Contrary to Plaintiff’s contention and as discussed in detail supra, Plaintiff did not properly serve BRLI on September 1, 2017. Rather, Plaintiff’s process server’s rushed and careless attempt at service on September 1 fell far short of the explicit requirements for service of process on a corporation as set forth in N.J. Ct. R. 4:4-4(a)(6).

Plaintiff filed its Complaint with this Court on December 16, 2016 alleging patent infringement of U.S. Patent No. 5,902,912 as a violation of 35 USC. §271 against defendant MEK Chemical. In Paragraph 5 of the Complaint, Honeywell has made the following allegations as factual assertions, ostensibly after reasonable inquiry: Case 2:16-cv-09322-SDW-LDW Document 9-18 Filed 01/24/17 Page 7 of 14 PageID: 286 3 5994917.1 5. This Court has personal jurisdiction over MEK Chemical under the provisions of the New Jersey Long Arm Statute, N.J. CT R. 4:4-4, and consistent with the underlying due process principles of the U.S. Constitution. MEK Chemical is doing business in New Jersey, has offered for sale and sold products made by an infringing process in New Jersey, and has purposely shipped or caused to be shipped products made by an

Plaintiff filed its Complaint with this Court on December 16, 2016 alleging patent infringement of U.S. Patent No. 5,902,912 as a violation of 35 USC. §271 against defendant MEK Chemical. In Paragraph 5 of the Complaint, Honeywell has made the following allegations as factual assertions, ostensibly after reasonable inquiry: Case 2:16-cv-09322-SDW-LDW Document 8-18 Filed 01/23/17 Page 7 of 14 PageID: 179 3 5994917.1 5. This Court has personal jurisdiction over MEK Chemical under the provisions of the New Jersey Long Arm Statute, N.J. CT R. 4:4-4, and consistent with the underlying due process principles of the U.S. Constitution. MEK Chemical is doing business in New Jersey, has offered for sale and sold products made by an infringing process in New Jersey, and has purposely shipped or caused to be shipped products made by an

Id. (citing DeJames v. Magnificence Carriers, Inc., 654 F.2d 280, 284 (3d Cir. 1981)); N.J. Ct. R. 4:4- 4(b)(1); see also Jacobs v. Walt Disney World Co., 309 N.J. Super. 443, 452 (App. Div. 1998). New Jersey courts thus “look to federal law for the interpretation of the limits on in personam jurisdiction.”

The New Jersey long-arm rule extends to the limits of the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause. See N.J. Ct. R. 4:4-4; Carteret Sav. Bank, FA v. Shushan, 954 F.2d 141, 145 (3d Cir. 1992). To satisfy the Due Process Clause, a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant if that defendant has “certain minimum contacts with [the forum state] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (internal quotation marks omitted).

The New Jersey long-arm rule extends to the limits of the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause. See N.J. Ct. R. 4:4-4; see also Carteret Sav. Bank, FA v. Shushan, 954 F.2d 141, 145 (3d Cir. 1992). To satisfy the Due Process Clause, a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant if that defendant has “certain minimum contacts with [the forum state] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Int.’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945) (internal quotation marks omitted). Depending on the type of minimum contacts, personal jurisdiction can be specific or general.

Here, New Jersey’s long-arm statute extends the exercise of personal jurisdiction to the constitutional limit. See N.J. Ct. R. 4:4-4. Therefore, “[i]n New Jersey, this inquiry is collapsed into a single step because the New Jersey long-arm statute permits the exercise of personal jurisdiction to the fullest limits of due process.”

2016). NJ’s long-arm statute provides that “[t]he primary method of obtaining in personam jurisdiction over a defendant in this State is by causing the summons and complaint to be personally served within this State… on any officer, director … or on a person at the registered office of the corporation in charge thereof…” and extends the exercise of personal jurisdiction over nonresidents to the full extent permitted by due process.3 N.J.Ct.R. 4:4-4(6) (emphasis added); Colida v. LG Elecs., Inc., 77 Fed. Appx. 523, 525 (Fed. Cir. 2003).

Id. (citing N.J. Ct. R. 4:4-4(c)). A district court sitting in New Jersey may therefore exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant if the defendant has "certain minimum contacts with [New Jersey] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'"

In New Jersey, “[i]f personal service cannot be effected after a reasonable and good faith attempt . . . service may be made by mailing a copy of the summons and complaint by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested, to the usual place of abode of the defendant.” See New Jersey Court Rule 4:4-3. In the case at bar, the process server’s affidavit states that he mailed process to Luzunaris via regular first class mail, not via either registered or certified mail, with a request that a receipt be returned to him by the United States Postal Service.