The newstatutesdid not, however, require states to provide standards to guide prosecutors’ decisions as to whether to seek the death penalty in the 798 first place. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc.art. 37.071 (2000). As Justice Brennan has pointed out, . .. discrimination andarbitrariness at an earlier point in the selection process nullify the value of later controls on the jury.

Ann. § 31-20A-3 (Michie 1990); Okla. Stat. Ann.tit. 21, § 701.11 (West 1993); 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 9711(c)(1)(iv) (1982); S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-20(C) (Law. Co- op. 1992); Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204(g) (1993); Tex. Crim. Proc. Code Ann. § 37.071 (West 1993). 462 U.S. at p. 732; Harmelin v. Michigan, supra, 501 U.S.at p. 994), and since the provision of greater protections to a noncapital defendant thanto a capital defendant would violate the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment (see, e.g., Myers v. YI st, supra, 897 F.2d at p. 421),it follows that unanimity with regard to aggravating circumstancesis constitutionally required.

Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 259 (1976). Twenty states have statutes similar to that of Georgia and seven havejudicially °7 See Ark. Code Ann. §5-4-603(a) (Michie 1993); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §16-11-103(2) (West 1992); Ill. Ann. Stat., ch. 38, para. 9-1(g) (Smith-Hurd 1992); La. Code Crim.Proc. Ann., art. 905.6 (West 1993); Md. Ann. Code,art. 27, §413(D (1993); Miss. Code Ann. §99-19-103 (1992); N.H. Rey. Stat. Ann. §630:5(IV) (1992); N.M. Stat. Ann. §31-20A-3 (Michie 1990); Okla. Stat. Ann., tit. 21, §701.11 (West 1993); 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §9711(c)(1)(iv) (1982); S.C. Code Ann. §16-3- 20(c) (Law, Co-op. 1992); Tenn. Code Ann. §39-13-204(g) (1993); Tex. Crim. Proc. Code Ann. §37.071 (West 1993), 478 wu instituted similar review.** 60. Penal Code $190 does not require that either the trial court or this Court undertake a comparison between this and other factually similar cases to examine the proportionality of the sentence imposed, 1.e., inter-case proportionality review.

In Richardson v. United States (1999) 526 U.S.813, 815-816 [119 S.Ct. 707, 143 L.Ed.2d 985], the United States Supreme Court interpreted 21 U.S.C. 630:5(IV) (1992); Okla. Stat. Ann.tit. 21, § 701.11 (West 1993); 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 9711(c)(1)(iv) (1982); S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-20(C) (Law. Co-op. 1992); Tenn. Code Ann., § 39-13-204(g) (1993); Tex. Crim. Proc. Code Ann.§ 37.071 (West 1993). 280 section 848(a), and held that the jury must unanimously agree on whichthree drug oesviolations constituted the “continuing series of violations’” necessary for a continuing criminal enterprise [CCE] conviction.

Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 179 (1988) (plurality opinion); Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 373-75 (1988); Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 502 (1987), overruled on other grounds, Payne, 501 U.S. at 829-30; Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 875-76 (1983) As such, the Texas mitigation special issue serves this constitutionally mandated function, instructing the jury to consider all of the evidence — the circumstances of the offense, the defendant’s character and background, and the general moral culpability of the defendant — and that it need not agree on what evidence supports an affirmative answer. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art 37.071 § 2(e) & (f). Thus, the mitigation issue confers upon the jury a broad ability to show leniency and reduce the defendant’s sentence to life imprisonment.

Ann. § 31-20A-3 (Michie 1990); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 21, § 701.11 (West 1993); 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 9711(c)(1)(iv) (1982); S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-20(C) (Law. Co- op. 1992); Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204(g) (1993); Tex. Crim. Proc. Code Ann. § 37.071 (West 1993).) 169 punishmentof one yearin prison, but not to a finding that could have “a substantial impact on the jury’s determination whether the defendant should live or die” (People v. Medina (1995) 11 Cal.4th 694, 763-764), would by its inequity violate the equal protection clause and by its irrationality violate both the due process and cruel and unusual punishmentclausesof the state and federal Constitutions, as well as the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of a trial by jury..

Ann., § 31-20A-3 (Michie 1990); Okla. Stat. Ann., tit. 21, § 701.11 (West 1993); 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann., § 9711(c)(1)(iv) (1982); S.C. Code Ann., § 16-3-20(C) (Law. Co-op. 1992); Tenn. Code Ann., § 39-13-204(g) (1993); Tex. Crim. Proc. Code Ann., § 37.071 (West 1993). 566 defendants are entitled to more rigorous protections than those afforded noncapital defendants (see Monge v. California, supra, 524 U.S.at p. 732; Harmelin v. Michigan (1991) 501 U.S. 957, 994) — and, since providing more protection toa noncapital defendant than a capital defendant would violate the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment(see, e.g., Myers v. YIst, supra, 897 F.2d at p. 421) — it follows that unanimity with regard to aggravating circumstancesis constitutionally required.

Under Texas law, Mr. Buck could only be sentenced to death if his jury concluded that he was likely to be dangerous in the future. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann, art. 37.071 (West 2013). Thus, to avoid a death sentence, any and all defense witnesses should have offered testimony addressing how unlikely it was that Mr. Buck would pose a danger in the future.

(See Reynolds v. Sims (1964) 377 U.S. 533, 565; U.S. Const., 14" Amend.; Cal. Const., art. I, § 7.) Becausecapital defendants are entitled under the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to more rigorous protections than those afforded non-capital defendants (see Harmelin v. Michigan, supra, 501 U.S.at 994), and since providing more protection to a noncapital defendant than a capital (1982); S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-20(c) (Law. Co-op. 1992); Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204(g) (1993); Tex. Crim. Proc. Code Ann. § 37.071 (West 1993).) 198 defendant would violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment(see, e.g., Myers v. Ylst, supra, 897 F.2d at 421), it follows that the sentencer in a capital case is constitutionally required to identify for the record in some fashion the aggravating and mitigating circumstances found and rejected.

See Acts 2001, 77th Leg., ch. 585 (amending Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 37.071 to provide that “…evidence may not be offered by the state to establish that the race or ethnicity of the defendant makes it likely that the defendant will engage in future criminal conduct.”).