This lowered employee burden brings the state law more in line with New York City law, where discriminatory harassment can be shown if employees can demonstrate they were โtreated less wellโ than other employees due to their membership in a protected category. N.Y. Exec. Law ยง 296(1)(h). Required Distribution of Anti-Harassment Policy in English or Primary LanguageEmployers must now provide their written sexual harassment prevention policy and the information they present at their annual sexual harassment prevention training program to employees in either English or the employeeโs primary language (as indicated by the employee), at the time of hire and at every annual sexual harassment prevention training.
As of October 11, 2019, plaintiffs only need to show that they suffered โinferior terms, conditions or privileges of employment because of the individualโs membership in one or more [ ] protected categories.โ N.Y. Exec. Law ยง 296(1)(h). This new, lowered standard is similar to the NYCHRL, under which plaintiffs only need to show that they were treated โless wellโ than other employees because of their membership in one or more protected classes.
โ Expanded prohibition of mandatory arbitration (N.Y. Civ. R. ยง 7515).โ Elimination of the โsevere and pervasiveโ standard (N.Y.S. Exec. Law ยง 296(h)).โ Expanded legal protections for contractors and vendors and consultants and other non-employees ((N.Y.S. Exec. Law ยง 296-d).
With the passage of the Act, the City law now adopts the definition of "undue hardship" found inN.Y. Executive Law ยง296(10)(d), stating that, with respect to religious accommodations, undue hardship "means an accommodation requiring significant expense or difficulty (including a significant interference with the safe or efficient operation of the workplace or a violation of a bona fide seniority system)." Like N.Y. Executive Law ยง296(10)(d), the Act identifies a nonexhaustive list of factors that must be evaluated when determining whether an accommodation constitutes an "undue economic hardship." The factors include, but are not limited to: (i)the identifiable cost of the accommodation, including the costs of loss of productivity and of retaining or hiring employees or transferring employees from one facility to another, in relation to the size and operating cost of the employer; (ii)the number of individuals with a sincerely held religious observance or practice who will need the particular accommodation; and (iii)for an employer with multiple facilities, the degree to which the geographic separateness or administrative or fiscal relationship of the facilities will make the accommodation more difficult or expensive.
The court rejected PwC's attempts to cabin the worksharing agreement not only based on its plain language, but on the liberal spirit animating the charge-filing requirement: "it would effectively rewrite the ADEA's administrative prerequisites, making them traps for the unwary, poised to spring into action and deny those who may have suffered employment discrimination their right to seek redress in federal court."Second, the court held that the charge-filing requirement was also met by the filing in New York. The part of the decision hinged, though, on whether the N.Y. state law (N.Y. Exec. Law ยง 296) applied to this action. In a potentially far-reaching decision for employers based in New York, the D.C. Circuit construed the NYHRA to extend extraterritorially.
participate in the Section 8 programs violates the Fourth Amendment because it forces landlords to suffer warrantless searches of their rental property as well as their records.The Court agreed, stating that landlords cannot accept a Section 8 voucher without participating in the Section 8 program. In requiring respondents to accept Section 8 vouchers, the Human Rights Law compels landlords to participate in the Section 8 program. Thus, respondentsโ property and records are subject to warrantless searches. Citing precedent, the Court maintained that a law cannot โcoerce property owners into consenting to warrantless inspections in derogation of their constitutional rights by conditioning their ability to rent real property on providing such consentโ . Here, because the Human Rights Law requires landlords to accept Section 8 vouchers, the law unconstitutionally requires landlords to waive their Fourth Amendment rights. Therefore, the Court dismissed the Stateโs petition with prejudice. N.Y. Exec. Law ยง 296(5)(a)(1).People v. Commons W., 2023 N.Y. Slip Op. 23213, (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2023).Id. citing Sokolov v Village of Freeport, 52 N.Y.2d at 345-347 (N.Y. 1981).
Judge Masler found landlords participating in Section 8 housing vouchers were compelled to consent to warrantless searches of their records and properties, as a condition of participating in Section 8, in violation of the Fourth Amendment.NYSHRL; Section 8The NYSHRLโs source-of-income antidiscrimination statute (N.Y. Exec. Law ยง 296(5)(a)(1)) makes refusing to โsell, rent, or lease a housing accommodationโ to an individual because of their lawful source of income a discriminatory practice. Under the NYSHRL (N.Y. Exec. Law ยง 292(36)), an individualโs lawful source of income includes any federal or state housing assistance, including, but not limited to, assistance provided through the Housing Choice Voucher Program, more commonly known as Section 8.Section 8 is a federal government assistance program that provides vouchers to eligible low-income families. Although participation in Section 8 is a voluntary program at the federal level, a voucher cannot be accepted as rent payment without the landlordโs participation in the program through a Housing Assistance Payment (HAP) contract with a Public Housing Agency. Significantly, the HAP contract requires a property owner to consent to an inspection of their properties and records to determine the reasonableness of the unit and rent requested.Constitutional ChallengeIn this cas
work for them in this type of religious role.โIn a special proceeding brought before a local state trial court pursuant to New York Executive Law ยง 298 (which invokes the same standard of review as an Article 78 challenge), the petitioner appealed the SDHRโs determination and argued that the ministerial exception did not bar either his termination or harassment claims. The trial court affirmed the SDHRโs dismissal of the petitionerโs termination claim (citing Hosanna-Tabor) but held that the SDHR should not have dismissed his harassmentclaim because โneither the US Supreme Court, the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, the New York State Court of Appeals or the New York State Supreme Court Appellate Division for the Fourth Department have held that the Ministerial Exception bars hostile work environment claim[s].โ The trial court thus remanded the case to the SDHR and instructed the SDHR to make โa proper determination of the merits of [p]etitionerโs complaint with respect to New York Executive Law ยง 296 on the issue of a hostile work environment.โBoth the Diocese and the SDHR appealed that decision, arguing that the trial court applied the wrong standard of review and failed to give the SDHR the deference to which it is entitled when making agency determinations, such as its own jurisdiction (the petitioner did not cross-appeal the dismissal of his termination claim). On June 30, 2023, the Fourth Department reversed the trial court, agreeing with both the Diocese and the SDHR. The Fourth Department held:The SDHRโs determination is entitled to considerable deference given its expertise in evaluating discrimination claims. Here, SDHR determined that it lacked jurisdiction over petitionerโs complaint inasmuch as petitioner had been a priest serving as the pastor of a church and the ministerial exception barred his claims. Inasmuch as there is no controlling United States Supreme Court or New York precedent and the federal courts that have addressed the issue are divided on the extent to
In early 2022, New York State entered S.812B/A.2035B into law, which amended the New York State Human Rights Law, N.Y. Executive Law ยง 296, to require a statewide toll-free, confidential hotline (the โHotlineโ) for the lodging of complaints of sexual harassment in the workplace. On July 19, 2022, Governor Hochul announced the launch of the Hotline (1-800-427-2773 or 1-800-HARASS-3).
Earlier this year, Governor Kathy Hochul signed into law S.812B/A.2035B, which amended the New York State Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. Law ยง 296, to require the establishment of a state-wide, toll-free, confidential hotline for complaints of workplace sexual harassment. On July 19, 2022, Governor Hochul announced the launch of this new hotline.