Section 1691 - Scope of prohibition

54 Citing briefs

  1. Larson v. Trans Union , LLC

    MOTION for Summary Judgment on Trans Union LLC's Third Affirmative Defense

    Filed March 13, 2015

    J at p. 10.) Plaintiff cannot voluntarily close a credit card account, then attempt to use his unilateral decision to close an account as evidence that Plaintiff Case3:12-cv-05726-WHO Document66 Filed03/13/15 Page18 of 21 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 - 14 - NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - CASE NO. 3:12-CV-05726-WHO LA 51813704 S T R O O C K & S T R O O C K & L A V A N L L P 20 29 C en tu ry P ar k E as t Lo s A ng el es , C al ifo rn ia 9 00 67 -3 08 6 suffered a qualifying adverse action as defined in 15 U.S.C. § 1691(d)(6). Although Plaintiff testified that he did not close the account, Plaintiff never disputed the notation establishing that the WF Credit Card was closed by the consumer with TransUnion, despite his admissions that he knew he had the right to dispute incorrect information on his file disclosure and that he previously has disputed incorrect information on numerous occasions.

  2. Cole et al v. GMAC Mortgage LLC

    MEMORANDUM in Support of 8 MOTION to Dismiss

    Filed February 19, 2010

    Such term does not include a refusal to extend additional credit under an existing credit arrangement where the applicant is delinquent or otherwise in default, or where such additional credit would exceed a previously established credit limit.” 15 U.S.C. § 1691(d)(6). The definition of “credit” is discussed more below.

  3. ROSE v. BANK OF AMERICA (Mauro, J., assigned justice pro tempore; Chin, J., not participating)

    Respondent’s Exhibits in Support of Request for Judicial Notice

    Filed July 17, 2012

    “(c) REGULATIONS.—The appropriate Federal department or agency shall prescribe regulations, after notice and opportunity for comment, which determine what types of ‘self-tests’ are sufficiently extensive so as to constitute a determination of the level or effectiveness of a creditor's compliance with thistitle.”. SEC. 156. CREDIT SCORING SYSTEMS. Section 701 of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (15 U.S.C. 1691) is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection: “(f) CREDIT SCORING SYSTEM.— “() IN GENERAL.—A creditor shall be deemed to be in compliance with sub- section (a) with respect to any credit decision made by the creditor which is based solely on the use of an empirically derived, demonstrably andstatistically sound, credit scoring system (as defined by the Board in regulations prescribed underthis title) if such system— “(A) does not utilize any category protected under subsection (a); “(B) does not use as a factor in such system any criterion which is so di- rectly associated with such a category as to be the functional equivalent of such a category; and “(C) does not use as a factor in such system any criterion that has a dis- parate impact on a category protected under subsection (a) unless use of the criterion is justified by business necessity and there is no less discrimina- tory alternative available. 038 22 “(2) AGE AS A FACTOR.-—-No provision of this subsection s

  4. Russick v. Wells Fargo, Inc.

    BRIEF in Support re Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim

    Filed April 7, 2017

    See 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a). Moreover, Ms. Russick lacks standing to assert a claim of discrimination based upon Mr. Gay’s alleged disability because an applicant under the ECOA does not include co-applicants or those associated with the applicant and she does not allege that she is disabled.

  5. Latouche v. Well Fargo Home Mortgage Inc. et al

    Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim

    Filed November 11, 2016

    Nor can this Complaint plead that the Defendant, Plaza, "continued to extend credit to others", as Plaza was not the loan originator or successor and was not in the "ordinary course of business of making credit decisions". ECOA also provides that a claim for relief must be brought within two years after the date that the alleged discriminatory credit practice occurred. 15 U.S.C. § 1691(e)(f). The statute accrued upon the closing of the Plaintiff's loan in 2002 (see C, ¶ 55).

  6. Liz Banks v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. et al

    MEMORANDUM of CONTENTIONS of FACT and LAW

    Filed August 24, 2015

    Summary: Under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (hereinafter, the “Act”), found at 15 U.S.C. §1691 et seq., JPMC must provide, “any person who applies… for an extension, renewal, or continuation of credit, or applies… for use of an existing credit plan for an amount exceeding a previously established credit limit" with a written reason for the denial of credit and that reason must be accurate (see: 12 CFR 1002.9). JPMC failed to provide any accurate, written notice of denial as Banks did not qualify for a modification given her home value and the value of the loan regardless of the documents she may have provided.

  7. Canatella v. Donovan et al

    MOTION to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint

    Filed February 19, 2014

    (Comp., ¶28.) Thus, Plaintiff cannot rely upon 15 U.S.C. § 1691 to state an underlying claim. 4.)

  8. Mungai v. Wells Fargo Bank N.A et al

    MOTION to Dismiss

    Filed February 13, 2014

    Applying this logic, 15 U.S.C. § 1691(d)(1) only applies to applications for credit, and not a change in terms to existing credit – i.e., a loan modification. Put differently, either the default exception applies and the statute is not applicable or a modification is not contemplated in 15 U.S.C. § 1691(d)(1), making it inapplicable to Plaintiff’s situation. Either way, the statute is not applicable and the claim fails.

  9. American Bar Association v. Federal Trade Commission

    Memorandum in opposition to re MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment

    Filed October 13, 2009

    See 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(r)(5).5 The ECOA is Title VII of the Consumer Credit Protection Act (“CCPA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq. (2009), and the FCRA is Title VI of the CCPA.6 The ECOA makes it unlawful for any creditor to discriminate against any applicant with respect to any aspect of a credit transaction on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, sex or marital status or age; because all or part of the applicant’s income derives from any public assistance program; or because the applicant has in good faith exercised any right under the Consumer Credit Protection Act. 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a).7 Case 1:09-cv-01636-RBW Document 11 Filed 10/13/09 Page 14 of 50 Opportunity Act Amendments of 1975) (quoting Dr. Arthur S. Flemming, Chairman of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, in testimony before the Consumer Affairs Subcommittee) (“It would be difficult to exaggerate the role of credit in our society. Credit is involved in an almost endless variety of transactions reaching from the medical delivery of the newborn to the rituals associated with the burial of the dead.”); 94 Cong. Rec. 16740-41 (daily ed. June 3, 1975) (remarks of Mr. Annunzio on H.R. 6516, the Equal Credit Opportunity Act Amendments of 1975)

  10. Gesin v. Equifax Information Services Llc

    Brief/Memorandum in Support

    Filed July 5, 2017

    Regulatory guidance counsels in favor of dismissal. Plaintiff’s claim that it is improper to report authorized user information also contradicts regulatory guidance promulgated under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (“ECOA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1691 et seq. The ECOA prohibits credit discrimination on various bases, including marital status.