Finally, in Macy, the Court found the plaintiff had standing based on the “risk of harm” resulting from the omissions in the same letter as the one Ms. Kausar received. Ms. Kausar alleged the same “risk of harm” as the plaintiff in Macy, i.e., “that as a result of this omission, the least sophisticated debtor might make an oral request instead, thereby waiving the protections of 15 U.S.C. §1692g(b). (Cmplt.

Also noteworthy is the fact that all allegations pertaining to the Sprechman Defendants filing documents and pleadings in the Case 9:12-cv-80675-WJZ Document 59 Entered on FLSD Docket 09/16/2013 Page 21 of 25 Page 22 of 25 underlying state court action without validating the debt, all reference dates of filings of documents and pleadings after the Sprechman Defendants had provided validation to the Plaintiff. As such, Defendant is entitled to Summary Judgment on Plaintiff’s 15 U.S.C § 1692g claims. b) Defendants are entitled to Summary Judgment on Plaintiff’s Invasion of Privacy claim Count IX of Plaintiff’s Complaint raises an invasion of privacy claim.

(internal citations omitted). 5 In addition, even if credit reporting to a CRA could be construed as an indirect communication “with” a consumer — and, again, courts universally hold that it is not — Plaintiff’s section 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(3)-(5) claim would still fail as a matter of law because MDS’s alleged credit reporting regarding the $87.00 medical debt to Experian and TransUnion in October 2015 occurred after MDS allegedly sent the July 29, 2015 Letter to Plaintiff concerning the exact same $87.00 medical debt. (See Complaint ¶¶ 14-16, 18-19, 23-25 & Ex. 1 thereto; see also July 29, 2015 Letter, attached hereto as Exhibit A).

Thus, like in Spira and Sebrow, it is clear that the Letter does not overshadow the validation notice as the Letter states that ICS will not take any action until after the 30-day Case 2:15-cv-07040-JFB-GRB Document 29-8 Filed 01/31/17 Page 14 of 17 PageID #: 316 12 131613912v1 0981430 validation period has ended. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Third Count alleging a violation of § 1692g should be dismissed. POINT III PLAINTIFF HAS NOT ALLEGED THAT DEFENDANT ATTEMPTED TO COLLECT THE PROCESSING FEE The Complaint alleges §1692f and §1692e alleging an unlawful processing fee.

The letter failed to include the “in writing” requirement found at 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(4) and the “written request” requirement found in 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(5). Defendant’s omission of the writing requirements in its validation notice contravened the express requirements of the statute, restricted the rights afforded to consumers, and thus violated the FDCPA at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692g(a)(4), 1692g(a)(5) and 1692e. Plaintiff accordingly requests that this Court grant him summary judgment on his claims, while reserving judgment on an award of damages until the Court has ruled upon Plaintiff’s motion for class certification and appointment of class counsel.

(citation omitted). For the same reasons discussed above with respect to Plaintiff’s section 1692g(a)(2) claim, Plaintiff has also failed to state claims against MDS under sections 1692e and 1692e(8). Again, Plaintiff specifically alleges in the Complaint that “Lakeway Regional Hospital” is the “assumed” trade name “registered with the Tennessee Secretary of State for . . . Hospital of Morristown, Inc.,” and that it is the “name under which Hospital of Morristown, Inc. does business.”

To prevent this, the provision vests consumers with the right to verify any debt they are alleged to owe, and contains various procedures for ensuring that right, including disclosure requirements for debt collectors. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a). A debt collector must provide a consumer, within five days after the initial communication between the consumer and the debt collector, a written notice containing: (1) the amount of the debt; (2) the name of the creditor to whom the debt is owed; (3) a statement that unless the consumer, within thirty days after receipt of the notice, disputes the validity of the debt, or any portion thereof, the debt will be assumed to be valid by the debt collector; (4) a statement that if the consumer notifies the debt collector in writing within the thirty-day period that the debt, or any portion thereof, is disputed, the debt collector will obtain verification of the debt or a copy of a judgment against the consumer and a copy of such verification or judgment will be mailed to the consumer by the debt collector; and (5) a statement that, upon the consumers written request within the thirty-day period, the debt collector will provide the consumer with the name and address of the original credito

However, if this were Congress’s intent, Congress would have incorporated the substantive notice requirements of the Rosenthal Act into the FDCPA. From the plain text of the FDCPA, it is clear that Congress determined that 15 U.S.C. § 1692g’s notice provisions were adequate.” Id.

In this case, Plaintiff alleges Defendant violated the FDCPA’s “validation of debts” provision. Complaint, at ¶ 36; 15 U.S.C. § 1692g. The provision’s purpose is to “eliminate the recurring problem of debt collectors dunning the wrong person or attempting to collect debts which the consumer has already paid.”

In this case, Plaintiff alleges Defendant violated the FDCPA’s “validation of debts” provision. Complaint, at ¶ 36; 15 U.S.C. § 1692g. The provision’s purpose is to “eliminate the recurring problem of debt collectors dunning the wrong person or attempting to collect debts which the consumer has already paid.”