FRCP 9(b); Id. This does not, however, absolve a plaintiff from the predicate requirement that malice, fraud or oppression under §3294 still must be averred, albeit generally. FRCP 8, 9(b). The absence of such averment may still render a complaint objectionable.

Oppression means “despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person’s right.” Cal. Civ. Code § 3294(c)(2). 38.

(7) Plaintiff Lourdes Estrada’s loss of consortium claim (Count 7) is dismissed pursuant to FRCP Rule 12(b)(6) on the grounds that (a) loss of consortium does not lie for FEHA violations or for wrongful termination at common law, (b) Ms. Estrada fails to allege a “negligent or intentional injury” to Mr. Estrada, which is a predicate showing for her claim, and (c) to the extent the claim is based on injuries that arose during Mr. Estrada’s employment, Ms. Estrada’s derivative count it is barred by workers’ compensation exclusivity. (8) Plaintiffs’ punitive damages claim is dismissed/stricken pursuant to FRCP 12(b)(6) and 12(f) because (a) Plaintiffs fail to factually allege malice, oppression or fraud by anyone; and (b) Plaintiffs also fail to allege that GGI ratified any acts on which punitive damages could be based, as would be required by California Civil Code § 3294, et seq. Specifically, the following language is dismissed/stricken from the FAC:  Page 13, lines 5-11 (“Such actions were therefore done in conscious disregard of the rights of Plaintiff to be free of gender discrimination in the workplace, among other rights secured under California law.

on the grounds that (a) loss of consortium does not lie for FEHA violations or for wrongful termination at common law, (b) Ms. Estrada fails to allege a “negligent or intentional injury” to Mr. Estrada, which is a predicate showing for her claim, and (c) to the extent the claim is based on injuries that arose during Mr. Estrada’s employment, Ms. Estrada’s derivative count it is barred by workers’ compensation exclusivity. Case 2:17-cv-01100-MWF-FFM Document 9-1 Filed 02/17/17 Page 3 of 4 Page ID #:112 3 [PROPOSED] ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS/STRIKE COMPLAINT LA 132943078v1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 (10) Plaintiffs’ punitive damages claim is dismissed/stricken pursuant to FRCP 12(b)(6) and 12(f) because (a) Plaintiffs fail to factually allege malice, oppression or fraud by anyone; and (b) Plaintiffs also fail to allege that GGI ratified any acts on which punitive damages could be based, as would be required by California Civil Code § 3294, et seq. Specifically, the following language is dismissed/stricken from the Complaint:  Page 14, lines 4-10 (“Such actions were therefore done in conscious disregard of the rights of Plaintiff to be free of gender discrimination In the workplace, among other rights secured under California law.

Fourth, any plaintiff seeking punitive damages against a corporation must show that the act constituting malice, oppression or fraud was committed or ratified by an “officer, director, or managing agent.” Cal. Civil Code § 3294(b); Cruz v. HomeBase, 83 Cal. App. 4th 160, 163 (2000); White v. Ultramar, Inc., 21 Cal. 4th 563, 572-77 (1999). Here, there is no evidence – much less clear and convincing evidence – of malice, fraud or oppression.

The evidence Plaintiffs have highlighted thus far does not meet this standard. It largely involves conduct by Donna Farmer (Senior Toxicologist), William Heydens (Product Safety Assessment Strategy Lead), Daniel Goldstein, (Medical Sciences and Outreach Lead), and John Acquavella (Senior Fellow, Epidemiology). Plaintiffs provide no evidence that any of these individuals were “managing agents” of Monsanto, exercising “substantial discretionary authority” over any portion of Monsanto’s business. Cal. Civ. Code § 3294; White, 21 Cal. 4th at 572, 577. Nor can they. Each employee worked in Monsanto’s regulatory or science group. While they Case 3:16-md-02741-VC Document 2419 Filed 01/03/19 Page 28 of 36 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 20 DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT RE: TIER 1 PLAINTIFFS ON NON-CAUSATION GROUNDS contributed to the company through their expertise in their respective scientific disciplines, not one can fairly be characterized as having the authority over business affairs required by the California punitive damages statute to hold Monsanto liable.

Plaintiffs’ demands for punitive damages must satisfy the requirements of Twombly and Iqbal. See GBTI, Inc. v. Ins. Co. of Pa., No. CV F 09-1173 LJO DLB, 2009 WL 2365409, at *8 (E.D. Cal. July 29, 2009) (striking punitive damages where the complaint contained only “platitudes and a conclusory paragraph which essentially summarizes section 3294 elements”); see also Diaz v. Bank of Am. Home Loan Servicing, L.P., No. CV099286PSGMANX, 2011 WL 13046844, at *5 (C.D. Cal. July 8, 2011) (granting the defendants’ motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s demands for punitive damages for lack of sufficient factual detail). Instead, they provide no facts showing that either OLS’s or OMS’s actions were oppressive, fraudulent, or malicious, or that either entity acted “with a willful and conscious disregard” of their rights.

The economic loss rule requires a purchaser to recover in contract for purely economic loss due to disappointed expectations, unless he can demonstrate harm above and beyond a broken contractual promise. Quite simply, the economic loss rule “prevent[s] the law of contract and the law of tort from dissolving one into the other.” Id. at 988 (internal citations omitted). Entirely consistent with the economic loss rule is California Civil Code Section 3294, which likewise provides that punitive damages are not available in actions for breach of contract: “(a) In an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, the plaintiff, in addition to the actual damages, may recover damages for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant.” Cal. Civil Code § 3294(a) (emphasis added); see also, e.g., Cates Construction, Inc. v. Talbot Partners, 21 Cal. 4th 28, 61, 980 P.2d 407, 427, 86 Cal. Rptr. 2d 855, 878 (Cal. 1999) (“The law governing this subject has been aptly summarized as follows. ‘[P]unitive or exemplary damages, which are designed to punish and deter statutorily defined types of wrongful conduct, are available only in Case 8:15-cv-02113-CJC-JCG Document 144 Filed 07/10/17 Page 14 of 34 Page ID #:4132 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 CASE NO. 8:15-cv-02113-CJC-JCG - 9- DEFENDANTS’ PARTIAL MOTION TO DISMISS OR FOR MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT 610986907.1 actions 'for breach of an obligation not arising from contract

Montegna’s demand for punitive damages must satisfy the requirements of Twombly and Iqbal. See Diaz v. Bank of Am. Home Loan Servicing, L.P., No. CV099286PSGMANX, 2011 WL 13046844, at *5 (C.D. Cal. July 8, 2011) (granting the defendants’ motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s demands for punitive damages for lack of sufficient factual detail); GBTI, Inc. v. Ins. Co. of Pennsylvania, No. CV F 09-1173 LJO DLB, 2009 WL 2365409, at *8 (E.D. Cal. July 29, 2009) (striking punitive damages where the complaint contained only “platitudes and a conclusory paragraph which essentially summarizes section 3294 elements”). Instead, he provides no facts showing that either OLS’s or OMS’s actions were oppressive, fraudulent, or malicious, or that either entity acted “with a MMA (KSC), 2013 WL 12121260, at *6 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 7, 2013) (quoting Kelley v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 750 F.Supp.2d 1132, 1146 (E.D. Cal. 2010)). Case 3:17-cv-00939-AJB-BLM Document 11-1 Filed 06/30/17 PageID.60 Page 18 of 20

Ramsden’s demand for punitive damages must satisfy the requirements of Twombly and Iqbal. See GBTI, Inc. v. Ins. Co. of Pennsylvania, No. CV F 09-1173 LJO DLB, 2009 WL 2365409, at *8 (E.D. Cal. July 29, 2009) (striking punitive damages where the complaint contained only “platitudes and a conclusory paragraph which essentially summarizes section 3294 elements”); see also Diaz v. Bank of Am. Home Loan Servicing, L.P., No. CV099286PSGMANX, 2011 WL 13046844, at *5 (C.D. Cal. July 8, 2011) (granting the defendants’ motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s demands for punitive damages for lack of sufficient factual detail).