Conn. Gen. Stat. § 31-349
The fact that an employee has suffered a previous disability, shall not preclude him from compensation for a second injury, nor preclude compensation for death resulting from the second injury. If an employee having a previous disability incurs a second disability from a second injury resulting in a permanent disability caused by both the previous disability and the second injury which is materially and substantially greater than the disability that would have resulted from the second injury alone, he shall receive compensation for (1) the entire amount of disability, including total disability, less any compensation payable or paid with respect to the previous disability, and (2) necessary medical care, as provided in this chapter, notwithstanding the fact that part of the disability was due to a previous disability. For purposes of this section, "compensation payable or paid with respect to the previous disability" includes compensation payable or paid pursuant to the provisions of this chapter, as well as any other compensation payable or paid in connection with the previous disability, regardless of the source of such compensation.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 31-349
(1949 Rev., S. 7489; 1949, 1951, 1953, S. 3053d; September, 1957, P.A. 13, S. 6; 1958 Rev., S. 31-216; 1959, P.A. 580, S. 11; 1961, P.A. 491, S. 75; 1967, P.A. 842, S. 20; 1969, P.A. 696, S. 14; 1971, P.A. 447, S. 1; P.A. 79-376, S. 80; P.A. 81-464, S. 2; P.A. 82-398, S. 6; 82-472, S. 109, 183; P.A. 86-31; P.A. 88-40, S. 1, 2; 88-47, S. 1; P.A. 89-66, S. 1, 2; P.A. 90-116, S. 7; 90-327, S. 2, 3; P.A. 91-32 , S. 35 , 41 ; 91-339 , S. 36 , 55 ; P.A. 93-228 , S. 24 , 35 ; 93-429 , S. 2 , 7 ; P.A. 95-277 , S. 3 , 19 ; P.A. 96-242 , S. 1 , 10 .)
Cited. 150 C. 156 . "Second Injury Fund", legislative history and purpose discussed; phrase "permanent physical impairment" construed to include decedent's heart disease, although that disease had neither manifested itself so as to be a hindrance to obtaining employment nor come to the attention of the employer. 166 C. 352 . Second Injury Fund assumes responsibility for compensation and medical treatment only when preexisting impairment contributes materially and substantially to permanent disability. 171 Conn. 577 . Cited. 174 C. 181 ; 218 Conn. 9 ; 222 C. 78 ; 223 Conn. 336 . Phrase "one-hundred-four-week period" refers to time period of claimant's disability. 224 Conn. 382 . Cited. 226 Conn. 569 ; 227 Conn. 333 . Interpretation of "compensation" discussed. 231 Conn. 287 . Cited. Id., 469; 232 Conn. 311 ; 233 Conn. 14 ; Id., 243; 235 C. 778 ; Id., 790; 237 Conn. 259 ; Id., 490; 241 Conn. 282 . Limitations provision in Subsec. (b) and re-notification provision of Subsec. (e) do not violate contract or due process clause of U.S. Constitution because premise that second injury fund had contractual relationship with employees, employers and insurers is unsustainable. 248 C. 466 . Section requires employer at time of claimant's second injury to accept liability for all compensation benefits due claimant for a period of 104 weeks, and thereafter, requires fund to accept liability for all benefits due claimant for the combined injuries. Id., 635. Legislature intended amendment to section, contained in P.A. 95-277 , to remove fund's obligation to reimburse employers on or after July 1, 1995. 250 C. 753 . Cited. 6 Conn.App. 45 . Notification provision relating to a fatality is mandatory. 15 CA 625 , 627. Cited. 27 Conn.App. 699 ; 37 CA 131 ; 41 CA 231 ; 4 2 Conn.App. 1 47; 43 CA 732 ; Id., 737; 45 Conn.App. 324 ; Id., 448; 46 Conn.App. 346 . Where employee has suffered two separate injuries that result in total disability, fund is liable only for the portion of disability attributable to the second injury. 48 CA 474 . "Disability", as used in section, connotes medical impairment. 76 CA 563 . Employee's permanent disability met standard in section, and therefore may not be apportioned under statutory gap remedy set forth in 288 C. 303 . 146 CA 154 . Cited. 37 CS 742 . Subsec. (a): "Compensation benefits" refers only to compensation under act. 223 Conn. 336 . For purposes of calculating 104-week period in which notice must be given, "disability" refers to claimant's degree of medical impairment, rather than inability to work or loss of earning capacity. 243 C. 513 . Subsec. provides compensation for any injury that combines with a preexisting nonoccupational or noncompensable disability to materially increase claimant's overall impairment. 315 C. 543 . Disability refers to physical impairment, not capacity for employment. 59 CA 565 . Subsec. (b): Cited. 38 Conn.App. 1 75. Employer's insurer was excused from complying with statutory notice requirements for transfer of liability to Second Injury Fund where evidence showed that employer was defunct and that insurer was unable to obtain wage information necessary for strict compliance with statute. 52 CA 819 . Employer and insurance company did not give timely notice of their intent to transfer liability to the fund because period of plaintiff's disability began on the day he was injured rather than on the day he sought medical care for the injuries or the day he underwent surgeries for the injuries. 67 CA 385 . Appeal dismissed as moot; notice filed was timely but not proper. 69 CA 385 . A person can be disabled for purposes of section even though such person can carry on all aspects of the employment. 73 CA 523 . Subsec. (d): With passage of section, legislature rebutted any presumption in favor of prospective only application of Sec. 31-349c . 241 Conn. 282 . Apportionment is not an available form of relief for second injury employer or its insurer under Subsec. 263 Conn. 279 . Subsec. (e): Re-notification clause in Subsec. does not violate contract or due process clause of U.S. Constitution because no showing under circumstances of case that legislature, in establishing Second Injury Fund, entered into a contract with employees, employers and insurers. 248 C. 457 . Renotice letter was timely where town sent it by certified mail on September 28, 1995 and fund received it on October 2, 1995. 67 CA 276 .