The court must ask the defendant whether the defendant wants a lawyer and, if so, whether the defendant is financially unable to retain one.
The ability to post bond for pretrial release does not make the defendant ineligible for appointment of a lawyer. The court reviews an appointing authority's determination of indigency de novo and may consider information not presented to the appointing authority.
The court should encourage any defendant who appears without counsel to be screened for indigency and potential appointment of counsel.
The court may refuse to adjourn a proceeding for the appointment of counsel or allow a defendant to retain counsel if an adjournment would significantly prejudice the prosecution, and the defendant has not been reasonably diligent in seeking counsel.
Mich. Ct. R. 6.005
Staff comment: The proposed amendment of MCR 6.005 would clarify the duties of attorneys in preconviction appeals.
The staff comment is not an authoritative construction by the Court. In addition, adoption of an amendment in no way reflects a substantive determination by this Court.
A copy of this order will be given to the Secretary of the State Bar and to the State Court Administrator so that they can make the notifications specified in MCR 1.201. Comments on the proposal may be sent to the Supreme Court Clerk in writing or electronically by October 1, 2021, at P.O. Box 30052, Lansing, MI 48909, or ADMcomment@courts.mi.gov. When filing a comment, please refer to ADM File No. 2020-13. Your comments and the comments of others will be posted under the chapter affected by this proposal at Proposed & Recently Adopted Orders on Admin Matters page.
WELCH, J. (concurring). I concur in the Court's order publishing for comment proposed changes to MCR 6.005 that are designed to clarify a criminal-defense trial attorney's responsibilities in handling preconviction appeals. I write separately because, while I recognize several longstanding problems linked to defendants being unrepresented before the Court of Appeals during preconviction appeals, I am concerned that the proposed amendments may not get to the root of the problem and may have unintended consequences. Currently, a criminal-defense trial attorney can withdraw from representing his or her client in a preconviction appeal, MCR 6.005(H)(4), or simply "notify the Court of Appeals that the lawyer will not be filing a brief in response to the application." MCR 6.005(H)(3)(ii). While I support a higher level of responsibility than what is set forth in our current rule, I question whether the proposed amendment may create additional problems. For example:
(1) Can an attorney, who has only been paid to handle trial court proceedings and whose client is unwilling to pay more for the preconviction appeal (but who is not indigent), withdraw as counsel and notify the Court of Appeals that the lawyer or the defendant will not file a response?
(1) Can an attorney, who has only been paid to handle trial court proceedings and whose client is unwilling to pay more for the preconviction appeal (but who is not indigent), withdraw as counsel and notify the Court of Appeals that the lawyer or the defendant will not file a response?
(2) What if an attorney petitions the trial court for extra funding to handle an appeal for a retained but poor client and the trial court rejects the request? Is that attorney still required to handle the appeal?
(3) Can an attorney (whether court-appointed or retained) make a referral to appellate counsel and opt out of handling the appeal even if the client decides not to hire the recommended appellate counsel? Would this be a basis to notify the Court of Appeals that the defendant has knowingly elected to not file a response?
(4) Can an attorney, who prefers to focus on trial-level work only, make it clear in an engagement agreement that the attorney does not handle appeals and will refer such matters out if needed? If so, would such an agreement be enforceable in light of the proposed amendments?
As a final matter, it is not clear to me how the proposed rule would mesh with MRPC 1.1, which states that an attorney has an ethical obligation not to litigate matters he or she is not competent to handle, or with MRPC 1.16, which discusses an attorney's obligation to withdraw in certain circumstances and discretion to withdraw in others (including a client's failure to abide by payment terms in a retention agreement).
I applaud the Court's efforts to help ensure that defendants in criminal cases will have representation during preconviction appeals. While I recognize that in most cases a transition to or partnership with appellate counsel will likely occur, it also seems predictable that there will be situations in which one of the scenarios I have outlined above could arise. I hope that the public comment process will, at a minimum, address and clarify the concerns that I have outlined above.