Filed November 14, 2013
Under the principles Ashe set forth, a "hung count is not a 'relevant' part of the 'record of [the] prior proceeding.'" Yeager v. United States, 557 U.S. at 121, guoting Ashe v , Swenson, 397 U.S. at 444; see Schiro v. Farley, 510 U.S. 222, 232 (1994) (applying Ashe in determining whether co l Lat.e.ra L estoppel barred evidence at the sentencing phase of the defendant's capital trial). Hence, the District Attorney has failed to offer any reason why Acevedo should be overruled, let alone meet his burden of 17 ( ••• continued) P.2d 1112, 1115 (Idaho 1994) (the state did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue at the prior proceeding), and State v. Dean, 589 A.2d 929, 932-933 n.5 (Me. 1991) (evidence of prior misconduct was admitted for a "limited purpose and could be considered for that limited purpose" if the jury concluded that it was established by a preponderance) 47 overcoming stare decisis.
Filed May 24, 2012
The Supreme Court held that, to the extent the fraud acquittals necessarily decided that the defendant was not in possession of any insider information, the issue-preclusion component of the double jeopardy clause barred a retrial on the insider trading charges.® (Id. at p. _—s« (174 L.Ed.2d at pp. 87-91].) The same rationale applies here.
Filed November 14, 2013
The Supreme Court only recently reaffirmed this holding. See Yeager v. United States, 557 U.S. 110, 123 (2009) (“Thus, if the possession of insider information was a critical issue of ultimate fact in all of the charges against petitioner, a jury verdict that necessarily decided that issue in his favor protects him from prosecution for any charge for which that is an essential element”) (emphasis supplied). Although this Court can impose more exacting double jeopardy protection under the New York State Constitution (see Defendant’s Brief at 2-3, 46 n.17), the Court should nonetheless look to Dowling for guidance in this area of the law.
Filed November 14, 2013
Thus, collateral estoppel should apply only if a defendant can demonstrate that the verdict as a whole signals a certain factual finding, with due regard not only for any acquittals, but also for the significance of any accompanying convictions. See generally Yeager v. United States, 557 U.S. 110, 121-25 (2009); Goodman, 69 N.Y.2d at 39; see also Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. 390, 393 (1932) (the “most that can be said” is that the “verdict shows that either in the acquittal or the conviction the jury did not speak their real conclusions, but that does not show that they were not convinced of the defendant’s guilt”). In the end, if a mixed verdict is factually inconsistent, or if a defendant can show no more than that the basis for the verdict is “ambiguous,” he cannot establish that the jury resolved the factual matter underlying the acquittal in his favor, and cannot sustain the heavy burden necessary to establish collateral estoppel.
Filed December 30, 2009
An acquittal or conviction and sentence under any one bars a prosecution for the same act or omission under any other.” And see Sanders v. Superior Court (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 609 [defendant convicted of grand theft; con- viction reversed on appealfor insufficient evidence; prosecution for same conductas forgery (a related offense) is precluded by section 654]. 2S See Yeager v. United States (2009) 129 S.Ct. 2360, 2368- 2369: if a certain element “was a critical issue of ultimate fact” in the original charge against the defendant, “a jury verdict that neces- 67 tage point of the trial court is superior to the narrow view ofan ad- vocate (prosecutor or defense counsel), and permits the court to as- sess the actual evidenceat trial with an eye to the ultimate interests of justice. The trial court can and should exercise its discretion to instruct in such circumstances, whetherthe lesser offense is included or related.
Filed April 8, 2013
For issue preclusion to take effect in a subsequent trial, the issue must have been “necessarily decided” by the prior jury. Yeager v. United States, 557 U.S. 110, 119 (2009). Usually, a special verdict clarifies which issues the jury necessarily decided.
Filed June 15, 2012
The Supreme Court has identified two vitally important interests vis a vis the Double Jeopardy clause: (1) that the government should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense; and (2) the preservation of the finality of judgments. See Yeager v. United States, 557 U.S. 110, 117-118 (2009) (citations omitted). Here, Counts One and Two of the Indictment charge separate and distinct crimes, and, therefore, Movant’s claim has no basis under the law.