d for appeal are: (1) whether Phillips’s conviction for aggravated murder was supported by sufficient evidence; (2) whether the jury’s finding that Phillips raped Sheila on the morning of her death was supported by sufficient evidence; (3) whether the jury’s finding that Phillips intended to kill Sheila was supported by sufficient evidence; (4) whether members of the jury were inflamed by the statements of a grand juror; (5) whether the trial court improperly instructed the jury outside the presence of Phillips and his counsel; and (6) whether trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance during the mitigation phase."Nicholas Cody Tate v. State, 2010 Ga. LEXIS 416 (Ga 6/1/2010) "Defendant's two death sentences for the murder of a mother and her daughter were supported by evidence of several aggravating circumstances, including his molestation of the daughter, his kidnapping of the victims under former O.C.G.A. § 16-5-40, and his directing his younger brother to kill the daughter under O.C.G.A. § 17-10-30(b)(6)." [via LexisOne]Donald Lenneth Banks v. State,2010 Fla. LEXIS 855 (FL 6/3/2010) "Defendant's conviction for first-degree murder and sentence of death are affirmed as none of defendant's claims, including claims that the trial court erred in denying a cause challenge to a prospective juror and in allowing the state to strike two African-American prospective jurors, warrant relief.

d for appeal are: (1) whether Phillips’s conviction for aggravated murder was supported by sufficient evidence; (2) whether the jury’s finding that Phillips raped Sheila on the morning of her death was supported by sufficient evidence; (3) whether the jury’s finding that Phillips intended to kill Sheila was supported by sufficient evidence; (4) whether members of the jury were inflamed by the statements of a grand juror; (5) whether the trial court improperly instructed the jury outside the presence of Phillips and his counsel; and (6) whether trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance during the mitigation phase."Nicholas Cody Tate v. State, 2010 Ga. LEXIS 416 (Ga 6/1/2010) "Defendant's two death sentences for the murder of a mother and her daughter were supported by evidence of several aggravating circumstances, including his molestation of the daughter, his kidnapping of the victims under former O.C.G.A. § 16-5-40, and his directing his younger brother to kill the daughter under O.C.G.A. § 17-10-30(b)(6)." [via LexisOne]Donald Lenneth Banks v. State,2010 Fla. LEXIS 855 (FL 6/3/2010) "Defendant's conviction for first-degree murder and sentence of death are affirmed as none of defendant's claims, including claims that the trial court erred in denying a cause challenge to a prospective juror and in allowing the state to strike two African-American prospective jurors, warrant relief. "

gation and a fair penalty phase because the court-appointed psychologist failed to conduct the appropriate tests for organic brain damage and mental illness, and trial counsel was ineffective for failing to protect the rights of Floyd in this regard; [ ] (3) Floyd is entitled to a new trial due to cumulative error;" "[4] Floyd was charged by a faulty indictment and deprived of a unanimous verdict; [5] cumulatively, the combination of procedural and substantive errors deprived Floyd of a fair trial;" and [6] ineffective assistance of appellate counsel (shackling, expert competency, child witness competency, Floyd's competency, & juror interviews).Brian Keith Hall v. Terrell, 2009 Ga. LEXIS 285 (Ga 6/1/2009) "A habeas corpus court erred by vacating defendant’s death sentence for the murder of a elderly victim during a robbery because he failed to show any reasonable probability that the jury would have failed to find beyond a reasonable doubt the statutory aggravating circumstance under O.C.G.A. § 17-10-30(b) that was based on depravity of mind." [via Lexisone]Jon Hall v. State, 2009 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 398 (Tenn. Crim. App. 6/5/2009) " In this case, the trial court entered its judgment of conviction in 1997.

gation and a fair penalty phase because the court-appointed psychologist failed to conduct the appropriate tests for organic brain damage and mental illness, and trial counsel was ineffective for failing to protect the rights of Floyd in this regard; [ ] (3) Floyd is entitled to a new trial due to cumulative error;" "[4] Floyd was charged by a faulty indictment and deprived of a unanimous verdict; [5] cumulatively, the combination of procedural and substantive errors deprived Floyd of a fair trial;" and [6] ineffective assistance of appellate counsel (shackling, expert competency, child witness competency, Floyd's competency, & juror interviews).Brian Keith Hall v. Terrell, 2009 Ga. LEXIS 285 (Ga 6/1/2009) "A habeas corpus court erred by vacating defendant’s death sentence for the murder of a elderly victim during a robbery because he failed to show any reasonable probability that the jury would have failed to find beyond a reasonable doubt the statutory aggravating circumstance under O.C.G.A. § 17-10-30(b) that was based on depravity of mind." [via Lexisone]Jon Hall v. State, 2009 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 398 (Tenn. Crim. App. 6/5/2009) " In this case, the trial court entered its judgment of conviction in 1997.

gation and a fair penalty phase because the court-appointed psychologist failed to conduct the appropriate tests for organic brain damage and mental illness, and trial counsel was ineffective for failing to protect the rights of Floyd in this regard; [ ] (3) Floyd is entitled to a new trial due to cumulative error;" "[4] Floyd was charged by a faulty indictment and deprived of a unanimous verdict; [5] cumulatively, the combination of procedural and substantive errors deprived Floyd of a fair trial;" and [6] ineffective assistance of appellate counsel (shackling, expert competency, child witness competency, Floyd's competency, & juror interviews).Brian Keith Hall v. Terrell, 2009 Ga. LEXIS 285 (Ga 6/1/2009) "A habeas corpus court erred by vacating defendant’s death sentence for the murder of a elderly victim during a robbery because he failed to show any reasonable probability that the jury would have failed to find beyond a reasonable doubt the statutory aggravating circumstance under O.C.G.A. § 17-10-30(b) that was based on depravity of mind." [via Lexisone]Week ofMay 25, 2009– In Favor of the State or GovernmentDaniel Wilson v. Strickland,2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 11386; 2009 FED App. 0386N (6th Cir. 5/28/2009) (unpublished) "A § 1983 lawsuit challenging a state's lethal injection protocol was barred by the doctrine of res judicata because the complaint raised an identical challenge to the lethal injection protocol that was raised by defendant in a previous lawsuit against the state, its governor, and others, and the prior lawsuit was resolved by a final judgment.

The State contends that in the early morning hours of March 23, 2006, both defendants opened fire on Deputy Whitehead as he and other members of the Task Force and the Bibb County Drug Unit were executing a "no-knock" warrant at 3135 Atherton Street within the City of Macon in Bibb County. Pursuant to OCGA § 17-10-35.1, we granted their applications for interim review to consider the following issues: (1) whether the trial court erred in denying the defendants' motions for a pre-trial determination of whether they are entitled to immunity from prosecution under OCGA § 16-3-24.2; (2) whether the trial court erred in denying the defendants' motions regarding an alleged scienter element in the OCGA § 17-10-30 (b) (8) statutory aggravating circumstance; and (3) in Fair's case, whether the trial court erred regarding his motion to suppress evidence seized during a search with a warrant."State v. Delano Hale, 2008 Ohio 3426 (Ohio 7/15/2008) Relief denied, most notably on claims concerning, (1) failure of the police to advise him of his Miranda warning prior to questioning; (2) failure to adequately life-qualify jury (including finding that "the trial court had no obligation to personally life-qualify the jurors.

The State contends that in the early morning hours of March 23, 2006, both defendants opened fire on Deputy Whitehead as he and other members of the Task Force and the Bibb County Drug Unit were executing a "no-knock" warrant at 3135 Atherton Street within the City of Macon in Bibb County. Pursuant to OCGA § 17-10-35.1, we granted their applications for interim review to consider the following issues: (1) whether the trial court erred in denying the defendants' motions for a pre-trial determination of whether they are entitled to immunity from prosecution under OCGA § 16-3-24.2; (2) whether the trial court erred in denying the defendants' motions regarding an alleged scienter element in the OCGA § 17-10-30 (b) (8) statutory aggravating circumstance; and (3) in Fair's case, whether the trial court erred regarding his motion to suppress evidence seized during a search with a warrant."State v. Delano Hale, 2008 Ohio 3426 (Ohio 7/15/2008) Relief denied, most notably on claims concerning, (1) failure of the police to advise him of his Miranda warning prior to questioning; (2) failure to adequately life-qualify jury (including finding that "the trial court had no obligation to personally life-qualify the jurors.

Georgia law ispermissive with regard to the scope of mitigating evidence that a jury may consider in the sentencing phase. OCGA § 17-10-30 is wholly silent on the definition of mitigating circumstances, and the "conclusion is inescapable that the legislature meant to empower the jury to consider as mitigating anything they found to be mitigating, without limitation or definition." [Cit.]