While defendants speculate that the word “person” is distinct from an affected federally insured financial institution, the broad definition of “person,” which extends to individuals and entities alike, indicates that the opposite is true. See 1 U.S.C. § 1. As with the word “[w]hoever,” had Congress intended to narrow the definition of “person,” it could have done so.

This reading of the term “individual” is further confirmed by the Dictionary Act, whereby Congress has provided definitions for a number of common statutory terms that courts must apply “unless the context indicates otherwise.” 1 U.S.C. § 1. The Dictionary Act requires that “in determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any ruling, regulation, or interpretation of the various administrative bureaus and agencies of the United States, the word[] . . . ‘individual’ [] shall include every infant member of the species homo sapiens who is born 8 The definition of individual has remained the same since the time when RECA was enacted in 1990.

Id. (quoting 1 U.S.C. § 1). An institution that “is accredited,” therefore, must remain accredited into the future.

Such corporations are merely associations of individuals . . . .”); Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 341–42 (2010) (finding that corporations—associations of Case 3:15-cv-04324-WHO Document 37 Filed 12/18/15 Page 7 of 10 COOLEY LLP ATTORNEYS AT LAW PALO ALTO 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 4. BLURB INC.’S MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINTCASE NO. 15-CV-04324 (WHO) persons—have speech rights under the First Amendment); Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2768 (2014) (finding word “person” in federal legislation includes corporations and companies, as well as individuals, and so the plaintiff corporation was a person under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993); see also 1 U.S.C. § 1 (“In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, unless the context indicates otherwise . . . the words ‘person’ and ‘whoever’ include corporations, companies, [and] associations . . . as well as individuals”). The same cannot be said for animals.

There is no “similar government conduct” exception in the text of the AKS, and it is axiomatic that the AKS does not apply to the Government. See 1 U.S.C. § 1 (unless otherwise specified, “the words ‘person’ and ‘whoever’ [in federal statutes] include corporations, companies, associations, firms, partnerships, societies, and joint stock companies, as well as individuals”); United States v. United Mine Workers of America, 330 U.S. 258, 275 (1947) (recognizing that “statutes employing [the term person] will not ordinarily be construed” as referring to the United States); United States v. Bidloff , 82 F. Supp. 2d 86, 94 (W.D.N.Y. 2000) (“it is well established when the personal pronoun whoever appears in a federal statute it should not be understood to refer to the [United States] unless the statute expressly so provides”). Thus, how federal programs deal with adherence says nothing about whether the Exjade scheme was illegal under the AKS or the FCA.

By federal law, in construing U.S. statutes, “words importing the singular include and apply to several persons, parties or things.” See 1 U.S.C. § 1. It is an “elementary rule of statutory construction that the singular . . . includes the plural.”

Plaintiff States are not “person[s]” to whom the AIA applies. That term is repeatedly defined in the federal code to the exclusion of the States, see, e.g., 1 U.S.C. § 1; 26 U.S.C. § 6671; 26 U.S.C. § 7343; 26 U.S.C. § 7701 (see parenthetical), and there is a “longstanding interpretive presumption that „person‟ does not include the sovereign.” Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States, 529 U.S. 765, 780 (2000); United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 275 (1947).

Thanks, Case 1:07-cv-00668-JDB Document 45-4 Filed 03/18/2008 Page 355 of 415 Final Bracketed Comment Letter Report on Simultaneous Marketing ANPRM – Page 347 Thomas Phlips, MD COMMENT NUMBER - 2005N-0345-EC793 2005N-0345-EC793 - STRUCTURED DATA ELEMENTS Initiative Name: Simultaneous Marketing of Rx and OTC Products Commenter Organization Name: Kuskey, Garvan 2005N-0345-EC793 - TEXT Issue Areas/Comments 1 A. Should FDA initiate a rulemaking to codify its interpretation of section 503(b) of the action regarding when an active ingredient can be simultaneously marketed in both prescription drug product and an OTC drug product? (See statement below in the comments section 1. B. Is there significant confusion regarding FDA's interpretation of section 503(b) of the act? yes 2 B. If it could, would it be able to do so as practical matter and, if so, how? GENERAL GENERAL If 5% testosterone -- a completely benign substance -- must be written on a triplicate prescription, then why not this more dangerous preparation?Or the reverse: if this drug can be marketed without a prescription to those over sixteen years of age, then why can't 5% testosterone be marketed to elderly men who need HRT? The FDA designated low-dose testosterone a dangerous drug specifically because of its abuse by body builders.

After imposing the duty to “immediately remove,” the WHBA provides in the next sentence that “[s]uch action [i.e., removal] shall be taken . . . until all excess animals have been removed . . . .” 16 U.S.C. § 1333(b)(2) (emphasis added). Although the word “action” is singular, 1 U.S.C. § 1 provides that it may be interpreted as plural. Reading “action” as plural Case 2:17-cv-00088-CW Document 20 Filed 05/03/17 Page 22 of 25 23 is appropriate because of the word “until.”

In re U.S. Foodservice Inc. Pricing Litigation, No. 3:07 MD 1894 (CFD), 2009 WL 5064468 (D. Conn. Dec. 15, 2009)..................19 Vance v. Rumsfeld, 653 F.3d 591 (7th Cir. 2011)..............................................................48 Vernon v. Cassadaga Valley Central Sch. District, 49 F.3d 886 (2d Cir. 1995)...............47 In re Wells Fargo Mortgage-Backed Certificates Litigation, 712 F. Supp. 2d 958 (N.D. Cal. 2010) .........................................................................64 Statutes 1 U.S.C. § 1........................................................................................................................51 12 U.S.C. § 1708(c)(3)(E)(v).......................................................................................31, 38 12 U.S.C. § 1717z-21(c)(1) (2006)..............................................................................31, 38 12 U.S.C. § 1833a...................................................................................................... passim 15 U.S.C. § 645(a) .............................................................................................................60 18 U.S.C. § 1001..........................................................................................................50, 55 18 U.S.C. § 1005..............................................................................................50, 51, 52, 53 18 U.S.C. § 1007..........................................................................................................53,