The Copyright Act is one of the statutorily recognized exceptions to the “American Rule” which permits the shifting of attorney’s fees to the losing party in litigation. See 17 U.S.C. §505. Section 505 of the Copyright Act provides that a court, “in its discretion may allow the recovery of full costs by or against any party […]” and that reasonable attorney’s fees can be awarded as part of those costs.

8 million in litigation expenses such as expert witnesses, e-discovery and jury consulting. The Ninth Circuit affirmed.Under the statute at issue in Rimini Street, 17 U.S.C. § 505, a district court “in its discretion may allow the recovery of full costs by or against any party” and “may also award a reasonable attorney’s fee to the prevailing party as part of the costs.” When deciding to affirm the District Court’s award, the Ninth Circuit acknowledged that the litigation expenses were beyond the scope of the six categories of costs that may be awarded against a losing party under §§ 1821 and 1920 but held that it was permitted because it reasoned that § 505’s “full costs” were not confined to the six categories.Interpretation with a Little Redundancy In a 9-0 decision on March 4, 2019, the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit and remanded for further proceedings.Justice Kavanaugh, writing for the Court, held that the term “full” did not expand the categories or kinds of expenses that may be awarded as costs under §§ 1821 and 1920, including the phrase in § 505.

8 million in litigation expenses such as expert witnesses, e-discovery and jury consulting. The Ninth Circuit affirmed.Under the statute at issue in Rimini Street, 17U.S.C.§505, a district court “in its discretion may allow the recovery of full costs by or against any party” and “may also award a reasonable attorney’s fee to the prevailing party as part of the costs.” When deciding to affirm the District Court’s award, the Ninth Circuit acknowledged that the litigation expenses were beyond the scope of the six categories of costs that may be awarded against a losing party under §§1821 and 1920 but held that it was permitted because it reasoned that §505’s “full costs” were not confined to the six categories.Interpretation with a Little Redundancy In a 9-0 decision on March 4, 2019, the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit and remanded for further proceedings.Justice Kavanaugh, writing for the Court, held that the term “full” did not expand the categories or kinds of expenses that may be awarded as costs under §§1821 and 1920, including the phrase in §505.

at 1. Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit held that the District Court’s award was appropriate because 17 U.S.C. § 505 of the Copyright Act allows for recovery of “full costs”: In any civil action under this title, the court in its discretion may allow the recovery of full costs by or against any party other than the United States or an officer thereof. Except as otherwise provided by this title, the court may also award a reasonable attorney’s fee to the prevailing party as part of the costs.Rimini, slip op.

It authorizes the trial court to award costs to the prevailing party related to such things as clerk fees, deposition transcription fees, and similar administrative expenditures incurred during the litigation. The Copyright Act has its own provision related to costs embodied in 17 U.S.C.§ 505. It provides, in relevant part, that “[i]nany civil action under this title, the court in its discretion may allow the recovery of full costs by or against any party other than the United States or an officer thereof” (emphasis supplied).

COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT – COSTS AND DAMAGESJodi BenassiIn 2019, the courts also clarified the costs and damages available under the Copyright Act.The US Supreme Court also interpreted the meaning of “full costs” as used in 17 U.S.C § 505. The Court determined that Section 505 has no special, expansive meaning, but is limited to the costs specified in the general costs statutes codified at 28 USC §§ 1821 and 1920.

In Depth On March 4, 2019, the US Supreme Court issued a unanimous decision authored by Justice Kavanaugh in Rimini Street, Inc. v. Oracle USA, Inc., finding that the term “full costs” in 17 USC § 505 of the Copyright Act has no special, expansive meaning, but rather is limited to the costs specified in the general costs statute codified at 28 USC §§1821 and 1920. As Kavanaugh explained, the addition of the adjective “full” to the term “costs” (in the Copyright Act) is not enough to conclude that Congress intended additional costs, beyond those set forth in the general cost statute.

Today, March 4, 2019 the Supreme Court of the United States ruled inRimini Street v. Oracle USA that “full costs” described in 17 U.S.C. § 505 of the (Copyright Act) are limited to the six categories of taxable costs set forth in 28 U.S.C. §§ 1821, 1920. The decision reversed the district court’s award of, and the Ninth Circuit’s order affirming, $12,774,550.26 in additional costs to Oracle for litigation costs outside of those delineated in §§ 1821 and 1920, such as expert witnesses, e-discovery, and jury consulting.

The Supreme Court unanimously decided two Copyright Act cases on March 4, 2019. In Rimini Street, Inc. v. Oracle USA, Inc., the Court held that the provision in the Copyright Act that gives federal district courts discretion to award “full costs” to a party in copyright litigation, 17 U. S. C. §505, covers only the six categories specified in the general costs statute, 28 U. S. C. §§1821, 1920. In Fourth Estate Pub.

See Cosmetic Ideas, Inc. v. IAC/Interactivecorp, 606 F.3d 612 (9th Cir. 2010); Positive Black Talk Inc. v. Cash Money Records Inc., 394 F.3d 357 (5th Cir. 2004). The question presented is: Whether “registration of [a] copyright claim has been made” within the meaning of § 411(a) when the copyright holder delivers the required application, deposit, and fee to the Copyright Office, as the Fifth and Ninth Circuits have held, or only once the Copyright Office acts on that application, as the Tenth Circuit and, in the decision below, the Eleventh Circuit have held.Rimini Street Inc. v. Oracle USA Inc., No. 17-1625 (Scheduled for argument on January 14, 2019) The second copyright case scheduled for argument this term involves a narrower issue: the definition of “costs” available to a prevailing party under the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 505. In general, costs awarded to prevailing parties in federal court litigation are governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1920 and are limited to court clerk and marshal fees, transcript fees, disbursements for printing and witnesses, copying fees, docketing fees, and the compensation of court-appointed experts and interpreters.