Zarvela v. Artuz

2 Analyses of this case by attorneys

  1. Capital Defense Weekly, August 12, 2002

    Capital Defense NewsletterAugust 11, 2002

    In Zarvela v. Artuz, the Second Circuit faced a similar mixed petition problem. See 254 F.3d 374, 380 (2001), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 506 (2001).

  2. Capital Defense Weekly, September 10, 2001

    Capital Defense NewsletterSeptember 10, 2001

    ge Cohen for addressing frankly this problem.Nara v. Frank,No. 99-3364 (3rd Cir 08/30/01) Where a habeas petitioner alleges serious misconduct on the part of his appointed counsel, such as stating to him that there was no time constraint on filing a habeas petition, the district court should hold an evidentiary hearing to determine if there are extraordinary circumstances to justify equitable tolling.Neverson v. Bissonnett,No. 00-1044 (1st Cir. 08/20/2001) First Circuit delineates scope of "stay and abeyance" procedures for that Circuit in cases of mixed petitions following Duncan v. Walker.To be sure, the petitioner could have improved his position by requesting that the district court stay, rather than dismiss, Petition No. 1. See Duncan, 121 S. Ct. at 2130 (Stevens, J., concurring) (observing that "there is no reason why a district court should not retain jurisdiction over a meritorious claim and stay further proceedings pending the complete exhaustion of state remedies"); see also Zarvela v. Artuz, 254 F.3d 374, 380 (2d Cir. 2001); Freeman v. Page, 208 F.3d 572, 577 (7th Cir. 2000); Calderon v. United States Dist. Ct., 134 F.3d 981, 986-87 (9th Cir. 1998). Post-AEDPA, this will be the preferable course in many cases involving "mixed" petitions - and it may be the only appropriate course in cases in which an outright dismissal threatens to imperil the timeliness of a collateral attack.Henderson v. Collins,No. 99-4046 (6th Cir. 08/28/2001) An Allen charge in a state that requires unanimous jury verdicts for either life or death is not error.In the end, then, we return to the question that we posed at the outset of our discussion: Can the case before us be materially distinguished from Lowenfield?