rockefeller v. U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, 248 F. Supp. 2d 17, 23 (D.D.C. 2003)) (“Plaintiff is precluded from asserting any claims pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 242 and 371 because, as criminal statutes, they do not convey a private right of action.”).

Plaintiff’s Tenth Cause of Action for some alleged “Civil Rights Violation” fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. In an apparent attempt to establish a claim for “Civil Rights Violation,” Plaintiff inserts the following inapplicable and/or insufficiently pleaded statutory provisions: 18 U.S.C. Chapter 13, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 18 U.S.C. § 241, 242, and 248, “U.S.C. section 1981,” “U.S. section 248,” “section 1985,” “section 1986,” “U.S. Constitution Title 42 section 1997f,” “28 U.S.C. § 592(g)(3),” “Title U.S.C. section 595,” “U.S.C. § 371,” and 42 U.S.C. § 14141. (See, Complaint, ¶¶ 172-179, 184).

But because the legal standards under both rules are essentially the same, the Court would reach the same conclusion under either rule”). Case 2:16-cv-05224-SVW-AGR Document 105-1 Filed 10/26/16 Page 14 of 35 Page ID #:1768 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 5 Constitutional Rights); (6) violation of 18 U.S.C. § 242 (Deprivation of Rights); (7) violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1983 (Violation of Civil Rights); (8) violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1986 (Civil Rights); (9) intentional infliction of emotional distress. The defendant state legislators and their spouses and Anne Gust are named in all of the foregoing Claims for Relief.

Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Associates, Inc., 483 U.S. 143, 157-158, 107 S. Ct. 2759, 2768 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring). Congress did not provide an express limitations period in 18 U.S.C. § 242 and, thus, the “catchall” statute governs a federal criminal civil rights offense. The “catchall” statute, 18 U.S.C. Chapter 213, § 3282(a), provides that “no person shall be prosecuted, tried, or punished for any offense, not capital, unless the indictment is found or the information is instituted within five years next after such offense shall have been committed.”

Nor can plaintiff and his attorney Case 1:13-cv-02618-JRS Document 37 Filed 04/07/14 Page 5 of 9 -5- have any expectation that their federal court filings are private and exempt from full access by any member of the public. Plaintiff simply has no substantive response to support his claims for violations of the Fourteenth Amendment, 42 U.S.C. §1983, or 18 U.S.C. §242. C. Judge Kane is entitled to judicial immunity from plaintiff’s claims.

18 U.S.C. § 242. See United States v. Bunke, 412 Fed. Appx. 760, 761 (6th Cir. 2011) (prison guard convicted for use of excessive force under 18 U.S.C. § 242); United States v. Sellers, 906 F.2d 597 (11th Cir. 1990) (investigators in Sheriff’s department allowed co-defendant to beat suspect to obtain confession); United States v. DiSantis, 565 F.3d 354 (7th Cir. 2009) (police officer convicted of depriving suspect’s right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure); United States v. Cote, 544 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2008) (prison guard convicted of excessive force); United States v. LaVallee, 439 F.3d 670 (10th Cir. 2006). Under color of law, it is similarly a crime to willfully subject a person to different punishments or pains on account of the person being an alien or by reason of his color or race.