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Zeitler v. City of Rochester

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, Fourth Department
May 15, 1969
32 A.D.2d 728 (N.Y. App. Div. 1969)

Summary

finding service of a notice of claim on an agent of a municipality with whom the City was " united in interest" to provide timely notice to the municipality

Summary of this case from Francis v. City of New York

Opinion

May 15, 1969

Appeal from the Monroe Special Term.

Present — Goldman, P.J., Witmer, Gabrielli, Moule and Bastow, JJ.


Order unanimously reversed, with costs and disbursements, and motion to dismiss complaint as to defendant, City of Rochester, denied. Memorandum: The statute (General Municipal Law, § 50-i, subd. 1, par. [c]) provides that an action such as this must be commenced within "one year and ninety days after the happening of the event upon which the claim is based." The pertinent date of the event herein was January 23, 1966. The summons and complaint were timely served (April 17, 1967) upon the individual defendant but it is not disputed that service on the city on April 25, 1967 was two days late. Normally such late service upon the municipality would not be fatal because another statute (CPLR 203, subd. [b]) provides in substance that timely service upon any one of two or more defendants, who are "united in interest" as to a claim, permanently deprives all codefendants of the defense of the Statute of Limitations (1 Weinstein-Korn-Miller, N Y Civ. Prac., par. 203.05). The defendants are clearly "united in interest" by reason of the city's alleged vicarious liability based on an employer-employee relationship ( ibid, par. 203.06, pp. 2-45, 2-46 and cases there cited). The city contends, however, that section 50-i is here controlling because of the further provision in subdivision 2 thereof that the time limitation (one year and 90 days) for commencement of the action "shall be applicable notwithstanding any inconsistent provisions of law, general, special or local". This section was added by chapter 788 of the Laws of 1959 as the result of a study by the Joint Legislative Committee on Tort Liability. (Cf. Erickson v. Town of Henderson, 30 A.D.2d 282). The evil sought to be remedied was thus stated by the committee: "The tolling provisions of section 24 of the Civil Practice Act [now CPLR 204] now result in extension of the one year period of limitation for various periods up to ninety days. For purposes of clarity and uniformity this bill provides for a period of one year and ninety days with express provision against further tolling." (N.Y. Legis. Doc., 1959, No. 36, p. 21). It, accordingly, has been held that statutory stays pursuant to CPLR 204 (subd. [a]) (formerly Civ. Prac. Act, § 24) theretofore applied by the courts in actions involving claims of municipal liability for tort have been eliminated by the new provisions of section 50-i of General Municipal Law. ( Joiner v. City of New York, 26 A.D.2d 840.) We find no legislative intent, however, that the provision in subdivision 2 of section 50-i rendered inoperative the ameliorative provision of CPLR 203 (subd. [b]) which made timely the service herein upon the municipality. A similar conclusion has been reached by courts of concurrent jurisdiction when considering other provisions of CPLR ( La Fave v. Town of Franklin, 20 A.D.2d 738; Abbatemarco v. Town of Brookhaven, 26 A.D.2d 664; see, also, Robinson v. City of New York, 24 A.D.2d 260).


Summaries of

Zeitler v. City of Rochester

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, Fourth Department
May 15, 1969
32 A.D.2d 728 (N.Y. App. Div. 1969)

finding service of a notice of claim on an agent of a municipality with whom the City was " united in interest" to provide timely notice to the municipality

Summary of this case from Francis v. City of New York

In Zeitler v. City of Rochester, 32 A.D.2d 728, 302 N.Y.S.2d 207 (4th Dept. 1969), for example, when the individual defendant, an employee of the City of Rochester, was served on the final day of the statutory period applicable to the City, but the City itself was not served until two days later, the court held that the statute of limitations had been tolled as to the City by the service of the summons on the City's employee with whom the City was united in interest.

Summary of this case from Paschall v. Mayone

In Zeitler v. City of Rochester (32 A.D.2d 728) we recognized that subdivision 2 of section 50-i does not render inoperative all provisions of CPLR article 2 which would in effect permit the maintenance of an action against a municipality without service of process on it within the one-year and 90-day period prescribed by subdivision 1 of section 50-i.

Summary of this case from Corbett v. Fayetteville-Manlius School
Case details for

Zeitler v. City of Rochester

Case Details

Full title:EMMA N. ZEITLER, Appellant, v. CITY OF ROCHESTER et al., Respondents

Court:Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, Fourth Department

Date published: May 15, 1969

Citations

32 A.D.2d 728 (N.Y. App. Div. 1969)
302 N.Y.S.2d 207

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