June 22, 1992
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Luciano, J.).
Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.
The Supreme Court correctly found that an easement of way by necessity was created when the common grantors to the parties conveyed the defendant's parcel to the defendant's predecessors in interest. The land conveyed to the defendant was entirely surrounded by the land from which it was severed, and was thereby separated from the public street (see, 49 N.Y. Jur 2d, Easements and Licenses in Real Property, § 94; Palmer v. Palmer, 150 N.Y. 139). We agree with the Supreme Court that the deed given to the defendant's predecessors in interest does not expressly negate an intent to create an easement on the private road known as Inlet Walk. The surrounding circumstances, including the letter from the original grantors to the defendant's predecessors in interest, clearly evidence an intent that an easement over Inlet Walk should be created.
The extent of the easement is to be inferred from the circumstances surrounding the conveyance, "It is to be assumed that they anticipated such uses as might reasonably be required by a normal development of the dominant tenement" (Restatement of Property § 484, at 3022; see also, Armstrong v. County of Onondaga, 31 A.D.2d 735). The construction of a new home is certainly within the normal development of the defendant's land.
We have examined the plaintiffs' remaining contentions and find them to be without merit. Sullivan, J.P., Lawrence, Ritter and Santucci, JJ., concur.