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Wyshak v. City Nat. Bank

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit
Nov 20, 1979
607 F.2d 824 (9th Cir. 1979)

Summary

holding that plaintiff was not prejudiced by assertion of statute of limitations defense in amended answer because the defense would have been "effective at the outset of [plaintiff's] suit."

Summary of this case from Owens v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc.

Opinion

Nos. 76-2891, 76-3152.

September 21, 1979. Rehearing Denied November 20, 1979.

Robert H. Wyshak, Los Angeles, Cal., for plaintiff-appellant.

Michael Holtzman, Los Angeles, Cal., for defendant-appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California.

Before ELY and TRASK, Circuit Judges, and FITZGERALD, District Judge.

Honorable James M. Fitzgerald, United States District Judge for the District of Alaska, sitting by designation.


Plaintiff-appellant Robert H. Wyshak appeals from a district court order granting summary judgment in favor of defendant-appellee City National Bank (CNB). On February 4, 1974, Wyshak brought this action in the United States District Court alleging that CNB violated section 7(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act), 15 U.S.C. § 78g(d), and Federal Reserve Board Regulation U, 12 C.F.R. §§ 221.1 et seq., promulgated thereunder. The alleged violation by CNB was the extension to Wyshak of loans secured by margin stock in excess of the maximum loan values for that stock allowed under Regulation U. The district court found that the action was time-barred. We affirm its decision. Because of our holding, we need not reach the question of whether Regulation U was, in fact, violated, nor whether a private cause of action exists for such a violation. Even if a private cause of action exists for violation of section 7 margin requirements appellant Wyshak cannot properly bring such an action.

The district court had original jurisdiction under 15 U.S.C. § 78aa. This court has appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

Section 7(d) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78g(d) states, in pertinent part:

"It shall be unlawful for any person . . . to extend or maintain credit or to arrange for the extension or maintenance of credit for the purpose of purchasing or carrying any security, in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve [Board] shall prescribe to prevent the excessive use of credit. . . ."

Regulation U, 12 C.F.R. §§ 221.1 et seq., was adopted by the Federal Reserve Board pursuant to the Congressional mandate of section 7(d). It prescribes the maximum amount (a percentage, based upon the value of the collateral) which a bank may lend, when a loan is secured by stock and extended to the borrower for the purpose of purchasing or carrying stock registered on a national stock exchange. Such stock is then called "margin stock" and the loans are referred to as "purpose loans," or "purpose credit," to contrast them with those outside the scope of Regulation U, called "non-purpose loans."

Compare Pearlstein v. Scudder German, 429 F.2d 1136, 1140-41 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1013, 91 S.Ct. 1250, 28 L.Ed.2d 550 (1971); ( Pearlstein I); Goldman v. Bank of Commonwealth, 467 F.2d 439, 445 (6th Cir. 1972); Serzysko v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 290 F. Supp. 74, 78 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), aff'd. 409 F.2d 1360 (2d. Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 904, 90 S.Ct. 218, 24 L.Ed.2d 180 (1969); Remar v. Clayton Securities Corp., 81 F. Supp. 1014, 1017 (D.Mass. 1949), with Pearlstein v. Scudder German, 527 F.2d 1141, 1145, n.3 (2d Cir. 1975) ( Pearlstein II); Capos v. Mid-America Nat. Bank, of Chicago, 581 F.2d 676, 679 (7th Cir. 1978); Utah State University of Agriculture and Applied Science v. Bear, Stearns Co., 549 F.2d 164, 170 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 890, 98 S.Ct. 264, 54 L.Ed.2d 176 (1977).

I

The parties in this action are in a borrower-lender relationship. Their dealings began in 1958 when Wyshak arranged to borrow $95,000 from CNB for six months. Of that loan, $82,000 was used to retire two prior obligations to other banks in Los Angeles. Nearly half of the remaining $13,000 was used by Wyshak to retire a margin account debt he maintained with a Los Angeles stockbroker. Wyshak contends that CNB violated Regulation U when it allowed him to use the loan for this purpose.

Prior to its maturity date, the $95,000 loan was renewed. Thereafter, the loan was renewed periodically. In 1964, 1965, 1967, and finally on December 31, 1969, Wyshak obtained additional loans from CNB. Wyshak also used these loans to purchase stock. On December 20, 1972, Wyshak consolidated and renewed all of the above debts by executing a promissory note in the amount of $210,500 in favor of CNB. When Wyshak failed to repay the note upon maturity in January 1974, CNB sold the collateral securing the note, reducing Wyshak's indebtedness to $111,159.62, and demanded payment of the unpaid amount.

Thereupon Wyshak commenced this action in district court alleging that CNB violated Regulation U in extending credit to him. CNB filed an answer and counterclaimed, seeking to recover the unpaid balance on the note. CNB was later allowed to amend its answer to plead the statute of limitations as an affirmative defense. The amended answer alleged that "plaintiff's claims are barred by the applicable statute of limitations." Wyshak then sought to amend his original complaint to allege that fraudulent concealment of Regulation U violations by CNB tolled any limitations statute. The district court denied Wyshak's motion and granted CNB's motion for summary judgment.

II

The district court found Cal.Code Civ.Proc. § 338.1, which provides a three year limitations period for actions based on liabilities created by statute, to be the applicable limitations rule. Because the federal securities laws do not provide a statute of limitations applicable to claims founded upon alleged violations of section 7(d) of the 1934 Act, the appropriate limitations period must be determined by resort to state law. Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 395, 66 S.Ct. 582, 90 L.Ed. 743 (1946); Douglass v. Glen E. Hinton Investments, Inc., 440 F.2d 912, 915 (9th Cir. 1971). The court reasoned that because the federal claims under section 7(d) of the 1934 Act and Regulation U have only a statutory base, being unknown at common law, the section 338.1 limitations period for statutory claims was most appropriate to such claims. The court then found that Wyshak's cause of action accrued on December 31, 1969, the date of the final loan to Wyshak and thus the last conceivable date of a possible Regulation U violation by CNB. Since the limitations period started to run on December 13, 1969, the court held that Wyshak's 1974 suit was barred by the statute. We agree with the district court's reasoning and note that other jurisdictions have applied similar state statutes to reach the same result. See e. g., Capos v. Mid-American Nat. Bank of Chicago, 581 F.2d 676, 679 (7th Cir. 1978); Hornblower Weeks-Hemphill, Noyes v. Burchfield, 366 F. Supp. 1364, 1367 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (companion section 7(c) and Regulation T).

Wyshak's attempt to come within the section 338.1 time limits must be rejected. Wyshak points out that on December 20, 1972, CNB consolidated and renewed all of his outstanding loans. He argues that the 1974 suit was timely because this 1972 loan renewal is tainted by the allegedly violative original loans and so must be considered in determining the beginning of the limitations period. This argument is incorrect. Renewals are not treated under Regulation U as further extensions of credit and do not come within the purview of Regulation U requirements. See 12 C.F.R. § 221.3(e). The 1972 loan renewal is thus outside the scope of Regulation U and cannot be used to maintain an action under it.

III

Wyshak's procedural arguments are without merit. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing CNB to amend its answer to plead the statute of limitations defense. Wyshak was not prejudiced by the later assertion of the defense because the limitations rule, if applicable, would be effective at the outset of Wyshak's suit. In the absence of prejudice to the opposing party, leave to amend should be freely given. Fed.R.Civ.P. § 15(a); Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182, 83 S.Ct. 227, 9 L.Ed.2d 222 (1962); Howey v. United States, 481 F.2d 1187, 1190 (9th Cir. 1973).

The statute of limitations was also adequately pleaded. The procedural sufficiency of a pleaded claim or defense in federal court is governed by the federal rules, even though the defense relied on may be a state defense. Although California law provided here the applicable limitations period, Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(c) determines whether the pleading of the limitations defense was sufficient. Rule 8(c) provides, in pertinent part, that "a party shall set forth affirmatively . . . [a defense based upon the] statute of limitations." The key to determining the sufficiency of pleading an affirmative defense is whether it gives plaintiff fair notice of the defense. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47-48, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957); 5 Wright Miller Federal Practice and Procedure, § 1274 at 323. In the instant case, Wyshak received fair notice of the nature of the defense pleaded. Prior to the filling of the amended answer, Wyshak received from CNB a notice of the Motion for Leave to Amend Answer and Counterclaim. To that notice there was attached a copy of the amended answer and a Memorandum of Points and Authorities. While the amended answer simply alleged that "plaintiff's claims are barred by the applicable statute of limitations," the attached memorandum made specific mention of Cal.Code Civ.Proc. § 338.1 as the statute of limitations upon which CNB relied. We find that under these circumstances the statute of limitations was adequately pleaded.

Finally, since the district court correctly ruled that section 338.1 is the appropriate limitations statute, it would have been futile for Wyshak to amend his complaint to allege fraud, since an allegation of fraud is irrelevant to the application of section 338.1. In such a case, it was not an abuse of discretion to deny Wyshak leave to file an amended pleading. Sackett v. Beaman, 399 F.2d 884, 890 (9th Cir. 1968); Caddy-Imler Creations, Inc. v. Caddy, 299 F.2d 79, 84 (9th Cir. 1962).

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.


Summaries of

Wyshak v. City Nat. Bank

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit
Nov 20, 1979
607 F.2d 824 (9th Cir. 1979)

holding that plaintiff was not prejudiced by assertion of statute of limitations defense in amended answer because the defense would have been "effective at the outset of [plaintiff's] suit."

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holding that amended answer that simply alleged that “plaintiff's claims are barred by the applicable statute of limitations” was adequate, when accompanied by attached memorandum in support of motion to amend that cited statute on which defense relied

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holding that an answer that simply alleged "plaintiff's claims are barred by the applicable statute of limitations" along with an attached memorandum that specifically identified Cal. Code Civ. P. § 338.1 as the applicable limitations period was sufficient to give the plaintiff "fair notice"

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holding that leave to amend should be freely given when doing so would not cause prejudice to the opposing party

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holding that an answer that simply alleged "plaintiff's claims are barred by the applicable statute of limitations" along with an attached memorandum that specifically identified Cal. Code Civ. P. § 338.1 as the applicable limitations period, was sufficient to give the plaintiff "fair notice"

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holding that fair notice of the nature of the defense requires more than allegation of the doctrine at issue

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holding that fair notice of the nature of the defense requires more than allegation of the doctrine at issue

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holding "key to determining the sufficiency of pleading an affirmative defense is whether it gives plaintiff fair notice of the defense"; finding statute of limitations adequately pleaded as defense, where conclusory statement thereof was supported by "attached memorandum" identifying specific provision on which defendant relied

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holding that plaintiff was not prejudiced by assertion of statute of limitations defense in amended answer because the defense would have been "effective at the outset of [plaintiff's] suit"

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holding that defendants met the Conley no-set-of-facts standard when they attached a memorandum to their answer indicating the applicable statute on which their statute-of-limitations affirmative defense relied

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holding that citing the applicable statute of limitations provided fair notice of the defense

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holding that leave to amend should be freely given so long as no prejudice to the moving party results

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holding "key to determining the sufficiency of pleading an affirmative defense is whether it gives plaintiff fair notice of the defense"

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holding that the plaintiff "was not prejudiced by the later assertion of the defense [of limitations] because the limitations rule, if applicable, would be effective at the outset of [plaintiff's] suit.

Summary of this case from Foothills of Fernley v. City of Fernley

finding no abuse of discretion where district court allowed amendment of answer to assert statute of limitations because the defense existed at the time plaintiff sued

Summary of this case from Hall v. City of Los Angeles

finding defendant provided "fair notice" of factual basis for "statute of limitations" as affirmative defense, where answer did no more than plead "plaintiff's claims are barred by the applicable statute of limitations," but defendant identified specific statute in its motion for leave to amend answer to allege such bar as defense

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finding statement invoking statute of limitations sufficiently plead where attached memo provided the appropriate statutory authority

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finding limitations period affirmative defense supplied fair notice because defendant specifically identified "the statute of limitations upon which [it] relied" in a memorandum attached to the answer

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finding sufficient defendant's allegation that "plaintiff's claims are barred by the applicable statute of limitations," where an "attached memorandum made specific mention of Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 338.1 as the statute of limitations upon which [defendant] relied"

Summary of this case from Solis v. Zenith Capital LLC

finding sufficient defendant's allegation that "plaintiff's claims are barred by the applicable statute of limitations," where an "attached memorandum made specific mention of Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 338.1 as the statute of limitations upon which [defendant] relied"

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denying motion to strike statute of limitations defense where defendant specified the applicable statute of limitations

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denying motion to strike in light of reference to specific statutory basis for an asserted defense in a memorandum

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In Wyshak, the Ninth Circuit implied that the statement “plaintiff's claims are barred by the applicable statute of limitations” does not provide fair notice; instead, a defendant must identify the specific statute of limitations which they contend bars the suit.

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In Wyshak v. City Nat'l Bank, 607 F.2d 824 (1979), the Ninth Circuit specifically addressed the pleading standard needed when asserting an affirmative defense.

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Case details for

Wyshak v. City Nat. Bank

Case Details

Full title:ROBERT H. WYSHAK, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, v. CITY NATIONAL BANK…

Court:United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit

Date published: Nov 20, 1979

Citations

607 F.2d 824 (9th Cir. 1979)

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