See Taggart v. GMAC Mortg., LLC, No. 12–415, 2012 WL 5929000, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 26, 2012) (citing Vino 100, LLC v. Smoke on the Water, LLC, 864 F.Supp.2d 269, 281 (E.D. Pa. 2012) (“private parties are not authorized to file enforcement actions, only the FTC has that authority”)); see also Carpenter v. Kloptoski, No. 08–2233, 2010 WL 891825, at * 11 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 10, 2010) (“There is no private right of action under Federal Trade Commission Act.”); Martino v. Everhome Mortg., 639 F. Supp. 2d 484, 491 n. 16 (D.N.J. 2009) (citing several circuit cases holding that no private right of action exists under FTCA); Gilliam v. Nat’l Comm’n for Certification of Physician Assistants, Inc., 727 F. Supp. 1512, 1514 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (“Although it is unclear just what provisions of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41 et seq. plaintiff is invoking, and it seems that no violation has been validly alleged, the matter need not be pursued, since there is no private right of action under that statute.”) Thus, this cause of action must also be dismissed with prejudice.

(15 U.S.C. §§ 1011, 1012; see U.S. Dept. ofTreasury v. Fabe (1993) 508 U.S. 491, 499-500 [discussing history of McCarran-Ferguson Act].) The Model Act closely paralleled the Federal Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. § 41 et seq.) to avoid potential federal preemption ofstate regulation of unfair or deceptive insurancetrade practices.

Obviously, without a right of action, no allegation can survive a challenge under Rule 12(b)(6). Case 2:16-cv-06192-MAK Document 4-2 Filed 12/05/16 Page 8 of 14 4 1. The Federal Trade Commission Act Plaintiff alleges that Chase violated the FTCA, 15 U.S.C. § 41 et seq. Compl. at ¶ 1.

These private rights are contrasted with a government officer's right to enforce a statute-usually an Attorney General or administrative agency. See, e.g., Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914, 16 15 U.S.C. § 41 et seq. (providing for administrative enforcement of competition laws without private right of action). Courts will not find a "private right of action" in a statute unless they conclude that Congress (or the legislature) intended to create such a right, by assessing whether the statute was enacted for the benefit of a specialized class, and whether recognition of a private right of action to enforce the law would promote the underlying purpose of the statute.

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009). C. The Federal Trade Commission Act (“FTCA”) Does Not Create a Private Right of Action Plaintiff alleges that TMCC was “non compliant with the Federal Trade Commission Act 15 U.S.C. 41, et seq.” (Compl.) However, even if Plaintiff’s allegations are true – and Plaintiff has not pled any facts to indicate that they are – this claim must fail because Plaintiff has no private right of action under the FTCA.

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009). C. The Federal Trade Commission Act (“FTCA”) Does Not Create a Private Right of Action Plaintiff alleges that TMCC was “non compliant with the Federal Trade Commission Act 15 U.S.C. 41, et seq.” (Compl.) However, even if Plaintiff’s allegations are true – and Plaintiff has not pled any facts to indicate that they are – this claim must fail because Plaintiff has no private right of action under the FTCA.

All of the listed agencies are led by multi- member commissions, and all but the Federal Reserve have mandatory or traditional bipartisan requirements. See 7 U.S.C. § 2(a)(2)(A) (CFTC); 47 U.S.C. § 154(b)(2)(B)(5) (FCC); 15 U.S.C. § 41 (FTC); 42 U.S.C. § 7171(b)(1) (FERC); 15 U.S.C. § 78d(a) (SEC); Breger & Edles, Established by Practice, supra at 13 n.5, at 1139 n.137 (NLRB traditional bipartisan requirement). Moreover, even though the Federal Reserve does not have a political diversity requirement, it does have other requirements designed to ensure viewpoint diversity, including requirements regarding geographic and industry representation.

(See Fin. Code, § 23000 et seq.) While there are no federal lawsthat specifically target payday lending, the FTC has investigated andfiled enforcementactions against payday lenders using the Federal Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. §§ 41- 58) (prohibiting deceptive trade practices) and the Truth in Lending Act (15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1667f) (requiring specific disclosures in lending documents). On April 2, 2012, the FTC filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District ofNevada against 19 defendants, including MNE Services, Inc. and SFS, Inc. (See FTC v. AMGServices, Inc. (D.Nev. May 28, 2014, No. 2:12cv536)__ F.Supp.2d __ [2014 WL 2927148].)

1 (“[These jewelry] guides are administrative interpretations of the law; they do not have the force of law . . . .”). Second, the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 41 et seq, itself differentiates between the promulgation of industry guidance and rule making. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 57a(a)(1)(A) with § 57a(a)(1)(B).

(Id. at p. 257.) A third test employs the definition of “unfair” from the Federal Trade Commission [**18] Act (15 U.S.C. § 41 et seq.), and requires (1) a substantial consumerinjury; (2) that is not outweighed by any countervailing benefits to consumers; and (3) causes an injury that consumers could not reasonably have avoided. (Ibid.; accord, Davis v. Ford Motor Credit Co. LLC (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 581, 594- 597 [101 Cal. Rptr. 3d 697].)