From Casetext: Smarter Legal Research

Wright v. SFX Entertainment Inc.

United States District Court, S.D. New York
Feb 7, 2001
No. 00 CIV. 5354 (SAS) (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 7, 2001)

Opinion

No. 00 CIV. 5354 (SAS).

February 7, 2001.

For Plaintiff: Jonathan Ben-Asher, Esq., New York, New York.

For Defendants SFX Entertainment, Inc., SFX Radio Network, Inc., and Clear Channel Communications, Inc.: Gerald D. Silver, Esq. Anne L. Quintal, Esq. New York, New York.

For Defendant Steven Saslow: Richard Schaeffer, Esq., Brandon T. Davis, Esq., Teresa Boyle, Esq. New York, New York.


OPINION AND ORDER


Vernon Wright brings this action against SEX Entertainment, Inc., SEX Radio Network, Inc., Clear Channel Communications, Inc. (collectively, the "Corporate Defendants"), and Steven Saslow, asserting state law claims for breach of contract, fraud, promissory estoppel and racial discrimination in violation of the New York City Human Rights Law, N.Y.C. Admin. Code, § 8-107 et seq., and the New York State Human Rights Law, Exec. Law § 296 et seq. The Corporate Defendants move, pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA"), 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq., to compel arbitration of plaintiff's claims and to dismiss or stay this action. In the event that the Corporate Defendants' motion is granted, defendant Saslow cross moves to stay this action pending arbitration. For the foregoing reasons, the Corporate Defendants' motion to compel arbitration is granted and Saslow's motion to stay this action is denied.

The Complaint is ambiguous concerning which claims are asserted against Saslow. Although Saslow contends that only the breach of contract claim is asserted against him, see Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant Steven Saslow's Cross-Motion to Stay this Action Pending Arbitration ("Saslow Mem.") at 1, plaintiff maintains that all claims against the Corporate Defendants, except for the race discrimination claim under the New York State Human Rights Law, are asserted against Saslow. See Plaintiff's Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendant Steven Saslow's Cross-Motion to Stay this Action Pending Arbitration at 3 and n. 1. This dispute need not be resolved at this time.

I. BACKGROUND

A. The Underlying Facts

In March 1993, plaintiff, a black male, began working at Urban Entertainment Corp. ("Urban Entertainment"), which later became SJS Entertainment Corp. ("SJS"). See Complaint ¶¶ 48, 87. Plaintiff contends that he was induced to accept this employment based on Saslow's intentionally false representations. See id. ¶¶ 38-40, 47. Saslow, an officer of Urban Entertainment, promised plaintiff, inter alia, a high salary, commissions, and partial ownership of the company. See id. ¶¶ 28, 33, 34, 37. Over the next several years, Saslow continued to promise plaintiff that he would become an "owner" of Urban Entertainment and would soon be "rich." See id. ¶¶ 56, 58-61, 74. 76, 97, 101-103, 112, 117, 118, 121. In early 1998, Saslow informed the staff that SJS had been sold to SFX Entertainment, Inc. ("SEX") and assured plaintiff, once again, that he had already been "taken care of" and would become rich. Id. ¶¶ 129, 130. Saslow made these statements and promises knowing that they were not true. See id. ¶¶ 44, 45, 53, 92, 93, 123, 124, 154, 155.

On October 17, 1998, SFX terminated Saslow's employment. See id. ¶ 158. Shortly thereafter, in November, 1998, plaintiff was promoted to "Vice President and General Sales Manager" of SEX Radio Network, Inc. ("SEX Radio"). Id. ¶ 167. Approximately one year later, on November 19, 1999, plaintiff was terminated. See id. ¶ 180.

B. The Arbitration Agreement

Prior to his termination, on February 3, 1999, plaintiff executed an "Arbitration, Confidentiality, and At-Will Employment Agreement" with SFX Radio (the "Agreement"). The Agreement includes a confidentiality provision, a non-compete clause, and an at-will employment provision. See Agreement, Ex. B to 10/20/00 Affidavit of Gerald D. Silver, counsel to the Corporate Defendants ("10/20/00 Silver Aff."), at 1-2. Also included in the Agreement is an arbitration clause, which states:

3. Arbitration

(a) Except to the extent otherwise provided by law, any claim of any nature alleging a violation of law by the Company and arising out of, or related to the Employee's employment with the Company or the termination thereof, that might otherwise be subject to litigation, including but not limited to any claim of unlawful retaliation or civil rights violation, wrongful termination of employment, violation of public policy, or unlawful discrimination or harassment . . . shall be submitted to and resolved by final and binding arbitration.
(b) The arbitration shall be conducted in accordance with the then existing rules of practice and procedure of the Judicial Arbitration and Mediation Services [("JAMS")] or its successor
(c) The arbitrator shall not have the right to add to, subtract or modify any of the terms of this Agreement, nor shall he or she have the power to decide the justice or propriety of any specific provisions, which by the terms of this Agreement, are reserved solely to the Company's discretion.
IF A DISPUTE OR CLAIM ARISES ALLEGING A VIOLATION OF LAW BY THE COMPANY, THE PARTIES AGREE TO WAIVE ANY RIGHTS EACH MAY HAVE TO A JURY OR COURT TRIAL AND TO USE BINDING ARBITRATION TO RESOLVE ALL SUCH DISPUTES BETWEEN THEM.
Id. at 2-3 (underscored emphasis added, bold and capitalization in original)

The Agreement also includes a notice of claim provision, which states in relevant part:

4. Representations

(b) If I am already employed by the Company at the time of executing this Agreement:
I ACKNOWLEDGE AND CONFIRM THAT I HAVE NO CLAIMS AGAINST THE COMPANY, OR ANY OF ITS AFFILIATES, AND I HAVE NO AGREEMENTS OR UNDERSTANDINGS WITH THE COMPANY, OR ANY OF ITS AFFILIATES, THAT ARE INCONSISTENT WITH THE TERMS SET FORTH IN THIS AGREEMENT, UNLESS I DELIVER WRITTEN NOTICE OF ANY SUCH CLAIMS AND ALLEGED AGREEMENTS AND UNDERSTANDINGS TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE COMPANY, WITHIN THREE (3) BUSINESS DAYS OF EXECUTING THIS AGREEMENT.
Id. at 3 (emphasis in original).

II. DISCUSSION

A. The Corporate Defendants' Motion to Compel Arbitration

The FAA provides that "an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." 9 U.S.C. § 2. In deciding whether to compel arbitration, a district court must determine: (1) whether there is an agreement to arbitrate; (2) the scope of that agreement to arbitrate; (3) whether Congress intended the federal statutory claims, if any are asserted, to be nonarbitrable; and (4) whether to stay proceedings relating to any non-arbitrable claims pending arbitration. See Genesco, Inc. v. T. Kakiuchi Co., 815 F.2d 840, 844 (2d Cir. 1987); Mahant v. Lehman Bros., No. 99 Civ. 4421, 2000 WL 1738399, at *1 (S.D.N Y Nov. 22, 2000).

Plaintiff does not — nor could he — dispute the second, third, or fourth Genesco factors. The scope of the arbitration provision in the Agreement is clearly broad enough to encompass each of plaintiff's claims against the Corporate Defendants. See Collins Aikman Prods. Co. v. Building Sys., Inc., 58 F.3d 16, 20 (2d Cir. 1995) (stating that a clause requiring "[a]ny claim or controversy arising out of or relating to th[e] agreement" to be submitted to arbitration is the "paradigm of a broad clause" warranting "a presumption that the claims are arbitrable"). Moreover, plaintiff does not assert any federal statutory claims. See Mahant, 2000 WL 1738399, at *3. Rather, plaintiff focuses on the first factor, arguing that the Agreement is unenforceable. Specifically, plaintiff contends that the three day notice of claim provision in paragraph 4(b) is unconscionable and that the entire Agreement is a contract of adhesion. See Plaintiff's Memorandum of Law in Opposition to the Corporate Defendants' Motion to Compel Arbitration ("Pl. Mem.") at 15-16, 19-22. Plaintiff's argument is unavailing because the determination as to whether the Agreement is unenforceable must be made by the arbitrator, not this Court.

The only statutory claims asserted here — discrimination claims under the New York State and City Human Rights Laws — are arbitrable. See Mahant, 2000 WL 1738399, at *3 (citing Fletcher v. Kidder, Peabody Co., Inc., 81 N.Y.2d 623, 635 (1993)).

An unconscionable contract is one where "there is an `absence of meaningful choice on the part of one of the parties together with contract terms which are unreasonably favorable to the other party.'"Desiderio v. National Ass'n of Secs. Dealers, 207 (2d Cir. 1999) (citation omitted).

As explained by the Second Circuit:

A court will find adhesion only when the party seeking to rescind the contract establishes that the other party used "high pressure tactics," or "deceptive language," or that the contract is unconscionable. "Typical contracts of adhesion are standard-form contracts offered by large, economically powerful corporations to unrepresented, uneducated, and needy individuals on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, with no opportunity to change the contract's terms.
Klos v. Lotnicze, 133 F.3d 164, 168 (2d Cir. 1997) (quoting Aviall, Inc. v. Ryder Sys., Inc., 913 F. Supp. 826, 831 (S.D.N Y 1996)).

1. The Prima Paint Doctrine

In Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 402-04 (1967), the Supreme Court held that, under the FAA, a challenge to the making of a contract generally, as opposed to the making of the arbitration provision specifically, must be decided by the arbitrator. The Court adopted the view of the Second Circuit that "arbitration clauses as a matter of federal law are `separable' from the contracts in which they are embedded, and that where no claim is made that fraud was directed to the arbitration clause itself, a broad arbitration clause will be held to encompass arbitration of the claim that the contract itself was induced by fraud." Id. at 402.

Although Prima Paint involved a claim that the underlying contract was induced by fraud, its holding is not limited to such claims. As stated by the First Circuit:

The teaching of Prima Paint is that a federal court must not remove from the arbitrators consideration of a substantive challenge to a contract unless there has been an independent challenge to the making of the arbitration clause itself. The basis of the underlying challenge to the contract does not alter the severability principle.
Unionmutual Stock Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. Beneficial Life Ins. Co., 774 F.2d 524, 529 (1st Cir. 1985). Claims of unconscionability and adhesion contracts are similarly included within the Prima Paint rule.See Benoay v. Prudential-Bache Secs., Inc., 805 F.2d 1437, 1441 (11th Cir. 1986) ("If on the other hand, [plaintiff's] claims of adhesion [and] unconscionability . . . pertain to the contract as a whole, and not to the arbitration provision alone, then these should be resolved in arbitration."). "As long as one party's agreement to arbitrate is supported by the other's, the agreements supply their own consideration, `so objections to other parts of the contract, based on fraud or unconscionability or mistake or whatever, need not spill over to the arbitration clause.'" Belship Navigation. Inc. v. Sealift, Inc., 95 Civ. 2748, 1995 WL 447656, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. July 28, 1995) (quotingMatterhorn, Inc. v. NCR Corp., 763 F.2d 866, 869 (7th Cir. 1985)); see also Jeske v. Brooks, 875 F.2d 71, 75 (4th Cir. 1989) (stating that the alleged unconscionability of the entire contract must be decided by the arbitrator, not the court); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner Smith, Inc. v. Haydu, 637 F.2d 391, 398 (5th Cir. 1981) (same); Dale v. Prudential-Bache Secs. Inc., 719 F. Supp. 1164, 1169 (E.D.N.Y. 1989) ("Even if plaintiff's alleged misunderstanding would void the agreement, a claim of fraudulent inducement, duress or unconscionability involves the formation of the entire contract and must be determined by the arbitrator."); Brener v. Becker Paribas Inc., 628 F. Supp. 442, 446 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) ("Claims concerning duress, unconscionability, coercion, or confusion in signing should be determined by an arbitrator because those issues go to the formation of the contract.")

Leading commentators on arbitration law have summarized the reach of Prima Paint:

[T]he separability doctrine [of Prima Paint] has been applied to numerous issues affecting arbitrability other than fraud. These include: illegality; consensual requirements such as whether a draft was intended to be a finalized contract and mutual mistake; authority issues, such as ultra vires; supervening event issues, such as frustration of purpose; consensual defenses, such as duress, "overreaching," and unconscionability; procedural requirements such as time limits on submission of claims against seller for defective goods; and statute of limitations running on the contract containing the arbitration clause.

2 Ian R. Macneil et al., Federal Arbitration Law § 15.3.2, at 15:26 to 15:27 (1999) (footnotes omitted) ("Federal Arbitration Law").

However, the Prima Paint doctrine may not be applicable where the party resisting arbitration alleges "a bona fide claim of fraud in the factum." Kyung In Lee v. Pacific Bullion (New York) Inc., 788 F. Supp. 155, 157 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (collecting cases). "The distinction between fraud in the factum and fraud in the inducement is basic: Fraud in the factum occurs when the maker [of the note] is tricked into believing that which he is signing is something other than a promissory or obligatory note. By contrast, fraud in the inducement consists of misrepresentations that cause the maker of the note to enter the transaction." Revak v. SEC Realty Corp., 18 F.3d 81, 91 (2d Cir. 1994) (quotation marks and citations omitted). Plaintiff has not alleged a bona fide claim of fraud in the factum. Indeed, plaintiff signed the Agreement knowing that it contained an arbitration provision. See 10/3/00 Deposition of Vernon Wright, Ex. C to 10/20/00 Silver Aff., at 42, 70.

With respect to the notice of claim provision, plaintiff has not demonstrated the requisite "nexus" between the allegedly unconscionable provision and the arbitration clause. Campaniello Imps., Ltd. v. Saporiti Italia, S.p.A, 117 F.3d 655, 668 (2d Cir. 1997) ("Other courts in this Circuit have similarly required some nexus between the alleged fraud or misrepresentation and the arbitration clause in particular."). Not only is the notice of claim provision written in a separate part of the Agreement than the arbitration clause, but the word "arbitration" is never mentioned in paragraph 4(b). Indeed, paragraph 4(b) appears to apply to litigation in court as well. Moreover, paragraph 4(b) contains a complete waiver of all agreements and understandings that conflict with any of the terms of the Agreement — including the confidentiality provision, the at-will employment provision, and the non-compete clause — unless written notice is provided within three days of executing the Agreement. An attack on paragraph 4(b) is not an attack on the arbitration provision merely because the notice of claim provision may procedurally bar plaintiff from pursuing his claims in arbitration. See Nuclear Elec. Ins. Ltd. v. Central Power Light Co., 926 F. Supp. 428, 435 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) ("[A]t least some of the allegations that the contract is invalid [must] be specifically directed to the arbitration provision . . . in order to permit the court to decide the issue.")

Similarly, plaintiff's contract of adhesion claim does not specifically address the arbitration provision. Rather, plaintiff contends that the circumstances under which the Agreement was signed demonstrate that defendants used "high pressure tactics" and "misleading" statements to force a "virtually one-sided" agreement on plaintiff. Pl. Mem. at 19-22. "Even though challenges are nominally made to the validity both of the arbitration clause and of the underlying contract, there must be allegations of at least some defects pertaining specifically to the arbitration clause itself, not solely as one of many clauses in an allegedly defective contract." 2 Federal Arbitration Law § 15.3.4, at 15:41.

2. Whether the Notice of Claim Provision is Arbitrable

Plaintiff argues that even if Prima Paint is applicable, paragraph 3(c) of the Agreement — which prohibits the arbitrator from "decid[ing] the justice or propriety of any specific provisions" of the Agreement — prevents the arbitrator from determining whether the notice of claim provision is unconscionable. Pl. Mem. at 18. Therefore, plaintiff contends, this issue must be determined by the Court, notwithstanding Prima Paint. Once again, plaintiff's argument is unconvincing.

Plaintiff wrongly contends that Prima Paint has been implicitly overruled or limited by the Supreme Court in First Options of Chicago. Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995) That case held that, unless the contract specifies otherwise, the scope of an arbitration clause is to be determined by the court, rather than the arbitrator. By contrast, thePrima Paint court held that challenges to the making of a contract — as opposed to the making of an arbitration provision — must be decided by the arbitrator. These two rulings are not in conflict. Indeed, following First Options, the Second Circuit has made clear thatPrima Paint remains the law in this Circuit. See Smith/Enron Cogeneration Ltd. P'ship v. Smith Cogeneration Int'l Inc., 198 F.3d 88, 99 (2d Cir. 1999); Campaniello Imps., 117 F.3d at 666-68. Leading commentators agree. See 2 Federal Arbitration Law § 15.3.1, at 15:11 (1999 Supp.) ("Nothing in First Options . . suggests that the Supreme Court intends to undermine Prima Paint.")

It is well established that "any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration . . . ."Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-5 (1983). The Second Circuit has held that courts must construe arbitration clauses as broadly as possible, see S.A. Mineracao da Trinidade-Samitri v. Utah Int'l, Inc., 745 F.2d 190, 194 (2d Cir. 1984), and that "language excluding certain disputes from arbitration must be "clear and unambiguous' or "unmistakably clear.'" Wire Serv. Guild v. United Press Int'l. Inc., 623 F.2d 257, 260 (2d Cir. 1980).

The language in paragraph 3(c) limiting the power of the arbitrator "to decide the justice or propriety of any specific provision" is too ambiguous to foreclose the arbitrability of plaintiff's unconscionability claim. Interpreting paragraph 3(c) as broadly as plaintiff suggests would create a conflict between that provision and paragraph 3(b) of the Agreement, which provides that the arbitration will be conducted in accordance with the JAMS rules. Specifically, JAMS Rule 20 provides that "[i]n determining the Award, the Arbitrator will apply applicable law, including relevant statutes and statutes of limitations, to the facts found at the Arbitration." JAMS Employment Arbitration Rules and Procedures ("JAMS Rules"), Ex. A to 11/27/00 Affidavit of Gerald D. Silver ("11/27/00 Silver Aff."), at 9. A claim that a contractual provision is unconscionable falls within a state's "applicable law." Because the Corporate Defendants drafted the Agreement, any ambiguity must be resolved against them. See Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton. Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 62 (1995) (applying common-law contract principles to interpret arbitration clause, including principle that ambiguities should be interpreted against the drafter); PaineWebber Inc. v. Bybyk, 81 F.3d 1193, 1199 (2d Cir. 1996) (same). Therefore, despite its language, paragraph 3(c) does not prevent the arbitrator from determining that certain provisions of the Agreement are enforceable.

Moreover, in their reply memorandum of law, the Corporate Defendants stated:

Plaintiff's claim that the arbitrator would not have the power to decide the "unconscionability" of the "notice of claim" provision . . . is grossly off the mark. . . . [T]he "justice or propriety" language at [paragraph] 3(c) of the. . . Agreement in no way limits the arbitrator's power to determine whether a provision in the agreement is enforceable.

Defendants' Reply Memorandum of Law in Further Support of Their Motion to Compel Arbitration, Dismiss the Complaint and/or Stay Proceedings ("Def. Reply Mem.") at 4 (emphasis in original) Based on their representation to the Court and to plaintiff, the Corporate Defendants are estopped from asserting in any arbitration proceeding to which plaintiff is a party that paragraph 3(c) prohibits the arbitrator from declaring the notice of claim provision unenforceable.

Accordingly, the Corporate Defendants' motion to compel arbitration is granted.

Plaintiff requests that the Court delay its ruling until after the Supreme Court's decision in Circuit City Stores. Inc. v. Adams, 194 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 68 U.S.L.W. 3536 (U.S. May 22, 2000) (No. 99-1379), where the Ninth Circuit held that the FAA does not apply to employment contracts. However, the Ninth Circuit's decision is directly contrary to the holding of every other United States Court of Appeals, including the Second Circuit. See Erving v. Virginia Sguires Basketball Club, 468 F.2d 1064, 1069 (2d Cir. 1972) ("In light of the strong national policy in favor of arbitration as a means of settling private disputes we see no reason to give an expansive interpretation to the exclusionary language of [FAA] Section 1."). Because there is no reason to believe that the Supreme Court will deviate from the majority rule, there is no reason to delay ruling on defendants' motion to compel arbitration.

B. Stay of Proceedings

"Under Section 3 of the FAA, 9 U.S.C. § 3, a district court `must stay proceedings if satisfied that the parties have agreed in writing to arbitrate an issue or issues underlying the district court proceedings.'"WorldCrisa Corp. v. Armstrong, 129 F.3d 71, 74 (2d Cir. 1997) (quotingMcMahan Secs. Co. L.P. v. Forum Capital Mkts. L.P., 35 F.3d 82, 85 (2d Cir. 1994)). As a result, the Corporate Defendants are entitled to a stay pending arbitration.

However, Saslow is not a party to the Agreement and is not entitled to a stay of proceedings under Section 3 of the FAA. See Citrus Mktg. Bd. of Israel v. J. Lauritzen A/S, 943 F.2d 220, 224-25 (2d Cir. 1991). Nonetheless, Saslow seeks a stay pursuant to the Court's inherent power to control its docket. See WorldCrisa Corp., 129 F.3d at 76 ("[D]istrict courts, despite the inapplicability of the FAA, may stay a case pursuant to `the power inherent in every court to control the disposition of the cases on its docket with economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants.'") (quoting Nederlandse Erts-Tankersmaatschappij, N.V. v. Isbrandtsen Co., 339 F.2d 440, 441 (2d Cir. 1964)). A defendant seeking such a stay bears the "heavy burden" of demonstrating "`to the satisfaction of the court that [he] ha[s] not taken nor will [he] take any steps to hamper the progress of the arbitration proceeding, that the arbitration may be expected to conclude within a reasonable time, and that such delay as may occur will not work undue hardship.'" Sierra Rutile Ltd. v. Katz, 937 F.2d 743, 750 (2d Cir. 1991) (quoting Nederlandse, 339 F.2d at 442). The issuance of a stay is firmly within a district court's discretion. See American Shipping Line. Inc. v. Massan Shipping Indus., Inc., 885 F. Supp. 499, 502 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).

Saslow has not satisfied the heavy burden of demonstrating that he is entitled to a stay. First, because an arbitration proceeding is not yet pending, it is impossible to predict whether the arbitration will conclude within a reasonable time. Second, the possibility remains that plaintiff's claims against the Corporate Defendants will be dismissed on procedural grounds. Therefore, contrary to Saslow's contention, the Court may not "gain the benefit of the factual and legal findings of the arbitration." Saslow Mem. at 9. Third, a stay would work undue hardship on plaintiff. Saslow is the central actor in many of the events at issue in the arbitration — indeed, the allegations against him are the basis for plaintiff's claims against the Corporate Defendants. However, as a non-party witness in the arbitration, he cannot be compelled to appear at a pre-arbitration deposition. See Integrity Ins. Co. v. American Centennial Ins. Co., 885 F. Supp. 69, 73 (S.D.N.Y 1995) (holding that the FAA does not authorize an arbitrator to compel non-party witnesses to appear for pre-arbitration depositions); National Broad. Co. v. Bear Stearns Co., 165 F.3d 184, 187-88 (2d Cir. 1999) ("[O]pen questions remain as to whether [9 U.S.C.] § 7 may be invoked as authority for compelling pre-hearing depositions and pre-hearing document discovery, especially where such evidence is sought from non-parties."); cf. Fed.R.Civ.P. 45 (authorizing a district court to issue a subpoena commanding a non-party to attend a deposition or produce documents). The interests of justice and judicial economy require that discovery proceed in this action. Accordingly, Saslow's cross motion to stay this action pending arbitration is denied.

The Corporate Defendants have represented that they will assert the defense that plaintiff has waived any claims that predate the Agreement.See Def. Reply Mem. at 2-3.

JAMS Rule 17 permits arbitrators to subpoena nonparty witnesses only for the arbitration hearing, not pre-arbitration depositions.See JAMS Rules at 8.

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Corporate Defendants' motion to compel arbitration and stay this action against them is granted. Saslow's cross motion to stay this action pending arbitration is denied. A conference is scheduled for February 26, 2001 at 4:30 p.m.

SO ORDERED:


Summaries of

Wright v. SFX Entertainment Inc.

United States District Court, S.D. New York
Feb 7, 2001
No. 00 CIV. 5354 (SAS) (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 7, 2001)
Case details for

Wright v. SFX Entertainment Inc.

Case Details

Full title:VERNON WRIGHT, Plaintiff, v. SFX ENTERTAINMENT INC., SFX RADIO NETWORK…

Court:United States District Court, S.D. New York

Date published: Feb 7, 2001

Citations

No. 00 CIV. 5354 (SAS) (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 7, 2001)

Citing Cases

Paduano v. Express Scripts, Inc.

Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing Co., 388 U.S. 395, 87 S.Ct. 1801, 18 L.Ed.2d 1270 (1967)…

Nissan Fire Marine Insurance Co. v. Fortress re Inc.

Several courts have allowed discovery to continue when arbitration was not yet pending or discovery would be…