(a) General rule.--Express warranties by the seller are created as follows:
(1) Any affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller to the buyer which relates to the goods and becomes part of the basis of the bargain creates an express warranty that the goods shall conform to the affirmation or promise.
(2) Any description of the goods which is made part of the basis of the bargain creates an express warranty that the goods shall conform to the description.
(3) Any sample or model which is made part of the basis of the bargain creates an express warranty that the whole of the goods shall conform to the sample or model.
(b) Formal words or specific intent unnecessary.--It is not necessary to the creation of an express warranty that the seller use formal words such as “warrant” or “guarantee” or that he have a specific intention to make a warranty, but an affirmation merely of the value of the goods or a statement purporting to be merely the opinion of the seller or commendation of the goods does not create a warranty.
Credits 1979, Nov. 1, P.L. 255, No. 86, § 1, effective Jan. 1, 1980. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE COMMENT Prior Uniform Statutory Provision: Sections 12, 14 and 16, Uniform Sales Act. Changes: Rewritten. Purposes of Changes: To consolidate and systematize basic principles with the result that: 1. “Express” warranties rest on “dickered” aspects of the individual bargain, and go so clearly to the essence of that bargain that words of disclaimer in a form are repugnant to the basic dickered terms. “Implied” warranties rest so clearly on a common factual situation or set of conditions that no particular language or action is necessary to evidence them and they will arise in such a situation unless unmistakably negated. This section reverts to the older case law insofar as the warranties of description and sample are designated “express” rather than “implied”. 2. Although this section is limited in its scope and direct purpose to warranties made by the seller to the buyer as part of a contract for sale, the warranty sections of this Article are not designed in any way to disturb those lines of case law growth which have recognized that warranties need not be confined either to sales contracts or to the direct parties to such a contract. They may arise in other appropriate circumstances such as in the case of bailments for hire, whether such bailment is itself the main contract or is merely a supplying of containers under a contract for the sale of their contents. The provisions of Section 2-318 on third party beneficiaries expressly recognize this case law development within one particular area. Beyond that, the matter is left to the case law with the intention that the policies of this Act may offer useful guidance in dealing with further cases as they arise. 3. The present section deals with affirmations of fact by the seller, descriptions of the goods or exhibitions of samples, exactly as any other part of a negotiation which ends in a contract is dealt with. No specific intention to make a warranty is necessary if any of these factors is made part of the basis of the bargain. In actual practice affirmations of fact made by the seller about the goods during a bargain are regarded as part of the description of those goods; hence no particular reliance on such statements need be shown in order to weave them into the fabric of the agreement. Rather, any fact which is to take such affirmations, once made, out of the agreement requires clear affirmative proof. The issue normally is one of fact. 4. In view of the principle that the whole purpose of the law of warranty is to determine what it is that the seller has in essence agreed to sell, the policy is adopted of those cases which refuse except in unusual circumstances to recognize a material deletion of the seller's obligation. Thus, a contract is normally a contract for a sale of something describable and described. A clause generally disclaiming “all warranties, express or implied” cannot reduce the seller's obligation with respect to such description and therefore cannot be given literal effect under Section 2-316. This is not intended to mean that the parties, if they consciously desire, cannot make their own bargain as they wish. But in determining what they have agreed upon good faith is a factor and consideration should be given to the fact that the probability is small that a real price is intended to be exchanged for a pseudo-obligation. 5. Paragraph (1)(b) makes specific some of the principles set forth above when a description of the goods is given by the seller. A description need not be by words. Technical specifications, blueprints and the like can afford more exact description than mere language and if made part of the basis of the bargain goods must conform with them. Past deliveries may set the description of quality, either expressly or impliedly by course of dealing. Of course, all descriptions by merchants must be read against the applicable trade usages with the general rules as to merchantability resolving any doubts. 6. The basic situation as to statements affecting the true essence of the bargain is no different when a sample or model is involved in the transaction. This section includes both a “sample” actually drawn from the bulk of goods which is the subject matter of the sale, and a “model” which is offered for inspection when the subject matter is not at hand and which has not been drawn from the bulk of the goods. Although the underlying principles are unchanged, the facts are often ambiguous when something is shown as illustrative, rather than as a straight sample. In general, the presumption is that any sample or model just as any affirmation of fact is intended to become a basis of the bargain. But there is no escape from the question of fact. When the seller exhibits a sample purporting to be drawn from an existing bulk, good faith of course requires that the sample be fairly drawn. But in mercantile experience the mere exhibition of a “sample” does not of itself show whether it is merely intended to “suggest” or to “be” the character of the subject-matter of the contract. The question is whether the seller has so acted with reference to the sample as to make him responsible that the whole shall have at least the values shown by it. The circumstances aid in answering this question. If the sample has been drawn from an existing bulk, it must be regarded as describing values of the goods contracted for unless it is accompanied by an unmistakable denial of such responsibility. If, on the other hand, a model of merchandise not on hand is offered, the mercantile presumption that it has become a literal description of the subject matter is not so strong, and particularly so if modification on the buyer's initiative impairs any feature of the model. 7. The precise time when words of description or affirmation are made or samples are shown is not material. The sole question is whether the language or samples or models are fairly to be regarded as part of the contract. If language is used after the closing of the deal (as when the buyer when taking delivery asks and receives an additional assurance), the warranty becomes a modification, and need not be supported by consideration if it is otherwise reasonable and in order (Section 2-209). 8. Concerning affirmations of value or a seller's opinion or commendation under subsection (2), the basic question remains the same: What statements of the seller have in the circumstances and in objective judgment become part of the basis of the bargain? As indicated above, all of the statements of the seller do so unless good reason is shown to the contrary. The provisions of subsection (2) are included, however, since common experience discloses that some statements or predictions cannot fairly be viewed as entering into the bargain. Even as to false statements of value, however, the possibility is left open that a remedy may be provided by the law relating to fraud or misrepresentation. Cross References: Point 1: Section 2-316. Point 2: Sections 1-102(3) and 2-318. Point 3: Section 2-316(2)(b). Point 4: Section 2-316. Point 5: Sections 1-205(4) and 2-314. Point 6: Section 2-316. Point 7: Section 2-209. Point 8: Section 1-103. Definitional Cross References: “Buyer”. Section 2-103. “Conforming”. Section 2-106. “Goods”. Section 2-105. “Seller”. Section 2-103. JT. ST. GOVT. COMM. COMMENT--1952 (1) Express Warranties: Scope and Terminology. In addition to including affirmations and promises as “express” warranties, the Code treats as “express” warranties descriptions of the goods and use of samples or models. Cf. Uniform Sales Act §§ 14 and 16, 69 P.S. §§ 123, 125 (repealed). (a) Affirmations and Promises. Subsection (1)(a), in giving both affirmations and promises the effect of warranties, is in accord with § 12 of the Uniform Sales Act, 69 P.S. § 121 (repealed). See: Montgomery Foundry & Fittings Co. v. Hall Planetary etc. Co., 282 Pa. 212, 127 Atl. 633 (1925). A narrower rule was in effect in Pennsylvania before adoption of the Uniform Sales Act. McAllister v. Morgan, 29 Pa.Super.Ct. 476 (1905); Pyott v. Baltz, 38 Pa.Super.Ct. 608 (1909); McFarland v. Newman, 9 Watts 55 (1839) (liability based on “intent to be bound”). (b) Descriptions. Subsection 1(b) is comparable to § 14 of the Uniform Sales Act, 69 P.S. § 123 (repealed), in treating descriptions of the goods as warranties, although in the Code they are termed “express” rather than “implied.” Brown & Co. v. Standard Hide Co., 301 Pa. 543, 152 Atl. 557 (1930) (court pointed to relation between express warranty and description). (c) Sample or Model. Subsection (1)(c) is comparable to § 16 of the Uniform Sales Act, 69 P.S. § 125 (repealed), under which, in the case of a sale by sample, there was a warranty that the bulk corresponded with the sample. Holmes v. Cameron, 267 Pa. 90, 110 Atl. 81 (1920) (seller liable though error made in showing sample); Irwin Gas Coal Co. v. Logan Coal Co., 270 Pa. 443, 113 Atl. 667 (1921); see Andrea, Inc. v. Dodge, 15 F.2d 1003 (3d Cir.1926) (Pa.Dist.). Materiality of Affirmation, Promise, Description, Sample. Under the Code, the qualification that affirmations, etc. create a warranty if made “as a basis of” the bargain, appears to be substantially the same as the “reliance” qualification in § 12 of the Uniform Sales Act, 69 P.S. § 121 (repealed). (2) Formal Words Not Necessary. Subsection (2) rendering formal words unnecessary is in accord with § 12 of the Uniform Sales Act, 69 P.S. § 121, repealed (warranties may arise from “any” affirmation or promise). Statements of Value or Opinion. The qualification as to statements of “value” rephrases but does not appear materially to change § 12 of the Uniform Sales Act, 69 P.S. § 121 (repealed). See: Madison-Kipp Corp. v. Price Battery Corp., 311 Pa. 22, 166 Atl. 377 (1933) (“economy, accuracy and high speed production”); North Co. v. Binney, 25 Del. 388 (1935); Klerlein v. Werner, 307 Pa. 16, 160 Atl. 719 (1932) (net value of business; value rule applied to sale of stock). HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES Uniform Law: This section is similar to § 2-313 of the Uniform Commercial Code. See Uniform Laws Annotated, Master Edition, or Uniform Laws Annotated on Westlaw. Prior Laws: 1959, Oct. 2, P.L. 1023, § 2. 1953, April 6, P.L. 3, § 2-313 (12A P.S. § 2-313). 13 Pa.C.S.A. § 2313, PA ST 13 Pa.C.S.A. § 2313 Current through 2018 Regular Session Act 16