The dissent suggests that our conclusion in Artuz, that state procedural bars "prescrib[ing] a rule of decision for a court" confronted with certain claims previously adjudicated or not properly presented are not "filing" conditions, requires the conclusion that the time limit at issue here also is not a "filing" condition. Post, at 425-426; see Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U. S., at 10-11 (discussing N. Y. Crim. Proc. Law §§ 440.10(2)(a) and (c) (McKinney 1994)). The dissent ignores the fact that Artuz itself distinguished between time limits and procedural bars. 531 U. S., at 8-10. For purposes of determining what are "filing" conditions, there is an obvious distinction between time limits, which go to the very initiation of a petition and a court's ability to consider that petition, and the type of "rule of decision" procedural bars at issue in Artuz, which go to the ability to obtain relief. Far from requiring "verbal gymnastics," it must be the case that a petition that cannot even be initiated or considered due to the failure to include a timely claim is not "properly filed." Id., at 10.
This Frady has failed to do. At the outset, we emphasize that this would be a different case had Frady brought before the District Court affirmative evidence indicating that he had been convicted wrongly of a crime of which he was innocent. But Frady, it must be remembered, did not assert at trial that he and Richard Gordon beat Thomas Bennett to death without malice. Instead, Frady claimed he had nothing whatever to do with the crime. The evidence, however, was overwhelming, and Frady promptly abandoned that theory on appeal. Frady I, 121 U.S. App. D.C., at 95, 348 F.2d, at 101. Since that time, Frady has never presented colorable evidence, even from his own testimony, indicating such justification, mitigation, or excuse that would reduce his crime from murder to manslaughter.
It is also worth noting that Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U. S. 4 (2000), was decided only seven months after petitioner's habeas judgment became final. In cases where significant time has elapsed between a habeas judgment and the relevant change in procedural law, it would be within a district court's discretion to leave such a judgment in repose.
9. Reprimand for Failure to Fill Air Bottle. In May 2010, Plaintiff inadvertently failed to fill a Scott air bottle during his inspection of a fire truck. The operator who noticed Plaintiff's small error reported the offense, and Plaintiff was reprimanded. Typically, when an equipment operator finds something that needs attention ( e.g., top off an air bottle), it is customary practice “to simply perform the duty missed/neglected by the prior shift without the necessity of formally reporting said offense to superior officials.” However, the employee who noticed Plaintiff's error reported the offense because he had been instructed to “report anything he saw [Plaintiff] doing wrong to a supervisor immediately.” According to Union Representative Laura Misner, it “appeared that [Plaintiff] was being singled-out for formal reprimand for failure to comply with this policy/procedure or for any future incidents which may be routinelyand customarily ignored by fellow KDPS ... employees.”
Joseph M. Sellers, Christine E. Webber, Jenny R. Yang, Kalpana Kotagal, Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll PLLC, Washington, D.C., Brad Seligman, Jocelyn D. Larkin, The Impact Fund, Berkeley, CA, Steven Stemerman, Elizabeth A. Lawrence, Davis, Cowell & Bowe, LLP, San Francisco, CA, Arcelia Hurtado, Noreen Farell, Equal Rights Advocates, San Francisco, CA, Sheila Y. Thomas, Law Office of Sheila Thomas, Oakland, CA, Stephen Tinkler, The Tinkler Law Firm, Santa Fe, NM, Merit Bennett, The Bennett Firm, Santa Fe, NM, Debra Gardner, Baltimore, MD, Shauna Marshall, Hastings College of the Law, San Francisco, CA, for Respondents.
The Social Security Administration gives the most weight to opinions from a claimant's treating source; accordingly, an ALJ is procedurally required to "give good reasons in [its] notice of determination or decision for the weight [it gives the claimant's] treating source's opinion." Id. However, this requirement only applies to treating sources. Id. at 876. With regard to nontreating, but examining, sources, the agency will simply "[g]enerally  give more weight to the opinion of a source who has examined [the claimant] than to the opinion of a source who has not examined" him. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(1); see also Smith, 482 F.3d at 875. Because Dr. Bennett should not have been afforded controlling weight, in order to determine how much weight to give Dr. Bennett's opinion, the ALJ should consider factors including the length and nature of the treatment relationship, the evidence that the physician offered in support of her opinion, how consistent the opinion is with the record as a whole, and whether the physician was practicing in her specialty. See 20 C.F.R. 404.1527(d).
First, we presume that a statutory cause of action extends only to plaintiffs whose interests “fall within the zone of interests protected by the law invoked.” Allen, 468 U.S., at 751, 104 S. Ct. 3315, 82 L. Ed. 2d 556. The modern “zone of interests” formulation originated in Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 90 S. Ct. 827, 25 L. Ed. 2d 184 (1970), as a limitation on the cause of action for judicial review conferred by the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). We have since made clear, however, that it applies to all statutorily created causes of action; that it is a “requirement of general application”; and that Congress is presumed to “legislat[e] against the background of” the zone-of-interests limitation, “which applies unless it is expressly negated.” Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 163, 117 S. Ct. 1154, 137 L. Ed. 2d 281 (1997); see also Holmes, supra, at 287-288, 112 S. Ct. 1311, 117 L. Ed. 2d 532 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment). It is “perhaps more accurat[e],” though not very different as a practical matter, to say that the limitation always applies and is never negated, but that our analysis of certain…
The majority of Courts of Appeals have held that a plaintiff need not plead a prima facie case of discrimination under McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), in order to survive a motion to dismiss. See, e.g., Sparrow v. United Air Lines, Inc., 216 F.3d 1111, 1114 (CADC 2000); Bennett v. Schmidt, 153 F.3d 516, 518 (CA7 1998); Ring v. First Interstate Mortgage, Inc., 984 F.2d 924 (CA8 1993). Others, however, maintain that a complaint must contain factual allegations that support each element of a prima facie case. In addition to the case below, see Jackson v. Columbus, 194 F.3d 737, 751 (CA6 1999).
Although In re Burrus technically did not involve a construction of the diversity statute, as we understand Barber to have done, its statement that "[t]he whole subject of the domestic relations of husband and wife, parent and child, belongs to the laws of the States, and not to the laws of the United States," id., at 593-594, has been interpreted by the federal courts to apply with equal vigor in suits brought pursuant to diversity jurisdiction. See, e.g., Bennett v. Bennett, 221 U.S.App.D.C. 90, 93, 682 F.2d 1039, 1042 (1982); Solomon v. Solomon, 516 F.2d 1018, 1025 (CA3 1975); Hernstadt v. Hernstadt, 373 F.2d 316, 317 (CA2 1967); see generally 13B C. Wright, A. Miller, E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3609, pp. 477-479, nn. 28-32 (1984). This application is consistent with Barber's directive to limit federal courts' exercise of diversity jurisdiction over suits for divorce and alimony decrees. See Barber, 21 How. at 584. We conclude, therefore, that the domestic relations exception, as articulated by this Court since Barber, divests the federal courts of power to issue divorce, alimony, and child custody decrees. Given the long passage of time…
On remand, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the District Court in all major respects except the damages award, which it reversed and remanded for a new trial. See 937 F.2d, at 1339-1340. The only part of the Court of Appeals' decision that is at issue here is its affirmance of summary judgment in favor of Arthur Young on the RICO claim. Like the District Court, the Court of Appeals applied the "operation or management" test articulated in Bennett v. Berg and held that Arthur Young's conduct did not "rise to the level of participation in the management or operation of the Co-op." See 937 F.2d, at 1324. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit also has adopted an "operation or management" test. See Yellow Bus Lines, Inc. v. Drivers, Chauffeurs Helpers Local Union 639, 286 U.S.App.D.C. 182, 188, 913 F.2d 948, 954 (1990) (en banc), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1222 (1991). We granted certiorari, 502 U.S. 1090 (1992), to resolve the conflict between these cases and Bank of America National Trust Savings Assn. v. Touche Ross Co., 782 F.2d 966, 970 (CA11 1986) (rejecting requirement that a defendant participate in the operation or management of an…