Conn. Gen. Stat. § 17a-112
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 17a-112
(1959, P.A. 184, S. 1; February, 1965, P.A. 488, S. 9; P.A. 73-156, S. 4; P.A. 74-164, S. 3, 20; P.A. 75-420, S. 4, 6; P.A. 76-226; 76-436, S. 589, 681; P.A. 77-452, S. 7, 72; P.A. 82-202, S. 1; P.A. 83-355, S. 2; 83-387, S. 1; 83-478, S. 1; P.A. 84-449, S. 1, 7; P.A. 87-555, S. 1; P.A. 93-91, S. 1, 2; 93-193, S. 1; P.A. 94-81, S. 1; P.A. 95-238, S. 3; P.A. 96-130, S. 39; 96-246, S. 18; P.A. 98-241, S. 8, 18; P.A. 99-166, S. 4; P.A. 00-75, S. 1; 00-137, S. 1; 00-196, S. 15; P.A. 01-159, S. 3; 01-195, S. 21, 22, 181; P.A. 03-243, S. 1; P.A. 06-102, S. 7, 8; P.A. 15-159, S. 1; P.A. 16-28, S. 15; 16-70, S. 1; 16-105, S. 1, 2.)
Annotations to former section 17-43a: Cited. 165 C. 435, 436; 168 C. 421. Statute requires establishing the complete absence of an ongoing relationship. 177 Conn. 648. Cited. 179 Conn. 155; 181 C. 638; 182 C. 545; 183 C. 11; 187 Conn. 431; 188 C. 259. Due process requires proof of allegations by clear and convincing evidence rather than the preponderance of evidence standard of proof. 189 C. 58. Cited. Id., 66; Id., 276. Principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel as applied to petitions to terminate parental rights discussed. 190 C. 310. Cited. 194 C. 252; 195 Conn. 344; 196 Conn. 18; 210 C. 157; 215 Conn. 31; Id., 277; 217 Conn. 459. Cited. 1 CA 298; Id., 463; 2 CA 705; 3 CA 30; 4 CA 653; 6 CA 194; Id., 360; 9 CA 506; Id., 598; Id., 608; 10 CA 36; 11 CA 497; Id., 507; 13 CA 23; Id., 91; Id., 605; Id., 626; 15 CA 367; 16 CA 693; 18 CA 806; 19 CA 20; Id., 371; 20 CA 228; Id., 725; 23 CA 207; 24 CA 135; Id., 338. Where statutory requirements are met, a mother's prenatal conduct can be basis of a finding of neglect or termination of parental rights. 25 Conn.App. 586; judgment reversed, see 223 Conn. 492. Cited. 26 CA 414; 29 CA 112; Id., 600; 30 CA 839. Cited. 31 CS 271; 41 Conn.Supp. 23; Id., 145. Subsec. (a): Subdiv. (3): Termination of parental rights and relation thereto of adoptability of minor child discussed. 189 C. 66. Failure to rehabilitate cited; no ongoing parent-child relationship cited. 194 Conn. 252. Cited. 217 Conn. 459. Subsec. (b): Simultaneous hearing under statute not violation of due process rights on its face and as applied. 179 Conn. 155. Cited. 201 C. 229. Subdiv. (2): Court dismissed as not proven alternate ground for termination of parental rights where parents have failed to achieve a degree of personal rehabilitation that would allow them to assume a responsible position in their child's life; the dismissal of this alternate ground was not at issue in case. 2 Conn.App. 705, 707. Subdiv. (4): No ongoing parent-child relationship discussed. Id., 705. Cited. 3 CA 194; Id., 507; 9 CA 490; 15 CA 455; 22 Conn.App. 656; 24 CA 338; 30 Conn.App. 839; 35 CA 490; 38 CA 214. Annotations to present section: Cited. 223 Conn. 492. Court held legislature intended provisions of Sec. 52-212a and this section to coexist so Superior Court has limited jurisdiction to open judgment for termination of parental rights for 4 months after its rendering but not thereafter in absence of waiver of consent. 224 Conn. 263. Cited. 229 C. 345; 234 C. 194. Commissioner not required to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that reasonable efforts were made to reunite parent with children as a predicate to terminating parental rights; provision requiring commissioner to make reasonable efforts to reunite parent and child does not apply retroactively. 250 C. 674. In order to terminate a parent's parental rights under section, petitioner required to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that department has made reasonable efforts to reunify family, termination is in best interest of child, and there exists any of the 7 grounds for termination delineated in Subsec. (j)(3). 268 C. 614. A child has standing to appeal from termination of parental rights because the rights of the child are inextricably intertwined with those of the parent. 290 C. 131. Section requires the department to make reasonable efforts at reunification, including taking the parent's mental condition into consideration, and failure to provide adequate services because of the parent's mental condition would violate section and the Americans with Disabilities Act. 326 C. 480. Where statutory requirements are met, a mother's prenatal conduct can be basis of a finding of neglect or termination of parental rights. 25 Conn.App. 586; judgment reversed, see 223 Conn. 492. Cited. 26 Conn.App. 58; Id., 414; 28 CA 247; 29 Conn.App. 112; Id., 600; 30 Conn.App. 839; 35 CA 276; Id., 490; 40 CA 366; 46 Conn.App. 69. Jurisdiction for terminating parental rights lies either in Probate Court or Superior Court pursuant to this section and Sec. 45a-715(a) and (g); administrative hearing officer in department has no authority to hear or determine a petition for termination of parental rights; there is no statutory requirement that department file a treatment plan as condition precedent to filing of a termination petition; in a termination proceeding, burden is on department to prove by clear and convincing evidence that sufficient grounds exist for termination and that termination would serve the best interests of the child. 49 Conn.App. 706. Section requires trial court to analyze respondent's rehabilitative status as it relates to the needs of the particular child, and further, that such rehabilitation must be foreseeable within a reasonable time. Id., 763. Parent failed to achieve personal rehabilitation when, as of date of the petition, parent is unrecovered, active alcoholic and substance abuser, unable to provide for care and custody of the children, and termination of parental rights is in best interest of the children where trial court made specific findings regarding the seven statutory factors. 51 CA 446. Trial court did not err in finding the parent had not rehabilitated herself and could not assume a responsible position in the life of the child within a reasonable time. Id., 829. Res judicata does not bar reliance on provision authorizing termination of parental rights where a child has been found in prior proceeding to have been neglected. 52 CA 576. Burden of proof was not shifted to respondent father as to whether department made reasonable efforts to reunify him with the child because department made reasonable efforts specifically directed to respondent by offering him over the course of 3 years at least 6 services to facilitate reunification. 56 CA 776. 7 factors set forth in section serve simply as guidelines to court and are not statutory prerequisites that need to be proven by clear and convincing evidence before termination can be ordered. 60 CA 96. Use of clearly erroneous standard of review on appeal from a termination of parental rights proceeding does not deny respondent adequate procedural safeguards. 85 CA 528. Even when there is a finding of a bond between parent and a child, it still may be in child's best interest to terminate parental rights. 104 CA 744. Court properly found parents had failed to achieve sufficient rehabilitation. 105 CA 515. There is no requirement that a previously adjudicated child on whose behalf a petition to terminate parental rights is filed must have been in the custody of petitioner for any specific period of time before such petition may be filed. 139 CA 239. Determination of child's best interests occurs only after statutory grounds for termination of parental rights have been established by clear and convincing evidence, and it is improper for termination of parental rights to be grounded on finding that child's prospective home will be "better" than life with one or more biological parent. 154 CA 488. The interconnection among Subsecs. (j)(1), (j)(3) and (k) reveals a legislative intent that, in attempting to reunify the parent with the child pursuant to Subsec. (j)(1), the department must make reasonable efforts to assist the parent in addressing and overcoming the specific impediments preventing reunification, i.e., the statutory grounds advanced by the department pursuant to Subsec. (j)(3). 170 Conn.App. 833. Cited. 43 Conn.Supp. 108; 44 CS 101; Id., 169; Id., 551. Discussed. 45 CS 364. Subsec. (a): Authority to draft and sign petitions to terminate parental rights is not limited to attorneys. 247 Conn. 1. Cited. 40 Conn.App. 366. Subsec. (i) (former Subsec. (b)): Cited. 221 C. 903; 226 C. 917; 229 Conn. 345. Cited. 24 Conn.App. 338; 25 Conn.App. 536; Id., 741; 26 Conn.App. 58; 30 Conn.App. 839; 33 CA 12; 38 Conn.App. 214; 39 CA 353; 42 CA 664; 44 CA 80. Trial court properly found abandonment, that department did all it could to give respondent custody and did not shift the burden of permanency planning. 47 CA 124. Grounds of failure to achieve personal rehabilitation and nonaccidental or inadequately explained serious physical injury of child discussed. 49 CA 229. Cited. Id., 541. Subdiv. (2): Court properly granted coterminous petitions on basis of failure to achieve personal rehabilitation and a new adjudication of neglect was not required because court's reliance on prior adjudications of neglect was not improper. 63 CA 339. Subsec. (j) (former Subsec. (c)): Cited. 229 Conn. 345. Not unconstitutional as applied to termination of parental rights of an unfit mother upon proof by clear and convincing evidence that her child has been, among other things, uncared for. 270 C. 382. Even if the evidence had established that additional family therapy might have been beneficial, trial court's finding that department made reasonable efforts at reunification was not clearly erroneous. 290 Conn. 131. Under 2003 revision, department must prove either that it has made reasonable efforts to reunify parent and child or, alternatively, that the parent is unwilling or unable to benefit from reunification efforts. 293 C. 539. Where prior neglect adjudication must be opened, there was no longer any basis for trial court's finding that the children were neglected, regardless of whether parent raised claim on appeal, because court's finding was based on the prior neglect adjudication. 301 C. 345. A prior order of specific steps toward rehabilitation is required for any termination of parental rights grounded solely on a parent's failure to rehabilitate, except that, under the particular circumstances of this case, failure to provide specific steps constituted harmless error. 310 C. 485. It was necessary for the trial court to consider events subsequent to the filing of the petition for termination of parental rights when determining whether the department has made reasonable efforts to reunify child with respondent. 321 C. 523. Subdiv. (1): Finding of reunification efforts not required under section and Sec. 17a-111b is an independent basis on which to terminate parental rights. 322 Conn. 231. Department's failure to make reasonable modifications to its services, programs or activities to accommodate a parent's disability would likely preclude a finding under Subdiv. (1) that the department's reunification efforts were reasonable under the circumstances. 326 Conn. 480. Subdiv. (3)(C): "act or acts of parental commission or omission" includes both positively harmful actions of a parent and a parent's more passive failures to take action to prevent harm from occurring, and respondents' omissions, namely their failure over the course of three years to acknowledge the cause of the child's injuries and to take therapeutic steps that would prevent a similar tragedy from occurring in the future, clearly fell within the purview of Subpara. 327 C. 506. Cited. 30 Conn.App. 839; 49 CA 510. Resolution of whether termination petitions are appropriate requires a trial court to determine, inter alia, if termination of parental rights would serve best interests of the child. Id., 706. Trial court's determination that grounds existed to terminate respondent's parental rights was not clearly erroneous where trial court concluded that respondent's failure to believe child when confronted with child's account of incidents of abuse as well as with abuser's admission of abuse, and respondent's failure to protect child from further abuse, to utilize reunification services and to cooperate with police and department to ensure child's protection, constitute acts violative of Subdiv. (3)(C). Id., 763. Moving out of state relevant circumstance to determination of reasonable effort to reunite family. 50 CA 554. Provisions for granting a petition under Subsec. interpreted. 51 CA 595. "Reasonable efforts" in Subdiv. (1) defined and department required to take into consideration parent's mental condition when determining what "reasonable efforts" to make at reunification. 54 CA 463. Trial court properly found, with respect to Subdiv. (3)(D), that biological father of the minor child did not maintain an ongoing parent-child relationship and that to allow additional time for establishing such a relationship would be detrimental to the best interests of the minor child who had no positive memories of and negative feelings toward her father. 55 CA 807. Subdiv. (3): Abandonment focuses on parent's conduct and occurs where a parent fails to visit a child, does not display love or affection for the child, does not personally interact with the child and demonstrates no concern for the child's welfare; to "maintain" a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility implies a continuing, reasonable degree of concern and not a sporadic showing. 56 CA 12. As used in Subdiv. (3)(B), personal rehabilitation refers to restoration of a parent to his or her former constructive and useful role as a parent; Subdiv. (3)(B) is not void for vagueness; it provides fair warning of the conduct necessary for personal rehabilitation and provides minimum guidelines for enforcement. Id., 167. Failure to achieve rehabilitation must be proven by clear and convincing evidence, which is something more than preponderance of the evidence, required in neglect proceedings and in other civil cases, but something less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt, required in criminal cases; rehabilitation must be foreseeable within a reasonable time, which is a factual determination that must be made on case-by-case basis. Id., 688. "Personal rehabilitation" under Subdiv. (3)(B), revised to 1997, defined. 57 CA 441. Discussed re parent's failure to achieve sufficient personal rehabilitation and lack of an ongoing parent-child relationship; Appellate Court need only find one statutory basis to affirm decision to terminate parental rights. 58 CA 234. Father abandoned child within meaning of statute; claim is not valid that section is unconstitutionally void for vagueness because it fails to put an incarcerated parent on notice re how to prevent termination of parental rights; section does not violate double jeopardy clause of U.S. Constitution as applied to incarcerated parent. Id., 244. Subdiv. (3)(B) requires trial court to analyze respondent's rehabilitative status as it relates to needs of the child and such rehabilitation must be foreseeable within a reasonable time; trial court's finding that respondent failed to achieve sufficient personal rehabilitation was not clearly erroneous. 61 CA 19. Adjudication of neglect is not a prerequisite to order terminating parental rights on the basis of abandonment. Id., 185. Court did not abuse its discretion when it declined to apply Matthews v. Eldridge balancing test in denying respondent's motion to bifurcate termination hearing; Subsec. protects due process rights of respondent by requiring clear and convincing evidence in the adjudicatory phase. Id., 197. Evidence and standards re determination of degree of personal rehabilitation under Subdiv. (3)(B) in adjudicatory phase of termination proceedings discussed. Id., 224. Reasonable efforts, for purposes of Subdiv. (1), means doing everything reasonable, not everything possible; relative youth of respondent not an excuse in determination of failure to achieve personal rehabilitation under Subdiv. (3)(B). Id., 248. Department's act of offering mother substance abuse evaluation and treatment, parenting skill classes, domestic violence counseling, a family reunification program, a psychological evaluation and visitation constituted "reasonable efforts to locate the parent and to reunify the child with the parent"; trial court's determination to terminate parental rights based on failure to achieve sufficient personal rehabilitation affirmed. 62 CA 470. Father's claim under Subsec. is moot because father did not challenge court's finding that he was unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts, which finding satisfied the statute's first prong; case is distinguishable from In re Valerie D. because here it was the father's own conduct, not conduct of a third party, that prevented development of a relationship with his children. Id., 500. Subdiv. (3)(D): Trial court's conclusion that there was no ongoing parent-child relationship was factually supported by the record; evidence established that 9-year-old child had no present memories of or feelings for respondent father and had never known his father; court also found by clear and convincing evidence that it was not in child's best interest to allow further time to establish a parent-child relationship because child is very emotionally fragile and suffers from several disorders, has bonded with his maternal grandparents who are making progress with him, has a strong need for permanency and respondent father is unable to understand child's special needs. 63 CA 516. Lack of rehabilitation may be demonstrated by the length of time in which defendant waits to begin the first rehabilitative steps. 65 CA 538. Court properly based its decision on 217 Conn. 459 where respondent, rather than the state, created circumstances that caused and perpetuated the lack of an ongoing relationship between respondent and the child. 67 CA 417. Trial court's determination that department had made reasonable efforts to reunify respondent and her child was not clearly erroneous. 68 CA 342. Trial court improperly concluded that department's efforts to reunify respondent with minor child were reasonable under circumstances of case where department acknowledged that decision not to engage respondent in further reunification efforts was based on prior experiences with respondent; at department's request, respondent completed substance abuse treatment yet department did not make reasonable efforts at reunification when it should have done so; trial court's finding that respondent was unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts not supported by clear and convincing evidence. 73 CA 637. In determining whether there was an ongoing parent-child relationship, it is the character of that relationship at the time of the filing of termination petition that is relevant to court's inquiry. 75 CA 466. Subdiv. (3)(B): Personal rehabilitation refers to restoration of a parent to his or her former constructive and useful role as a parent; statute requires court to find by clear and convincing evidence that the parent's level of rehabilitation is less than that which would encourage a belief that he or she can assume a responsible position in the child's life within a reasonable time. 83 CA 17. Consideration of best interest of child comes after a determination that termination is warranted. 85 Conn.App. 528. Statutory requirements for termination of parental rights discussed; court properly concluded that commissioner had established, by clear and convincing evidence, that, despite parental skills training provided by department to parents, parents did not have ability to care for their daughters, either at time of termination proceedings or in the immediately foreseeable future; legislature's choice of "clear and convincing evidence" standard of proof under Subsec. does not violate due process provisions of state constitution; state constitution does not require court or legislature to equate terminations of parental rights with criminal convictions. 90 CA 565. Judgment terminating father's parental rights was improper and could not stand where evidence showed department made no efforts to foster a relationship between child and father prior to filing of termination petition because father's paternity had not been conclusively established. 93 CA 42. Subdiv. (3): Although "serious physical injury" in Subpara. (F) is not defined in statute, the court looked to its commonly approved usage, which is its dictionary definition; when applied to circumstances of case, there is ample evidence that the child's physical injury, a broken elbow caused by respondent mother who threw her young child across the floor and failed to seek medical attention for her injury for almost five days after the assault, was serious since the assault caused a severe fracture to child's elbow, required casting and caused distress to the child for at least three weeks after the assault. 97 CA 748. Subdiv. (3)(B)(ii): Neither Appellate Court nor trial court may speculate, or make a finding with respect to a termination of parental rights petition, on the basis of evidence that is not in the record. 104 CA 635. Subdiv. (3)(B)(ii): Issue is not whether parent has improved her ability to manage her life but whether she has gained an ability to care for the specific needs of her children. Id., 744. Subdiv. (3)(B): In making the determination as to whether the parent has achieved a sufficient degree of personal rehabilitation, the proper focus is on the parent's demonstrable development in relation to the needs of the child; the critical issue in assessing rehabilitation is whether the parent has gained the ability to care for the particular needs of the child at issue. 108 CA 839. In action for the termination of parental rights, the court did not deny respondent her procedural due process rights when conducting a trial on the merits with only her counsel present as the court still required petitioner to prove by clear and convincing evidence not only the grounds for termination, but that it was in the child's best interest for respondent's parental rights to be terminated. 111 CA 210. Trial court properly concluded that mother's denial of drug use and refusal to submit to drug testing supported adjudication that she failed to achieve personal rehabilitation under Subdiv. (3)(B); court properly determined that mother failed to achieve personal rehabilitation under section despite extensive use of support systems. 112 CA 69. Parental rights may be terminated under Subdiv. (3)(B)(i) because a parent must be able to meet the needs of the child, which are paramount, regardless of the needs of the parent, and the critical issue is not whether the parent has improved ability to manage own life but whether the parent has gained ability to care for the needs of the child. Id., 582. Reasonable efforts to reunite respondent and child were no longer appropriate where respondent abandoned child by leaving home and not communicating with child or inquiring as to child's welfare while respondent was living and incarcerated in another state or when he returned to Connecticut, where he failed to support child and was convicted and incarcerated for sexual assault of a minor. 115 CA 111. Department made reasonable efforts to reunify child with parent where department offered mother substance abuse treatment, group and individual therapy, drug testing, supervised and unsupervised visitation, parenting education, psychological evaluation, in-home reunification services, housing assistance and transportation and mother failed to achieve a sufficient degree of personal rehabilitation and her inability to parent prevented her from assuming a responsible position with respect to her child. 117 CA 710. Subdiv. (3)(B): Trial court must analyze the respondent's rehabilitative status as it relates to the needs of the particular child and whether prospects for rehabilitation can be realized within a reasonable time given the age and needs of the child. 120 CA 523. Subsec. not unconstitutionally void for vagueness as applied to respondent since referral for sexual offender treatment was sufficient to put respondent on notice that failure to attend could result in termination of his parental rights. 121 CA 376. Court improperly required petitioner to prove a subordinate fact by clear and convincing evidence. 123 CA 103. Subdiv. (3): Unresolved issues of domestic violence and lack of stable, safe housing support conclusion that parent failed to achieve sufficient degree of personal rehabilitation; respondent did not demonstrate that her counsel's representation resulted in prejudice to her. 126 CA 71. A 3-month time frame for achieving necessary degree of personal rehabilitation was reasonable given the age and needs of the child. 129 CA 449. Subdiv. (3)(B): "Rehabilitation" is not limited to the conduct contemplated in the prescribed specific steps. 148 CA 308. Cited. 44 Conn.Supp. 551. Legislature intended that Subdiv. (3)(F) be applied retroactively to facts which took place prior to its enactment; also, the law to be applied in a termination proceeding is the law that exists at time termination proceeding is brought. 45 CS 586. Subdiv. (3)(B)(i): Respondent's due process rights were not violated because one of the elements authorizing termination of parental rights required proof by clear and convincing evidence that a neglect finding was made in a prior proceeding and did not require a relitigation of such finding in the termination proceeding. 53 CS 402. Subsec. (k) (former Subsec. (d)): Cited. 229 Conn. 345. The plain language of Subdiv. (4) directs the trial court to consider the children's emotional ties with a long list of people in determining whether termination of respondent's parental rights is in their best interest; nothing in Subdiv. (4), however, required the trial court to consider only the children's emotional ties with respondent; therefore, it was appropriate for the trial court to consider the children's emotional ties to the preadoptive foster family in considering whether termination of respondent's parental rights was in the children's best interest; although a trial court shall consider and make written findings re the factors enumerated in Subsec., the trial court's determination of the best interests of a child will not be overturned on the basis of one factor if that determination is otherwise factually supported and legally sound. 317 C. 723. Cited. 24 Conn.App. 338; 30 Conn.App. 839; 33 Conn.App. 12; 38 Conn.App. 214; 39 Conn.App. 353; 44 Conn.App. 80. Trial court's findings that department had made the statutorily required "reasonable efforts" to reunify children with their mother were not supported by clear and convincing evidence; judgments reversed. 48 CA 290. Record supported trial court's factual findings where trial court found that respondent's decision to protect abuser, to deny or disregard the effects of sexual abuse on the child and to refuse counseling services prevented respondent from having a relationship with the child, and that department offered various counseling services to assist respondent and to facilitate reunification with the child, but respondent failed to utilize them. 49 CA 763. Subdiv. (1): Although respondent mother was offered a number of services by department aimed at reunification, including overnight visitation, visitation at the school and rehabilitation center, a bus pass to facilitate transportation, a psychological evaluation and various other social worker services, she failed to take advantage of them and to become more than minimally involved in her child's life; court found by clear and convincing evidence that department made reasonable and appropriate efforts to reunite respondent mother with her child. 56 Conn.App. 12. In certain instances, court may be required to make written findings concerning child's emotional ties to preadoptive family; such finding is required when child has developed significant emotional ties to preadoptive family and that family has exercised physical care, custody or control of the child for at least 1 year. 107 CA 395. In arriving at decision in dispositional phase of whether it is established by clear and convincing evidence that continuation of respondent's parental rights is not in best interest of the child, court is mandated to consider and make written findings regarding the 7 factors delineated in Subsec. 120 Conn.App. 523. Under Subsec., the word "reasonable" is the linchpin on which department's efforts in a particular set of circumstances are to be adjudged, using the clear and convincing standard of proof; "reasonable efforts" means doing everything reasonable, not everything possible. 124 CA 650. Subdiv. (7) does not require the court to consider the effect of respondent's illness and treatment when it evaluates the evidence. 163 CA 322; judgment reversed on alternate grounds, see 323 C. 640.
See Sec. 45a-764 re adoption procedures.