The speed of Wolverine’s trades is not public information, and this information could only have been improperly obtained by Edge through Griffith’s and O’Donnell’s misuse of their positions at the CBOE. Because Wolverine’s state law counterclaims concern the misuse and misappropriation of the same information forming the basis of Edge’s patent infringement allegations, the state law counterclaims and patent infringement claims derive from the same nucleus of operative facts.4 CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, Wolverine respectfully requests that this Court find that it has jurisdiction over Wolverine’s counterclaims of unjust enrichment, misuse of confidential information, common law unfair competition, unfair competition under 815 ILCS 505/1 et al., 4 Although Edge entitled their Motion to Dismiss, “Motion to Dismiss Defendant Wolverine’s State Law and Inequitable Conduct Counterclaims and Affirmative Defenses”, Edge’s supporting memorandum contained no arguments relating to Wolverine’s affirmative defenses, and therefore Edge has waived any argument against Wolverine’s affirmative defenses. Case: 1:09-cv-01521 Document #: 180 Filed: 05/25/11 Page 15 of 17 PageID #:7538 15 and inequitable conduct, that it find that these counterclaims are not preempted by the Illinois Trade Secrets Act, and that it find these counterclaims state a claim for relief.

Plaintiff Velazquez alleges that she “was forced to pay Securus unjust, unreasonable, unfair and/or deceptive amounts for intrastate phone calls within Illinois[.]” Am. Compl. ¶ 4. She lodges two claims on behalf of herself and putative classes: Unjust Enrichment (id. ¶¶ 43- 48); and violation of the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act, 815 ILCS 505/1, et seq. (“Illinois CFA”) (id. ¶¶ 62-75). LEGAL STANDARD “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Magee v. Trustees of Hamline Univ., 747 F.3d 532, 535 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “A claim has facial plausibility when the pleaded factual content allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”

ade Practices Act (Fla. Stat. § 501.201 et seq.), (14) breach of express warranty (Fla. Stat. § 672.313), (15) breach of implied warranty of merchantability (Fla. Stat. § 672.314), (16) violation of Georgia’s Fair Business Practices Act (Ga. Code Ann. § 10-1-390 et seq.), (17) Case 8:16-cv-00966-BRO-SS Document 47-1 Filed 11/28/16 Page 14 of 32 Page ID #:721 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 4813-4318-1629.10 7 8:16-cv-00966-BRO-SS MEMORANDUM OF POINTS & AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF BMW OF NORTH AMERICA, LLC’S MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS’ CONSOLIDATED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT LEWIS BRISBOIS BISGAARD &SMITHLLP ATTORNEYS AT LAW violation of Georgia’s Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act (Ga. Code Ann. § 10-1- 370 et seq.), (18) breach of express warranty (Ga. Code Ann. § 11-2-313), (19) breach of implied warranty of merchantability (Ga. Code Ann. § 11-2-314), (20) violation of the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act (815 ILCS 505/1 et seq. & 720 ILCS 295/1A), (21) breach of express warranty (810 Ill. Comp. Stat 5/2- 313), (22) breach of implied warranty of merchantability (810 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/2-314 & 5/2A-212), (23) violation of the Michigan Consumer Protection Act (Mich. Comp. Laws § 445.903 et seq.), (24) breach of express warranty (M.C.L.A. 440.2313 and 440.2860), (25) breach of implied warranty of merchantability (Mich. Comp. Laws § 440.2314), (26) violations of the Consumer Sales Practices Act (Ohio Rev. Code § 1345.01 et seq.), (27) breach of express warranty (Ohio Rev. Code § 1302.26 (U.C.C. § 2-313)), (28) breach of implied warranty of merchantability (Ohio Rev. Code § 1302.27 (U.C.C. § 2-314)), (29) violation of Tennessee Consumer Protection Act (Tenn. Code § 47-18-101 et seq.), (30) breach of express warranty (Tenn. Code § 47-2-313), (31) breach of implied warranty of merchantability (Tenn. Code § 47-2-314), (32) violations of the Deceptive Trade Practices Act (Tex. Bus. & Com. Code § 17.41 et seq.)

Penal Code § 319 (on behalf of all Plaintiffs), (iii) violation of Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 (the “UCL”) (on behalf of all Plaintiffs), (iv) violation of 720 ILCS 5/28-8 (the “Illinois LRA”) (on behalf of Soto), (v) violation 815 ILCS 525/40 (the “Illinois Prizes Act”) (on behalf of Soto), (vi) violation of 815 ILCS § 505/1 (the “ICFA”) (on behalf of Soto), (vii) unjust enrichment (on behalf of Soto), (viii) violation of MCL § 600.2939 (the “Michigan LRA”) (on behalf of Exelby) and (ix) unjust enrichment (on behalf of Exelby).

On June 2, 2016, Kia was sued in a purported class action in the Central District of California concerning engine lubrication issues with the 2011-2014 model year Optima, 2011-2014 Sportage, and 2012-2014 Sorento. That action, Wallis v. Kia Motors America, Case No. 8:16-cv-01033-AG-DFM, asserted claims under the CLRA, UCL, California False Advertising Law (Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17500, et seq.); Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Trade Practices Act (815 ILCS 505/1 et seq.); and for breach of warranty.2 Kia notified owners of the 2011-2014 Optima that it was extending the warranty coverage for the “short block” engine assembly to 10 years starting from 1

On June 26, 2017, Plaintiffs filed their FAC against Lumber Liquidators. ECF No. 171; see generally, FAC. The FAC asserts the following eight causes of action: (1) violation of the Consumer Legal Remedies Act (“CLRA”); (2) violation of California Business and Professions Code § 17200 et seq. under the unlawful business practice prong (“UCL”); (3) violation of California Business and Professions Code § 17200 et seq. under the unfair business practice prong (“UCL”); (4) violation of the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act, 815 Ill. Comp. Stat. 505/1 et seq. (“CFA”); (5) violation of Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices & Consumer Protection Law, 73 P.S. § 201 et seq.; (6) violation of Minnesota Consumer Fraud Act, M.S.A. § 325F.68 et seq.; (7) violation of West Virginia’s Consumer Credit and Protection Act, W. Va. Code §§ 46A-6 et seq.; and (8) violation of Florida’s Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act, Fla. Stat. § 501.201 et seq. (“FDUTPA”). Id. In addition, the FAC seeks to certify five (5) non-California subclasses, consisting of class members who reside outside of California.

901, et seq.; (10) Violation of the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act (“FDUTPA”), Fla. Stat. §§ 501.201, et seq.; (11) Violation of New York Gen. Bus. Law § 349; (12) Violation of New York Gen. Bus. Law § 350; (13) Violation of the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Practices Act, 815 Ill. Comp. Stat. §§ 505/1, et seq.; (14) Violation of the Missouri Merchandising Practices Act, Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 407.010, et seq.; (15) Violation of the Oklahoma Consumer Protection Act, Okla. Stat.

Compensable injury or damages is a required element for each of Plaintiff’s causes of action. See, e.g., Frye v. L’Oreal USA, Inc., 583 F. Supp. 2d 954, 957, 959 (N.D. Ill. 2008) (Gettleman, J.) (Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act, 815 Ill. Comp. Stat. 505/1, et seq. (“CFA”), negligence per se, and unjust enrichment); Cooney v. Chicago Pub. Schs., 943 N.E.2d 23, 27, 31 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010) (the CFA, negligence and negligence per se); Barille v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 682 N.E.2d 118, 121 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997) (breach of implied contract).

et seq., because Plaintiffs fail to allege that CVS committed any of the practices “specifically enumerated” in Tex. Bus. & Com. Code § 17.46(b) or any “unconscionable action or course of action,” id. § 17.50(a)(1)? 13. Does the SAC fail to state a class action claim under the Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act, Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1345.01 et seq., because Plaintiffs fail to allege CVS was on notice that its conduct was deceptive or unconscionable at the time it committed the alleged acts? 14. Does the SAC fail to allege “deceptive” or “unfair” conduct by CVS, as required to state a claim under the Arizona Consumer Fraud Act, Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 44-1521 et seq.; California Unfair Competition Law, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 et seq.; District of Columbia Consumer Protection Procedures Act, D.C. Code Ann. §28-3901 et seq.; Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act, Fla. Stat. Ann. § 501.201 et seq.; Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act, 815 ILCS 505/1 et seq.; Maryland Consumer Protection Act, Md. Code Ann., Com. Law § 13-101 et seq.; Massachusetts Consumer Protection Act, Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 93A; New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 56:8 et seq.; New York Consumer Protection Law, N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349 et seq.; Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act, Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1345.01 et seq.; Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law, 73 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 201-1 et seq.; and Rhode Island Deceptive Trade Practices Act, 6 R.I. Gen. Laws § 13.1-1 et seq.? Case 4:15-cv-03504-YGR Document 56 Filed 12/04/15 Page 14 of 39 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 - 1 -

1 In their First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), Plaintiffs allege causes of action for (1) recovery under the Illinois Loss Recovery Statute, 720 ILCS 5/28-8(a) (“ILRS”); (2) recovery under the Michigan Loss Recovery Statute, MCL § 600.2939 (“MLRS”); (3) recovery under the Illinois Prizes and Gifts Act, 815 ILCS 525/40 (“Prize Act”); (4) violation of California’s Unfair Competition Law, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200, et seq., (“UCL”) by way of violations of both California Penal Code (“Penal Code”) § 330b and § 319; (5) violations of the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act, 815 ILCS §§ 505/1, et seq. (“ICFA”) by way of violations of the Prize Act and 720 ILCS 5/28-2(a); and (6) unjust enrichment under the laws of Illinois and Michigan. Case: 1:15-cv-04768 Document #: 26 Filed: 09/29/15 Page 8 of 34 PageID #:568 2 IGG argues further that it was not the proximate cause of Plaintiffs’ damages because IGG’s transactions with Plaintiffs concluded immediately after their purchase of Gems, not after their subsequent wagering of the Gems.