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Wood v. Duff-Gordon

Court of Appeals of the State of New York
Dec 4, 1917
222 N.Y. 88 (N.Y. 1917)

Summary

holding that where a fashion designer granted her agent the exclusive right, for at least a year, to use the designer's "indorsements" on third parties' garments in exchange for one-half of the profits from the agent's efforts, "a promise [was] fairly to be implied" by the agent to "use reasonable efforts" to bring at least some profits into existence

Summary of this case from Kinzel v. Bank of Am.

Opinion

Argued November 14, 1917

Decided December 4, 1917

John Jerome Rooney for appellant.

Edward E. Hoenig and William M. Sullivan for respondent.


The defendant styles herself "a creator of fashions." Her favor helps a sale. Manufacturers of dresses, millinery and like articles are glad to pay for a certificate of her approval. The things which she designs, fabrics, parasols and what not, have a new value in the public mind when issued in her name. She employed the plaintiff to help her to turn this vogue into money. He was to have the exclusive right, subject always to her approval, to place her indorsements on the designs of others. He was also to have the exclusive right to place her own designs on sale, or to license others to market them. In return, she was to have one-half of "all profits and revenues" derived from any contracts he might make. The exclusive right was to last at least one year from April 1, 1915, and thereafter from year to year unless terminated by notice of ninety days. The plaintiff says that he kept the contract on his part, and that the defendant broke it. She placed her indorsement on fabrics, dresses and millinery without his knowledge, and withheld the profits. He sues her for the damages, and the case comes here on demurrer.

The agreement of employment is signed by both parties. It has a wealth of recitals. The defendant insists, however, that it lacks the elements of a contract. She says that the plaintiff does not bind himself to anything. It is true that he does not promise in so many words that he will use reasonable efforts to place the defendant's indorsements and market her designs. We think, however, that such a promise is fairly to be implied. The law has outgrown its primitive stage of formalism when the precise word was the sovereign talisman, and every slip was fatal. It takes a broader view to-day. A promise may be lacking, and yet the whole writing may be "instinct with an obligation," imperfectly expressed (SCOTT, J., in McCall Co. v. Wright, 133 App. Div. 62; Moran v. Standard Oil Co., 211 N.Y. 187, 198). If that is so, there is a contract.

The implication of a promise here finds support in many circumstances. The defendant gave an exclusive privilege. She was to have no right for at least a year to place her own indorsements or market her own designs except through the agency of the plaintiff. The acceptance of the exclusive agency was an assumption of its duties ( Phoenix Hermetic Co. v. Filtrine Mfg. Co., 164 App. Div. 424; W.G. Taylor Co. v. Bannerman, 120 Wis. 189; Mueller v. Bethesda Mineral Spring Co., 88 Mich. 390). We are not to suppose that one party was to be placed at the mercy of the other ( Hearn v. Stevens Bro., 111 App. Div. 101, 106; Russell v. Allerton, 108 N.Y. 288). Many other terms of the agreement point the same way. We are told at the outset by way of recital that "the said Otis F. Wood possesses a business organization adapted to the placing of such indorsements as the said Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon has approved." The implication is that the plaintiff's business organization will be used for the purpose for which it is adapted. But the terms of the defendant's compensation are even more significant. Her sole compensation for the grant of an exclusive agency is to be one-half of all the profits resulting from the plaintiff's efforts. Unless he gave his efforts, she could never get anything. Without an implied promise, the transaction cannot have such business "efficacy as both parties must have intended that at all events it should have" (BOWEN, L.J., in The Moorcock, 14 P.D. 64, 68). But the contract does not stop there. The plaintiff goes on to promise that he will account monthly for all moneys received by him, and that he will take out all such patents and copyrights and trademarks as may in his judgment be necessary to protect the rights and articles affected by the agreement. It is true, of course, as the Appellate Division has said, that if he was under no duty to try to market designs or to place certificates of indorsement, his promise to account for profits or take out copyrights would be valueless. But in determining the intention of the parties, the promise has a value. It helps to enforce the conclusion that the plaintiff had some duties. His promise to pay the defendant one-half of the profits and revenues resulting from the exclusive agency and to render accounts monthly, was a promise to use reasonable efforts to bring profits and revenues into existence. For this conclusion, the authorities are ample ( Wilson v. Mechanical Orguinette Co., 170 N.Y. 542; Phoenix Hermetic Co. v. Filtrine Mfg. Co., supra; Jacquin v. Boutard, 89 Hun, 437; 157 N.Y. 686; Moran v. Standard Oil Co., supra; City of N.Y. v. Paoli, 202 N.Y. 18; M'Intyre v. Belcher, 14 C.B. [N.S.] 654; Devonald v. Rosser Sons, 1906, 2 K.B. 728; W.G. Taylor Co. v. Bannerman, supra; Mueller v. Bethesda Mineral Spring Co., supra; Baker Transfer Co. v. Merchants' R. I. Mfg. Co., 1 App. Div. 507).

The judgment of the Appellate Division should be reversed, and the order of the Special Term affirmed, with costs in the Appellate Division and in this court.

CUDDEBACK, McLAUGHLIN and ANDREWS, JJ., concur; HISCOCK, Ch. J., CHASE and CRANE, JJ., dissent.

Judgment reversed, etc.


Summaries of

Wood v. Duff-Gordon

Court of Appeals of the State of New York
Dec 4, 1917
222 N.Y. 88 (N.Y. 1917)

holding that where a fashion designer granted her agent the exclusive right, for at least a year, to use the designer's "indorsements" on third parties' garments in exchange for one-half of the profits from the agent's efforts, "a promise [was] fairly to be implied" by the agent to "use reasonable efforts" to bring at least some profits into existence

Summary of this case from Kinzel v. Bank of Am.

holding that plaintiff's "sole compensation for the grant of an exclusive agency is to be one-half of all the profits" resulting from the defendant's sales, so the defendant had an implied duty to use "best efforts" to create sales

Summary of this case from AMC Tech., LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc.

holding there was an implied reasonable efforts clause in a contract that gave defendant exclusive right to place plaintiff's endorsement on fashion designs in return for one half of the profits

Summary of this case from DESHPANDE v. TARO PHARMACEUTICALS U.S.A., INC.

finding that an agreement that didn't recite a particular duty was nonetheless "instinct with an obligation, imperfectly expressed"

Summary of this case from Flood v. Clearone Communications

finding implied promise to perform as consideration for enforceable contract

Summary of this case from Hyatt Corp. v. Women's Intern. Bowling Congress

upholding contract granting exclusive right to market products endorsed by fashion designer

Summary of this case from Fransmart, LLC v. Freshii Development, LLC

In Wood v. Duff-Gordon, 222 N.Y. 88, 118 N.E. 214, the facts are thus stated in the syllabus: "Defendant is a `creator of fashions' whose favor helps a sale, and manufacturers of feminine apparel are willing to pay for a certificate of her approval.

Summary of this case from Marrinan Medical Supply v. Ft. Dodge Serum Co.

enforcing an agreement between two parties

Summary of this case from Meyer v. Kalanick

stating that a promise may be lacking in an agreement, yet the agreement nevertheless "may be `instinct with an obligation,' imperfectly expressed"

Summary of this case from FlightSafety International Inc. v. Flight Options, LLC

referring to obligation to use "reasonable efforts"

Summary of this case from Trecom Business Systems, Inc. v. Prasad

In Lady Duff-Gordon the Court noted that: "A promise may be lacking, and yet the whole writing may be instinct with an obligation imperfectly expressed."

Summary of this case from United States v. Castelbuono

In Wood v. Consumer's Co., the deceased, a child of seven, fell into an unguarded artificial pond resulting from the excavation of gravel on defendant's property located outside the city limits and some considerable distance from the child's home.

Summary of this case from Gustafson v. Consumers Sales Agency

In Wood v. Duff-Gordon (222 N.Y. 88) the plaintiff was to have, for the term of one year, the exclusive right to place defendant's indorsement on certain designs, in return for which she was to have one-half of all the profits and revenue derived from any contracts he might make.

Summary of this case from Oscar Schlegel Manufacturing Co. v. Peter Cooper's Glue Factory

In Wood v. Duff-Gordon, 222 N.Y. 88, defendant was at the "mercy" of plaintiff through an exclusive agency which required her to market her designs through plaintiff.

Summary of this case from Fox v. Fox Valley Trotting Club, Inc.

In Wood v. Duff-Gordon (222 N.Y. 88) it was said: "A promise may be lacking, and yet the whole writing may be `instinct with an obligation,' imperfectly expressed.

Summary of this case from St. Regis Paper Co. v. Hubbs Hastings Paper Co.

In Wood v. Duff-Gordon (supra), the plaintiff was to have the exclusive right, for one year, to place defendant's indorsements on the designs of others and to place her own designs on sale or license others to market them.

Summary of this case from Reback v. Story Prods

In Wood v. Duff-Gordon (222 N.Y. 88) the plaintiff was employed as the exclusive agent of the defendant for the sale of the latter's products.

Summary of this case from Matter of Central Hanover Bank Trust Co.
Case details for

Wood v. Duff-Gordon

Case Details

Full title:OTIS F. WOOD, Appellant, v . LUCY, LADY DUFF-GORDON, Respondent

Court:Court of Appeals of the State of New York

Date published: Dec 4, 1917

Citations

222 N.Y. 88 (N.Y. 1917)
118 N.E. 214

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