Plaintiff has failed to allege any facts to suggest that Defendants systematically and continuously do business in New York. Therefore, Defendants are not subject to general personal jurisdiction pursuant to Section 301.[13] 2. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(1) — transaction of business within the state Turning to specific personal jurisdiction pursuant to N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(1), Plaintiff's allegations fail to establish that any of the defendants transacted business in New York within the meaning of the statute.

a showing that business was transacted [in New York], there must be a ‘substantial nexus’ between the business and the cause of action.” Grand River, 425 F.3d at 166 (citation omitted). Plaintiff’s arguments regarding 302(a)(1) primarily reiterate his arguments pertaining to Section 301. As to Plaintiff’s argument that Nine Eighteen is making direct sales to companies in New York, “Section 302(a)(1) confers jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary corporation that ‘transacts business within the state or contracts anywhere to provide goods and services in the state,’ if there is a ‘direct relationship between the causes of action and the in state conduct.’” C.B.C. Woods Prods., Inc., 455 F. Supp. 2d at 224 (quoting Fort Knox Music, Inc., v. Baptiste, 203 F.3d 193, 196 (2d Cir. 2000)). The only sales directed to New York customers as apparent from the current record were not sales of the allegedly infringing product, and therefore there is no direct relationship between the cause of action and the state conduct.

And in fact, Ironridge is not (and has never been) registered to do business in New York; does not conduct business in New York; and does not have offices, employees or bank accounts in New York. (Id. ¶ 8.) Accordingly, there is no basis to conclude that Ironridge engaged in any business activity within the State, much less that 8 it did so on a “continuous, permanent, and substantial” basis as required by CPLR § 301 for general jurisdiction purposes. Moreover, NewLead cannot overcome its facially inadequate showing by conflating Ironridge’s alleged activities with those of its shareholder, Partners LLC.

There, plaintiff alleged that an employee of defendant met with plaintiff in New York City, presented plaintiff with a business card with a New York office address, and stated that he conducted business for defendant at such New York address. In declining to exercise jurisdiction over defendant under C.P.L.R. § 301, the Court stated that there was no evidence that defendant actually leased or owned an office in New York. The court then held that, “the Court certainly cannot hold that [the employee’s] representation alone suffices to establish general jurisdiction because even ‘the presence of . . . an office is not dispositive.’”

Laufer v. Ostrow, 55 NY2d 305, 310, 434 N.E.2d 692, 694-95 (1982) provides that “solicitation of business alone” will not satisfy the requirements of CPLR §301. Instead, jurisdiction can be exercised under CPLR §301 “when there are activities of substance in addition to solicitation.” POINT III DEFENDANTS ARE NOT SUBJECT TO JURISDICTION UNDER CPLR 302. Defendants showed that they are not subject to jurisdiction under CPLR 302 in their Brief in Support of the Motion to Dismiss.

Those who had any limited business activities in New York of any sort pursued such activities on behalf of SecureLogic and/or SpaceLogic. Thus, personal jurisdiction under CPLR § 301 does not lie. b. CPLR § 302(a)(1) does not confer jurisdiction over Defendants because the claims arise out of business transacted outside New York.

. New York courts have interpreted § 301 to permit the exercise of jurisdiction over an out-of-state corporation that “has engaged in such a continuous and systematic course of ‘doing business’ in New York that a finding of its presence in New York is warranted.” Sonera Holding B. V. v. Cukurova Holding A. S., 750 F.3d 221, 224 (2d Cir. 2014).

See Lebron, 2017 WL 2352856, at *7 (granting motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction under both § 301 and § 302 and explaining that defendant professional baseball player’s regular Case 1:17-cv-00401-WMS Document 5-5 Filed 06/13/17 Page 13 of 28 8 trips to New York each baseball season and his sports agents and representatives’ promotion of his interests in New York fail to establish a “continuous and systematic” presence in the state). Here, Plaintiff has not made a single allegation in her Complaint that addresses the availability of personal jurisdiction, either generally or through the long-arm statute, over Defendants. Further, she has provided no factual allegations whatsoever that support finding continuous, permanent, and substantial activity in New York. Simply put, there is no basis to find that Defendants are “at home” in New York or are “doing business” there so as to confer general personal jurisdiction. Dismissal is thus appropriate.

Plate Decl. ¶¶ 8-13. Accordingly, DH has not, and cannot, demonstrate that general jurisdiction exists over Positive Impact under CPLR § 301. D. Positive Impact is Not Subject to Specific Jurisdiction in New York Under CPLR § 302(a) The New York long-arm statute, CPLR § 302(a), authorizes personal jurisdiction over non-domiciliaries only under certain limited and enumerated circumstances that are not present here. 1. Positive Impact Does Not Transact Business or Supply Goods or Services in New York CPLR § 302(a)(1) authorizes specific personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant who “transacts any business within the state or contracts anywhere to supply goods or services in the state,” but only if “the claim asserted . . . arise[s] from that business activity.

¶ 10. Like AT&T Inc., it has not availed itself of the privilege of doing business in the State of New York. In short, “none of the factors indicative of presence [under § 301] have been demon- 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 5 AT&T Inc. and BellSouth Corporation’s Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint MDL No. 06-1791-VRW strated.” Mareno, 910 F.2d at 1046.2 B. Plaintiffs Cannot Establish Specific Jurisdiction Over Defendants. Specific jurisdiction may exist in a particular case as a result of the “relationship among the defendant, the forum and the litigation.