No statute of limitations is applicable here. IV.B.1; IV.B.2; IV.B.4; IV.E Relief Defendants (ECF No. 631) 4. Failure to join relief defendants as required by 15 U.S.C. § 53(b) No such defense exists IV.G.3 Relief Defendants (ECF No. 631) 5. Failure to exhaust administrative remedies Already adjudicated IV.A.2; IV.G.4 Relief Defendants (ECF No. 631) 6. Reservation of right to allege additional defenses This is a legal request, not an affirmative defense IV.F.2 Relief Defendants (ECF No. 631) 5. [sic] Defenses pleaded solely for the purpose of non- waiver This is a legal request, not an affirmative defense IV.F.2 Tucker Defendants (ECF No. 645) 1. FTC abused its discretion by failing to initiate rulemaking FTC is not required to proceed by rulemaking IV.D Tucker Defendants (ECF No. 645) 2. AMG is arm of Indian tribe and not subject to FTC Act jurisdiction Already adjudicated IV.A.1 Tucker Defendants (ECF No. 645) 3. Not a “proper case” for FTC district court litigation The FTC is authorized to initiate district court litigation for statutes it enforces IV.C Tucker Defendants (ECF No. 645) 4. FTC lacks stat

Venue would likewise be proper in D.C., in light of the broad venue provisions of the FTC Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 53(b). Case 2:13-cv-01887-ES-JAD Document 23 Filed 08/02/12 Page 7 of 19 PageID: 91Case 2:16-cv-00746-MRH Document 26-3 Filed 09/14/16 Page 8 of 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 7 II.

See, e.g., FTC v. United States Oil & Gas Corp., 748 F.2d 1431 (11th Cir. 1984) (district court has full equitable powers incident to express authority to issue permanent injunction under [15 U.S.C. §53]); [Singer, 668 F.2d at 1113] (permanent injunctive power also gives authority for ancillary equitable relief); FTC v. Southwest Sunsites, Inc., 665 F.2d 711, 718 [(5th Cir. 1982)], cert. denied, [456 U.S. 973 (1982)] (grant of jurisdiction in [15 U.S.C. §53(b)] includes authorization for district court to exercise full range of equitable remedies traditionally available). Amy Travel Service, 875 F.2d at 761; accord, QT, 448 F.Supp.2d at 957.

The FTC’s authority to “bring suit in a district court of the United States” is defined in the first sentence of Section 13(b): Whenever the Commission has reason to believe . . . that any person, partnership, or corporation is violating, or is about to violate, any provision of law enforced by the Federal Trade Commission . . . the Commission . . . may bring suit in a district court of the United States to enjoin any such act or practice. 15 U.S.C. § 53(b) (emphasis added). Ignoring this clear statement governing the limited circumstances in which the FTC “may bring suit” in federal court, the FTC focuses instead on a subsequent proviso in Section 13(b) that allows the FTC, once properly in federal court, to seek a permanent injunction where warranted.

Section 13(b) authorizes the FTC to challenge unlawful conduct directly in federal district court and to seek a permanent injunction for violations of “any law enforced by the Commission.” 15 U.S.C. § 53(b). The district court, rather than the Commission, determines whether the law has been violated and fashions the proper remedy, including, where appropriate, monetary equitable relief.

Third, the FTC not only has discretion in determining whether to take enforcement action, but has discretion regarding the method of enforcement and remedies if it does so. See 15 U.S.C. § 53(b) (civil actions in federal district court for injunctive and equitable remedies); 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (administrative adjudicatory proceedings); 15 U.S.C § 57b (remedies available at the conclusion of administrative proceedings). Thus, MPHJ’s assertion that its suit “does not interfere with any ongoing administrative action or investigation,” Opp.

11 the power to file a complaint directly in federal district court to seek injunctive relief and related remedies under Section 13(b). 15 U.S.C. § 53(b). At this point, the FTC has neither initiated an administrative proceeding by filing an administrative complaint in accordance with the FTC’s rules and regulations, nor filed an enforcement action in federal court.

No. 105) at ¶12. Venue is therefore proper in this district under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) and (c) and under 15 U.S.C. § 53(b). Clayton Act 10.

Section 13(b) of the FTC Act authorizes a preliminary injunction “[u]pon a proper showing that, weighing the equities and considering the Commission’s likelihood of ultimate success, such action would be in the public interest.” 15 U.S.C. § 53(b). To grant preliminary injunctive relief in an FTC Act case, the district court must: (1) determine the likelihood that the Commission will ultimately succeed on the merits, and (2) balance the equities.

This case, which involves violations of Section 5(a) of the FTC Act and the TSR in connection with the sale of a deceptive interest rate reduction service, qualifies as a “proper case” for injunctive relief under Section 13(b). FTC v. H.N. Singer, Inc., 668 F.2d 1107, 1111 (9th Cir. 1982) retain qualified counsel to represent these corporations, making default judgment the best means of resolving the case against these corporate defendants. Case 8:12-cv-00586-MSS-EAJ Document 213 Filed 09/20/13 Page 11 of 20 PageID 4339 12 (holding that a “routine fraud case” is a “proper case” for permanent injunctive relief under 13(b)). Section 13(b) of the FTC Act expressly authorizes the issuance of a permanent injunction to prevent further violations. 15 U.S.C. § 53(b); Gem Merch., 87 F.3d at 468. A permanent injunction is justified when there is a “cognizable danger of recurrent violation” that goes beyond a “mere possibility.” U.S. v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 633 (1953)