That case is In re Santa Fe Natural Tobacco Co. Marketing & Sales Practices Litigation, No. 1:16-md-02695 (D.N.M.).Plaintiff originally filed in the Southern District of Florida on September 30, 2015, but the case was transferred in connection with the multidistrict litigation. The Florida claims in the class action includeFlorida Count I: Violation of Florida’s Unfair & Deceptive Trade Practices Act, Fla. Stat. § 501.201, et seq., on Behalf of the Florida Class and the Florida Menthol Subclass; andFlorida Count II: Unjust Enrichment on Behalf of the Florida Class and the Florida Menthol Subclass.These claims stem from alleged deception and misrepresentation—according to Plaintiff, Natural American Spirit’s uses of the terms “Natural” and “Additive Free.”What’s Next?It remains to be seen how or when these cases will be brought to finality. There are significant pending issues, though.

WILLIAM H. PAULEY III, District Judge:Plaintiffs bring this putative class action alleging that KIND LLC and KIND Management, Inc. (together, "KIND") deceptively marketed certain products as "healthy," "all natural," and/or "non GMO.'' The Consolidated Class Action Complaint (ECF No. 52) asserts claims for breach of express warranty, unjust enrichment, and negligent misrepresentation, as well as violations ofNew York General Business Law§§ 349, 350 ("GBL"); California's Consumers Legal Remedies Act, Cal. Civ. Code§ 1750 ("CLRA"); the California False Advertising Law, Cal. Bus & Prof. Code § 17500 ("F AL"); the California Unfair Competition Act, Cal. Bus & Prof. Code § 17200 ("UCA"); the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act, 815 Ill. Cop. Stat. 505/1 ("ICFDBP A"); and the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act, Fla. Stat.§§ 501.201, et seq ("FDUTPA"). Plaintiffs seek to represent a national class of all individuals who purchased certain KIND products since April 17, 2011, as well as subclasses of purchasers from New York, California, Illinois and Florida.

WILLIAM H. PAULEY III, District Judge:Plaintiffs bring this putative class action alleging that KIND LLC and KIND Management, Inc. (together, "KIND") deceptively marketed certain products as "healthy," "all natural," and/or "non GMO.'' The Consolidated Class Action Complaint (ECF No. 52) asserts claims for breach of express warranty, unjust enrichment, and negligent misrepresentation, as well as violations ofNew York General Business Law§§ 349, 350 ("GBL"); California's Consumers Legal Remedies Act, Cal. Civ. Code§ 1750 ("CLRA"); the California False Advertising Law, Cal. Bus & Prof. Code § 17500 ("F AL"); the California Unfair Competition Act, Cal. Bus & Prof. Code § 17200 ("UCA"); the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act, 815 Ill. Cop. Stat. 505/1 ("ICFDBP A"); and the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act, Fla. Stat.§§ 501.201, et seq ("FDUTPA"). Plaintiffs seek to represent a national class of all individuals who purchased certain KIND products since April 17, 2011, as well as subclasses of purchasers from New York, California, Illinois and Florida.

Even if the third party agrees to provide the notices on behalf of the covered entity, failure to properly do so amounts to a violation by the covered entity, not the third party. Notwithstanding, FIPA specifically states that a third party may be subject to a deceptive trade practice claim, under Florida’s Deceptive Trade Practices Act, Fl Stat. § 501.201, et seq. , for its involvement in the breach. On the topic of violations, FIPA penalties for failure to provide proper notice are assessed per breach and not per affected individual.

com (hereinafter “the Websites”). The Websites retrieve mug shots from various law enforcement websites, publish them, and then charge a fee to remove them.After her mug shot was posted on one of the Websites, Plaintiff filed a complaint for injunctive relief and damages for violations of Florida’s Right to Publicity Statute (Fla. Stat. § 540.08), common law invasion of privacy, violation of Florida’s Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act (Fla. Stat. § 501.201, et seq.), and unjust enrichment. Plaintiff did not allege that she paid to have her mug shot removed from any of the Websites or that her image had substantial commercial value.

He sought to bring the suit on behalf of all persons in the United States who have purchased Meltdown for purposes other than resale since April 4, 2008. The claims included: (1) breach of express warranty under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act ("MMWA"), 15 U.S.C. § 2301, et seq.; (2) breach of express warranty; (3) unjust enrichment; and (4) violation of the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act ("FDUTPA"), Fla. Stat. § 501.201, et seq.The court concluded that the case would be unmanageable as a class action. First, the court saw no practical method of verifying membership in the proposed Class of Meltdown purchasers.

Count 2 alleges that because defendants failed to inform plaintiffs about Pinecastle, it would be inequitable for defendants to retain the benefits. Count 3 locates the duty in the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act (“FDUTPA”), FLA Stat. §§ 501.201 et seq., asserting that defendants’ failure to inform plaintiffs about Pinecastle constituted a “deceptive, misleading and unfair trade practice.” Count 4 locates the duty to disclose in common law negligence.The heart of the Eleventh Circuit’s decision is its refusal to extend Johnson v. Davis. The court found that the case did not apply because: (1) the defendants were not in privity with the buyer or acting as an agent in privity with the buyer (such as the seller’s real estate broker); and (2) there was no allegation in Count 1 that defendants’ “marketing efforts were at the behest or direction of Ryland, that Ryland exercised any control over [the] marketing efforts, or that [defendants] actually listed any of the homes… on behalf of Ryland.”Applying the same logic to Count 2, the court held that even assuming the plaintiffs conferred a benefit on defendants, Johnson’s duty to disclose did not extend to defendants.

For additional analysis of the ability to obtain tort remedies for breach of contract, see Amy Doehring, Blurring the Distinction Between Contract and Tort: Courts Permitting Business Plaintiffs to Recover Tort Damages for Breach of Contract, 12 Bus. Tort J. ___ (Winter 2005).[9] N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1.[10] 42 F. Supp. 2d 217 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). The relevant Florida statute is Fla. Stat. § 501.201 et seq.[11] 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6888 (E.D.N.Y. 2004).[12] N.Y. Gen Bus. Law § 349(a).[13] 303 A.D. 2d 288 (N.Y. App. 2003).