Section 1602 - Definitions and rules of construction

73 Citing briefs

  1. Burnett v. Tax Ease Funding, L P

    MOTION for Summary Judgment

    Filed January 23, 2012

    32(c). 15 U.S.C. § 1602(v); 12 C.F.R. § 226.23(a)(3), footnote 48; Official Staff Commentary § 226.

  2. In re Hero Loan Litigation

    NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION to Dismiss First Amended Complaint

    Filed March 10, 2017

    Count Six, for violations of the TILA mortgage originator rules, fails for all of the same reasons as described above in Section I.A. TILA mortgage originator rules are not applicable because those rules only apply to “residential mortgage loans” that are “consumer credit transactions,” and PACE transactions are neither. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1602 (cc)(2), (5). Beyond that, Count Six also must be dismissed because it is based on a fundamental misunderstanding of the cited statutory provision.

  3. In re Hero Loan Litigation

    NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION to Dismiss First Amended Complaint

    Filed March 8, 2017

    Count Five, for violations of the TILA mortgage originator rules, fails for all the same reasons described above in Section I.A. TILA mortgage originator rules are Case 5:16-cv-02478-AB-KK Document 60-1 Filed 03/08/17 Page 23 of 33 Page ID #:861 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 16 not applicable because those rules only apply to “residential mortgage loans” that are “consumer credit transactions,” and PACE transactions are neither. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1602(cc)(2), (5). Beyond that, Count Five also must be dismissed because it is based on a fundamental misunderstanding of the cited statutory provision.

  4. George Loya v. Western Riverside Council of Governments et al

    NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION to Dismiss the First Amended Complaint

    Filed March 2, 2017

    Count Six, for violations of the TILA mortgage originator rules, fails for all of the same reasons described above in Section I.A. TILA mortgage originator rules are not applicable because those rules only apply to “residential mortgage loans” that are “consumer credit transactions,” and PACE transactions are neither. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1602(cc)(2), (5). Beyond that, Count Six also must be dismissed because it is based on a fundamental misunderstanding of the cited statutory provision.

  5. George Loya v. Western Riverside Council of Governments et al

    NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION to Dismiss Case

    Filed January 17, 2017

    This allegation seeks to create liability based on the last sentence of the same “creditor” definition, which provides: Any person who originates 2 or more mortgages referred to in subsection (aa) [HOEPA] of this section in any 12-month period or any person who originates 1 or more such mortgages through a mortgage broker shall be considered to be a creditor . . .. 15 U.S.C. § 1602(g). Loya apparently believes that this final sentence creates an alternative, standalone definition of “creditor,” separate from the two-part test specified in the beginning of § 1602(g), which by its terms sets out the “only” standard for “creditor.”

  6. Limtiaco v Auctioncars.com, LLC

    MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment

    Filed May 23, 2012

    24 Defendant operates a used vehicle lot located at 3000 E. Lake Mead Blvd., North Las Vegas, NV 89030; Defendant is registered with the Nevada Secretary of State, and Defendant is licensed as a “dealer” with the Nevada Department of Motor Vehicles. In 2010 alone, Defendant 22 15 U.S.C. § 1602(e). 23 See July 24, 2010 Motor Vehicle Purchase Order and Federal Disclosure Statement (described herein as “the July 24, 2010 retail installment sales contract), attached hereto as Exhibit 1.

  7. Expressions Hair Design, et al., Respondents,v.Eric T. Schneiderman,, et al., Appellants.

    Brief

    Filed January 2, 2018

    It was thus unclear—at the time—whether a label stating the cash price and a percentage or dollars-and- cents surcharge for credit cards satisfied the rule that “two prices [be] tagged or posted.” See 15 U.S.C. § 1602(y). In the end, many of the ambiguities that afflicted the federal surcharge law were never resolved.

  8. Paatalo v. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank et al

    Response to Motion to Strike Amended Answer 17 18 Oral Argument requested.

    Filed January 13, 2016

    Op. and Order, p. 6 n. 2. Yet Plaintiff inexplicably relies on a TILA provision, 15 U.S.C. §1602(g), in asserting that Chase “does not have standing to challenge the rescission.” Pl.’s Mot.

  9. Michael Richardson v. County of Los Angeles et al

    NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION to Dismiss Case Plaintiff's Complaint Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 12

    Filed January 23, 2017

    TILA defines “credit” as “the right granted by a creditor to a debtor to defer payment of debt or to incur debt and defer its payment.” See 15 U.S.C. § 1602(f). The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s official staff interpretations of TILA expressly exclude “tax liens” and “tax assessments” from the definition of consumer “credit.”

  10. Richard Ramos v. San Bernardino Associated Governments et al

    NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.Proc. 12

    Filed January 19, 2017

    TILA defines “credit” as “the right granted by a creditor to a debtor to defer payment of debt or to incur debt and defer its payment.” See 15 U.S.C. § 1602(f). The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s official staff interpretations of TILA expressly exclude “tax liens” and “tax assessments” from the definition of Case 5:16-cv-02491-AB-KK Document 33-1 Filed 01/19/17 Page 25 of 28 Page ID #:367 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 – 19 – MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT SAN BERNARDINO ASSOCIATED GOVERNMENTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT R EE D S M IT H L LP A li m ite d lia bi lit y pa rtn er sh ip fo rm ed in th e St at e of D el aw ar e consumer “credit.”