Further, the copyright protection Clockwork argues is being violated by the Hiller Works does not exist. Id.; 17 U.S.C. § 102(b). Clockwork cannot meet its burden of showing that “Plaintiff’s claims are barred in whole or in part because Clockwork owns all of the intellectual property Plaintiff claims has been infringed.”

But while the implementation of a process (such as the implementation of an API) is potentially copyrightable, the process itself (like the abstract rules of a game, or an API itself) is not. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b). Nor does Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula, Int’l, Inc., 725 F.2d 521 (9th Cir. 1984), another pre-Feist case, help Oracle.

The only requirement is that the work must be original. See § 17 U.S.C. § 102(a). There is no reason to add a judicially-created exception to the Copyright Act’s broad scope that carves out animal-created works.

2. Preemption Defendants contend that VSI’s unfair competition claim under Maryland law is preempted by the Copyright Act Section 301, which preempts state law claims if (1) “the work is within the scope of the ‘subject matter of copyright’ as specified in 17 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103” and (2) “the rights granted under state law are equivalent to any exclusive rights within the scope of federal copyright as set out in 17 U.S.C. § 106.” Rosciszewski v. Arete Assocs., 1 F.3d 225, 229 (4th Cir. 1993).

Antonick cannot hold a copyright in the mere idea of a three-dimensional projection. 17 U.S.C. §102(b). The Complaint refers to implementing this idea using a “table lookup” and generating the projection at 30 frames per second.

2007), affirming, 430 F. Supp. 2d 24 (D. Mass 2006)(Ponsor, J.). However, 20-20 has ignored this fundamental principle of copyright law by claiming infringement of a number of claimed similarities that are pure functionalities that are barred from copyright protection under 17 U.S.C. §102(b). Moreover, many of the similarities claimed by 20-20 are uncopyrightable under the limiting doctrines of merger, scènes à faire, public domain, efficiency, words and short phrases, standard techniques or practices, and market demands.

Norris Industries v. Internat'l Telephone & Telegraph Corp., 696 F.2d 918, 922 (11th Cir. 1983) As indicated above, Defendants agree (and fail to controvert) that Page 12 of24 Case 1:14-cv-00272-JEJ-MCC Document 144-4 Filed 12/06/16 Page 20 of 32 Case 1:14-cv-00272-JEJ-MCC Document 142 Filed 11/30/16 Page 20 of 31 Plaintiff employed creative license in a motion picture. Pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 102(a): Copyright protection subsists ... in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed, from which they can be · perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device. Works of authorship include the following categories: (1) literary works; (2) musical works, including any accompanying words; (3) dramatic works, including any accompanying music; ( 4) pantomimes and choreographic works; ( 5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works; ( 6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works; (7) sound recordings; and (8) architectural works.

a. The Copyrighted Works Are Not “Systems” or “Methods of Operation” Under 17 U.S.C. §102(b). Section 102(b) says: “In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery[.]”

See Ahn v. Midway Mfg. Co., 965 F. Supp. 1134, 1138 (N.D. Ill. 1997); 17 U.S.C. § 101. Further, Plaintiff’s Lyrics, a literary work, fall within the scope of the subject matter of federal copyright as specified in § 102. Thus, the first preemption element is met.

See generally 17 U.S.C. § 102. Second, the state law claims are not equivalent to the copyright cause.