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    McMillian v. Johnson

    101 F.3d 1363 (11th Cir. 1996)   Cited 64 times   
    Admitting that the language used was "confusing" in Tinney v. Shores, 77 F.3d 378 (11th Cir. 1996), but that Tinney mandated that sovereign immunity apply to shield sheriffs from suit when sued in their individual capacities
    But a recent decision by this court, Tinney v. Shores, 77 F.3d 378 (11th Cir. 1996), holds that under Alabama law a sheriff and deputy sheriff are shielded by sovereign immunity against claims based upon intentional torts. Some of the language in Tinney is confusing; the court says that "[u]nder Alabama law, sheriffs and deputy sheriffs, in their official capacities and individually, are absolutely immune from suit when the action is, in effect, one against the state." Id. at 383. The claim under consideration in Tinney was against the sheriff and deputy sheriff in their individual capacities. However, no consideration was given to whether the action was, in effect, one against the state. Federal law controls a determination relative to whether a state is the real party-in-interest to the action, and under federal law the claim in Tinney was not one against the state. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 167-68, 105 S. Ct. 3099, 3106-07, 87 L.Ed.2d 114 (1985); and Jackson v. Georgia Dep't of Transp., 16 F.3d 1573, 1577 (11th Cir. 1994). Notwithstanding this confusing language in Tinney, the holding of the case is clear: under…
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    Sheth v. Webster

    145 F.3d 1231 (11th Cir. 1998)   Cited 118 times   
    Describing the holding in Tinney
    The issue of whether interlocutory appeals can be taken from the denial of "discretionary function" immunity under Alabama law is one of first impression in this circuit. Alabama law recognizes at least two types of immunity from suit or liability for the individual executive acts of public officers. Not applicable here is the absolute "sovereign" immunity, except for injunctive relief, afforded to certain state constitutional officers, including sheriffs and deputy sheriffs. See Tinney v. Shores, 77 F.3d 378 (11th Cir. 1996). This constitutional officer sovereign immunity is pursuant to Article I, Section 14 of the Alabama Constitution of 1901. Alabama law also extends a form of immunity, not absolute, to state, as opposed to municipal and county, executive officers who do not hold constitutional offices. This form of immunity is described as "discretionary function" immunity. Taylor v. Shoemaker, 605 So.2d 828 (Ala. 1992).
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    Godby v. Montgomery County Bd. of Educ.

    996 F. Supp. 1390 (M.D. Ala. 1998)   Cited 50 times   
    Explaining that even if Alabama state courts suffer confusion as to whether sovereign immunity attaches to sheriff's deputy in individual capacity for claims of intentional or malicious wrongdoing, the McMillian and Tinney holdings are binding and "a correct statement of Alabama law as far as this court is concerned"
    For the same reasons stated in the discussion of the negligent supervision claim, the Defendants sued under this count, Eberhart and Wilson, are entitled to a form of full immunity which protects them from suit in their individual and official capacities. In Flood v. State of Ala. Dept. of Ind. Rel., 948 F. Supp. 1535, 1549 (M.D.Ala. 1996) (Thompson, J.), referenced above, Judge Thompson of this district held that a director of a state department, the former director of the department, and a supervisor of a division in that department, were entitled to the sort of absolute immunity that Sheriffs have under Tinney and McMillian. Interestingly enough, that decision was made in the context of an invasion of privacy claim against the officials. Id.
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    Adams v. Franklin

    CIVIL ACTION 99-D-815-N (M.D. Ala. Jul. 31, 2000)   Cited 19 times   
    Finding that state law claims seeking monetary damages from sheriff and deputies in individual capacities for assault and battery, negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and outrage were barred by sovereign immunity doctrine, pursuant to Tinney
    Here, like in Tinney, the relief sought by Plaintiff in alleging state-law claims against Defendants is monetary, not injunctive. (2nd Am. Compl. at 3, 5.) Therefore, under the holding in Tinney, the court finds that Defendants are entitled to sovereign immunity on Plaintiff's state-law claims. Accordingly, the court finds that Counts 3-6 are due to be dismissed.
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    Byrnes v. DeBolt Transfer, Inc.

    741 F.2d 620 (3d Cir. 1984)   Cited 76 times   
    Following John Tinney decision as controlling, without additional analysis
    Because neither the LMRA nor ERISA contains an explicit limitation period with regard to actions such as this, federal courts must determine the timeliness of the suit by reference to the most appropriate statute of limitations of the state in which the action arose. International Union v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 705, 86 S.Ct. 1107, 1113, 16 L.Ed.2d 192 (1966). Eleven days prior to oral argument in the case sub judice, another panel of this court decided that, when a Fund sues to recover unpaid contributions to employee benefit trust funds, the three-year statute of limitations contained in Pennsylvania's Wage Payment and Collection Law, Pa.Stat.Ann. tit. 43, § 260.9a(g) (Purdon 1983), governs the action. Teamsters Pension Trust Fund v. John Tinney Delivery Service, Inc., 732 F.2d 319 (3d Cir. 1984). On appeal, the Funds have devoted much effort toward persuading us that the Tinney court failed to make the proper inquiry and thus reached an unfortunate result. They contend that because they allege violations of the collective bargaining agreement, the district court should have applied the six-year limitations statute governing an action on a…
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    Blythe v. Blythe

    976 So. 2d 1018 (Ala. Civ. App. 2007)   Cited 8 times   
    Discussing Schneider Nat'l Carriers, Inc. v. Tinney, 776 So. 2d 753, 754 (Ala. 2000), and Hanner v. Metro Bank Protective Life Ins. Co., 952 So. 2d 1056, 1061 (Ala. 2006), and the requirements pertaining to a trial court's order purporting to certify a judgment as final pursuant to Rule 54(b)
    In Schneider National Carriers, Inc. v. Tinney, 776 So.2d 753, 754 (Ala. 2000), our supreme court held that a trial court had validly certified a judgment as final pursuant to Rule 54(b) by stating that the judgment was "`expressly made a final judgment,'" and citing Rule 54(b), thus implicitly incorporating the language of the rule into that judgment. However, in Hanner v. Metro Bank Protective Life Insurance Co., 952 So.2d 1056, 1061 (Ala. 2006), the supreme court concluded that, although the trial court had stated that the judgment "`resolves all controversies pending in this case with prejudice and is final in accordance with the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure,'" the trial court's failure either to cite Rule 54(b) or to quote the language of that rule rendered its purported Rule 54(b) certification invalid. Id. See also Marlow v. Waters, 858 So.2d 980 (Ala.Civ.App. 2003) (concluding that the trial court had not validly certified the judgment as final pursuant to Rule 54(b) by stating that a party had 42 days to file a notice of appeal).
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    U.S. v. Colorado Eastern R. Co.

    50 F.3d 1530 (10th Cir. 1995)   Cited 142 times   
    Holding any claim for apportionment of cleanup costs between PRPs is a claim for contribution
    Where defendants bear the burden of proving divisibility, responsible parties rarely escape joint and several liability. O'Neil, 883 F.2d at 178-79. Therefore, CERCLA, as originally enacted, left a PRP faced with the prospect of being singled out as the defendant in a cost recovery action without any apparent means of fairly apportioning CERCLA costs awarded against it to other PRPs. The courts responded to this inequity by recognizing an implicit federal right to contribution where PRPs have been subject to joint and several liability and have incurred response costs in excess of their pro rata share. See Tinney, 933 F.2d at 1515; O'Neil, 883 F.2d at 179; Mardan Corp. v. C.G.C. Music Ltd., 804 F.2d 1454, 1457 n. 3 (9th Cir. 1986) ("district courts have interpreted § 107 of CERCLA to impose, as a matter of federal law, joint and several liability for indivisible injuries with a correlative right of contribution") (citations omitted).
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    Ricci v. DeStefano

    557 U.S. 557 (2009)   Cited 1,797 times   21 Legal Analyses   
    Holding that a city's making promotion decisions based on race would violate Title VII without a "valid defense"
    Other firefighters spoke against certifying the test results. They described the test questions as outdated or not relevant to firefighting practices in New Haven. Gary Tinney stated that source materials “came out of New York.... Their makeup of their city and everything is totally different than ours.” Id., at A774–A775; see also id., at A779, A780–A781. And they criticized the test materials, a full set of which cost about $500, for being too expensive and too long.
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    Randolph v. Ohio Dept. of Youth Services

    453 F.3d 724 (6th Cir. 2006)   Cited 344 times   1 Legal Analyses   
    Holding that liability to facility attaches where coworkers sat idly by as plaintiff was subjected to multiple physical attacks
    The district court erred in its holding as to liability. First, Randolph has presented sufficient evidence to survive summary judgment on the question of whether CYC had actual or constructive notice of the harassment. Randolph testified that she and her food service co-workers complained about the verbal harassment on several occasions to supervisors to no avail. Randolph's testimony also indicated that the supervisors were aware of the harassment but largely ignored it. In fact, as Tinney alleged, supervisors instructed the food service workers to stop complaining. More troubling than CYC's lukewarm response to the verbal harassment, however, is its response to Randolph's allegations of physical assault. While Randolph did not report these incidents immediately after they occurred, it is undisputed that she did eventually report both the choking incident and the two sexual assaults. Therefore, Randolph presented evidence sufficient to establish that CYC had actual notice of the hostile work environment to which she was subjected. The district court focused on the fact that Randolph failed to report the incidents in accordance with CYC's sexual harassment policy, on…
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    Tinney v. Shores

    77 F.3d 378 (11th Cir. 1996)   Cited 136 times   
    Holding that section 14 immunizes the state from both suit and liability
    As in McKinney, Patsy is inapplicable here. Under Parratt and Hudson, the Tinneys have failed to state a valid procedural due process claim because they have not alleged that Alabama law provided them with an inadequate post-deprivation remedy. Thus, the district court erred by denying summary judgment.
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