Section 1118 - Destruction of infringing articles

8 Citing briefs

  1. Yeti Coolers, LLC v. Kuer Outdoors, LLC

    MOTION for Default Judgment against Kuer Outdoors, LLC

    Filed October 27, 2016

    (See Comp. at p. 22);  An Order directing the destruction of (i) all the remaining Infringing Products, including any recalled Infringing Products (other than the samples turned over to YETI as described above), (ii) any other products that use a copy, reproduction, or colorable imitation of the YETI’s Trade Dress in Kuer’s possession or control, and (iii) all plates, molds, and other means of making the Infringing Products in Kuer’s possession, custody, or control, pursuant to at least 15 U.S.C. § 1118. Pathway, 2016 WL 1059536, at *5 (awarding destruction of products infringing Plaintiff’s trademarks upon default judgment); Diamond Heads, LLC v. Everingham, No. 07-462, 2009 WL 1046067, at *1, 10 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 20, 2009) (ordering destruction of products that infringed asserted patents).

  2. Chacanaca et al v. The Quaker Oats Company

    Reply in Support of Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings re

    Filed July 1, 2010

    Section 1116 is a remedy provision for alleged violations of Lanham Act Section 1125, and in no way circumvents the Lanham Act’s well- established standing requirements. See Compl., First Cause of Action, p. 17 (“False Advertising under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125 et seq.”), ¶¶ 77-78 (seeking as remedy destruction of advertising under 15 U.S.C. § 1118 and injunction under 15 U.S.C. § 1116). Plaintiffs do not cite a single case for the proposition that a Lanham Act claim can be brought by a non-competitor.

  3. National Football League et al v. Comercial Lt Baroda S.A. et al

    MEMORANDUM OF LAW in Support re: 9 MOTION for Default Judgment as to Defendants Comercial LT Baroda S.A. d/b/a BetUS and Commercial L.T. Baroda

    Filed January 18, 2007

    See, e.g., United We Stand America, Inc. v. United We Stand, America New York, Inc., 128 F.3d 86, 88 (2d Cir. 1997) (affirming default judgment in action to enjoin the use of plaintiff’s registered service mark). In particular, the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1116(a), 1118, and N.Y. GEN. BUS. L. § 360-m both specifically authorize injunctive relief in cases such as this where the defendant has infringed or diluted the plaintiff’s trademark rights.

  4. Cree, Inc v. Xiu Ping Chen et al

    Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim

    Filed May 26, 2017

    For an order from the Court that an asset freeze or constructive trust be imposed over all monies and profits in Defendants’ possession which rightfully belong to Plaintiff; 10. For an order requiring deliverance, for destruction, of the infringing articles in Defendants’ possession under 15 U.S.C. §1118; 11. For damages in an amount to be proven at trial for unjust enrichment; 12.

  5. Ryan House v. Ryan's House For Youth

    MOTION for Summary Judgment

    Filed April 20, 2017

    ¶ 7. Ryan’s 5 Transfer of the domain will ensure that it is not used by others, and is the equivalent of an order requiring destruction of infringing articles pursuant to Section 36 of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C.§ 1118. Case 2:16-cv-01404-RSL Document 27 Filed 04/20/17 Page 13 of 16 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (2:16-cv-01404-RSL) - 14 Davis Wright Tremaine LLP LAW OFFICES 1201 Third Avenue, Suite 2200 Seattle, WA 98101-3045 206.

  6. Slep-Tone Entertainment Corporation et al v. Klemz et al

    MOTION

    Filed April 18, 2014

    he Trademark Act provides for the destruction of infringing articles: In any action arising under this Act, in which a violation of any right of the registrant of a mark registered in the Patent and Trademark Office, a Case: 1:14-cv-00189 Document #: 47 Filed: 04/18/14 Page 11 of 13 PageID #:430   12 violation under section 43(a), or a willful violation under section 43(c), shall have been established, the court may order that all labels, signs, prints, packages, wrappers, receptacles, and advertisements in the possession of the defendant, bearing the registered mark or, in the case of a violation of section 43(a) or a willful violation under section 43(c), the word, term, name, symbol, device, combination thereof, designation, description, or representation that is the subject of the violation, or any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation thereof, and all plates, molds, matrices, and other means of making the same, shall be delivered up and destroyed. 15 U.S.C. § 1118. Although the destruction provided for in § 1118 is not mandatory, destruction is appropriate in this case because of the relative ease with which the Defendant could utilize the hard drives to conduct additional counterfeiting activities in a manner that avoids ready detection.

  7. National Football League et al v. Comercial Lt Baroda S.A. et al

    MOTION for Default Judgment as to Defendants Comercial LT Baroda S.A. d/b/a BetUS and Commercial L.T. Baroda

    Filed January 18, 2007

    3. Requiring BetUS to deliver up for destruction all infringing materials in its possession or control and all means of making the same, in accordance with 15 U.S.C. § 1118. 4.

  8. BBG Communications v. Network Communicat, et al

    MOTION for Summary Judgment On Counterclaims 3 and 4 for Trademark Infringement Under Texas State Law and Federal Law

    Filed December 2, 2004

    (2) In an action brought under this subsection, the owner of the famous mark shall be entitled only to injunctive relief as set forth in 15 USC § 1116 unless the person against whom the injunction is sought willfully intended to trade on the owner's reputation or to cause dilution of the famous mark. If such willful intent is proven, the owner of the famous mark shall also be entitled to the remedies set forth in 15 USC §§ 1117(a), 1118, subject to the discretion of the court and the principles of equity. As described above, NCIC does not have a trademark for the term "International Calling Services." Furthermore, the USPTO has conclusively determined that it has only descriptive meaning, and therefore is not "famous" for purposes of the legal requirement under trademark dilution.