Section 750.316 - First degree murder; incarceration order upon conviction; penalty; definitions

8 Analyses of this statute by attorneys

  1. COA: Jury must determine sentence for juvenile homicide offenders facing the possibility of life without parole

    Warner Norcross & Judd LLPMadelaine LaneAugust 24, 2015

    In doing so, the court held that MCL 769.25 violated the Sixth Amendment because it authorizes a judge to sentence a juvenile offender to life in prison without parole based on judicially-found facts. The defendant was convicted by a jury of first-degree premeditated murder, MCL 750.316(1)(a), attempted murder, MCL 750.91, and conspiracy to commit murder, MCL 750.157a, stemming from her orchestration of a brutal stabbing attack on her parents that occurred when she was seventeen. Her father died in the attack, but her mother survived.

  2. MSC: The prosecution has an affirmative duty to correct false testimony

    Warner Norcross & Judd LLPMatthew NelsonAugust 6, 2015

    In People v. Smith, No. 148305, the Michigan Supreme Court granted defendant’s application for leave to appeal on whether a prosecutor’s failure to correct false testimony violated the defendant’s due-process rights and a delay of trial for 41 months violated the defendant’s speedy-trial right. The Court held that the defendant was entitled to a new trial because the prosecutor had an affirmative duty to correct false testimony in seeking a conviction, but concluded that the defendant did not show sufficient prejudice to merit dismissal for a violation of his right to a speedy trial. The defendant was convicted of armed robbery, MCL 750.529 and first-degree felony murder, MCL 750.316(1)(B). One of the prosecutor’s witnesses, Mark Yancy, falsely testified that he had not been paid for his cooperation in relation to defendant’s case.

  3. MSC grants mini-oral argument on whether jury should have been instructed on second-degree child abuse in child death case

    Warner Norcross & Judd LLPMadelaine LaneJune 5, 2015

    In People v. Burks, No. 150857, the Michigan Supreme Court granted oral argument on the application for leave to appeal to decide if it should consider whether the trial court should have instructed the jury on second-degree child abuse, rather than first-degree child abuse alone, where the defense argued the death resulted from reckless conduct. Defendant Burks was convicted of felony murder, MCL 750.316, and first-degree child abuse, MCL 750.136b(2), for the death of his six-month-old son. At trial, defendant testified that he had accidentally rolled over on the baby, then given him CPR after the baby had difficulty breathing, then put him in the bath and given him CPR again.

  4. MSC holds that, for the purposes of mandatory life without parole, people turn eighteen on their eighteenth birthdays and not the day before as in common law

    Warner Norcross & Judd LLPMadelaine LaneDecember 3, 2014

    In People v. Woolfolk, No. 149127, the Michigan Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals’ decision that for the purposes of sentencing, age is to be determined by the anniversary of birth, rather than the day before in accordance with the common law. In 2007, the defendant was convicted of first-degree murder, MCL 750.316, after a fatal shooting that took place between 10:00 and 11:00 p.m. on the day before his eighteenth birthday. He was sentenced to mandatory life in prison without the possibility of parole.

  5. MSC grants mini-oral argument on whether failure to investigate use of expert testimony constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel

    Warner Norcross & Judd LLPMadelaine LaneDecember 2, 2014

    The court directed the parties to file supplemental briefs on whether the defendant was denied the effective assistance of counsel because his trial counsel failed to investigate the possibility of using expert testimony on behalf of the defendant. After a jury trial, the defendant was convicted of first-degree felony murder, MCL 750.316(b), and first-degree child abuse, MCL 750.136b(2), stemming from the death of his girlfriend’s three-year-old daughter because of a brain injury suffered while under his care. At trial, the defense argued that the girl fell out of bed. Defendant’s counsel consulted with one expert doctor, who told him that he did not believe the child’s injury could have been caused by falling out of bed and that he should consult another expert for testimony, although he still advised defense counsel on ways to attack the prosecution’s case.

  6. COA holds that evidence of prior thefts and Y-chromosome DNA evidence were admissible in murder trial

    Warner Norcross & Judd LLPMadelaine LaneNovember 5, 2014

    In People v. Wood, No. 315379, the Michigan Court of Appeals rejected numerous claims of error and affirmed the defendant’s convictions of alternative counts of first degree premeditated murder and felony murder, MCL 750.316(1)(a) and (b), larceny in a building, MCL 750.360, and possessing or using a stolen financial transaction device, MCL 750.157n(1). Specifically, the court ruled that the trial court did not err in allowing admission of 404(b)(1) evidence of defendant’s prior thefts from elderly women.

  7. Felony Murder, Adult Abuse as Predicate

    Tieber Law OfficeF. Martin TieberOctober 30, 2012

    The Court of Appeals disagreed, and held that the felony murder statute requires either first OR second degree to be proven – not both. The language of MCL 750.316(1)(b) states, “vulnerable adult abuse in the first and second degree under section 145n,” as being a possible predicate felony for felony murder. The defendant claims that because the statute uses “and” instead of “or” as it does in other instances, the legislature must have meant that both degrees of vulnerable adult abuse must be proven.

  8. Murder, Failure to Define

    Tieber Law OfficeF. Martin TieberDecember 30, 2010

    People v Mesick,__ Mich App __; __ NW2d __ (No. 282088, September 10, 2009)(sep'09).The failure of Michigan legislation to define "murder" does not render MCL 750.316 unconstitutional. The court held that "[w]e find nothing vague about what conduct is prohibited by the statute."