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Wilson v. the Budd Company

United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Southern Division
Dec 4, 2000
CASE NO.: 99-CV-75501-DT (E.D. Mich. Dec. 4, 2000)

Opinion

CASE NO.: 99-CV-75501-DT.

December 4, 2000.


OPINION


On November 15, 1999, Plaintiff Pamela Wilson filed an employment discrimination action against Defendant, The Budd Company, alleging that she was discriminated against on account of her race and age in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act, and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"). This matter is currently before the Court on Defendant's motion for summary judgment. Oral argument regarding Defendant's motion was heard on October 18, 2000. For the reasons stated below, Defendant's motion for summary judgment shall be granted.

Background

Plaintiff began her employment with Defendant in October of 1985 as a small punch/press operator. Plaintiff, however, eventually developed carpal tunnel syndrome, causing her to undergo surgery on her right hand in July of 1992. As a result of her surgery, Plaintiff was unable to work for approximately eight months, after which time she returned to an office position in the "explorer" part of the plant as a participant in Defendant's "Return to Work" ("RTW") program.

The RTW program was established by Defendant to provide employees with medical restrictions an alternative to worker's compensation. Under the RTW program, employees with medical restrictions assumed jobs that accommodated their medical restrictions until they were able to return to their regular positions. RTW program employees received a rate equivalent to the pay for their former positions, in contrast to being placed on leave status, under which such employees would receive only their worker's compensation benefits. Therefore, it was generally financially advantageous to participate in the RTW program.

Plaintiff remained in her RTW position until approximately three years later, when, in July of 1995, she underwent surgery on her left hand to treat her carpal tunnel syndrome. Plaintiff again collected worker's compensation for a period of time following her surgery, and eventually returned to work in Defendant's Human Resources Department as part of the RTW program. Plaintiff's duties in the Human Resources Department consisted mostly of clerical duties such as collecting data, making files, inputting or keyboarding information into the computer, and preparing other paperwork.

In April of 1997, and again in April of 1998, Plaintiff underwent hip surgery and was on worker's compensation for a period of approximately four months following each surgery. Plaintiff, however, does not have any medical restrictions as a result of her hip surgery. After her hip surgeries, Plaintiff returned to the Human Resources Department as part of the RTW program based upon the medical restrictions associated with her carpal tunnel syndrome.

Sometime in 1998, management personnel decided to remove all employees from the RTW program and place them back on worker's compensation. This decision was not implemented until March of 1999, at which time all employees, including Plaintiff, were removed from the RTW program and returned to worker's compensation. Subsequently, some of the employees who were removed from the RTW program were eventually recalled to work. Plaintiff, however, was not recalled. Thereafter, Plaintiff filed the instant action asserting that Defendant's decision to remove her from the RTW program, and subsequent decision not to recall her to work, constituted race and age discrimination.

It is unclear as to exactly how many employees were participating in the RTW program at the time it was terminated, as well as exactly how many of these employees were returned to work and exactly how many were not.

Defendant has filed a motion for summary judgment contending (1) that Plaintiff has failed to establish a prima facie case of race or age discrimination, (2) that it had legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for discontinuing the RTW program and not recalling Plaintiff to work, (3) that Plaintiff has no evidence that its legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons were really a pretext for discrimination, and (4) that in the event its motion for summary judgment is denied, any award for front-pay should be limited because Plaintiff rejected Defendant's subsequent offer of employment in a substantially similar position within its Department of Environmental Health and Safety at the same rate of pay Plaintiff was receiving in the Human Resources Department.

Discussion

"A plaintiff may establish a claim of discrimination either by introducing direct evidence of discrimination, or by proving circumstantial evidence which would support an inference of discrimination." Johnson v. University of Cincinnati, 215 F.3d 561, 572 (6th Cir. 2000) (citing Kline v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 128 F.3d 337, 348 (6th Cir. 1997)). "`The direct evidence and the circumstantial evidence paths are mutually exclusive; a plaintiff need only prove one or the other, not both.'" Id. (quoting Kline, 128 F.3d at 348).

Claims under the Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act are evaluated in the same manner as federal Title VII discrimination claims. See Lytle v. Malady, 458 Mich. 153 (1998). Therefore, it is not necessary for the Court to undergo a separate determination regarding Plaintiff's claims under the Elliott-Larsen Act. Claims under the ADEA are also generally analyzed using the same framework. See Godredson v. Hess Clark, Inc., 173 F.3d 365, 371 (6th Cir. 1999).

As the Sixth Circuit has recognized, however, "[i]t is the rare situation when direct evidence of discrimination is readily available, thus victims of employment discrimination are permitted to establish their cases through inferential and circumstantial proof." Kline, 128 F.3d at 348; see also McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). Under this approach, Plaintiff bears the initial burden of establishing, by a preponderance of the evidence, a prima facie case of discrimination by proving: 1) she is a member of a protected class; 2) she was qualified for her job and performed it satisfactorily; 3) despite her qualifications and performance, she suffered an adverse employment action; and 4) that she was replaced by a person outside the protected class or was treated less favorably than a similarly situated individual outside her protected class. Johnson, 215 F.3d at 572-73; see also Laderbach, 207 F.3d at 829.

Plaintiff's brief in opposition to Defendant's motion for summary judgment contends only that Defendant's motion for summary judgment should be denied because Plaintiff has met the four requirements of a prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas and, having done so, a genuine issue of fact exists with respect to whether Defendant's articulated legitimate business reason is a pretext. At the hearing on October 18, 2000, counsel for Plaintiff acknowledged that Plaintiff is relying upon the burden-shifting scheme of McDonnell Douglas to prove her claim of discrimination, and that if Plaintiff is unable to establish a prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas, she is not entitled to recover:
THE COURT: And would you also agree that if you haven't met the four prongs of McDonnell-Douglas, defendant doesn't have to come forth and articualte a business reason?
MR. OSETEK: If we're sticking with McDonnell-Douglas, yeah, we go through the procedure, yes.
THE COURT: When you say, "If we're sticking withMcDonnell-Douglas," I haven't seen anything else in your brief.
MR. OSETEK: No. Under McDonnell-Douglas, if they have — if we have not established a prima facie case, we go home.
THE COURT: Fair enough. Defendant is entitled to summary judgment?
MR. OSETEK: Yes.
(10/18/00 Hr'g Tr.) (pages 9-10 attached).

If Plaintiff succeeds at establishing a prima facie case of discrimination, "a mandatory presumption of discrimination is created," thereby shifting the burden to the defendant to "`articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's rejection.'" Id. at 573 (quoting McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S.Ct. at 1824). "It is important to note, however, that although the McDonnell Douglas presumption shifts the burden of production to the defendant, `[t]he ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff.'" St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 507, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 2747, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993) (quoting Texas Dep't Comm. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1093, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981)).

If Defendant articulates a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action, the presumption is rebutted and "`the factual inquiry proceeds to a new level of specificity' with the plaintiff shouldering the burden of `demonstrating that the proffered reason was not the true reason for the employment decision," but "merely a pretext for intentional discrimination." Cline v. Catholic Diocese of Toledo, 199 F.3d 853, 859 (6th Cir. 1999) (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256, 101 S.Ct. at 1095). Plaintiff may establish pretext by showing that: "1) the stated reasons had no basis in fact; 2) the stated reasons were not the actual reasons; and 3) that the stated reasons were insufficient to explain the defendant's action." Johnson, 215 F.3d at 573; see also Wheeler v. McKinley Enters., 937 F.2d 1158, 1162 (6th Cir. 1991)). However, "`[a] reason cannot be proved to be "a pretext for discrimination" unless it is shown both that the reason was false, and that discrimination was the real reason.'" Id. (quoting St. Maiy's Honor Ctr., 509 U.S. at 5516, 113 S.Ct. at 2752).

Because Plaintiff shoulders the initial burden under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework, Plaintiff's counsel agreed at the hearing on October 18, 2000 that if Plaintiff fails to establish a prima facie case of discrimination the inquiry ends and the Court need not address the second and third prongs of the inquiry, i.e., whether Defendant has articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions and whether the evidence reveals that the articulated reason is really a pretext for discrimination. See Kennedy v. Schoenberg, Fisher Newman, Ltd., 140 F.3d 716, 727 (7th Cir. 1998) (stating that because plaintiff had failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination, it was unnecessary to address whether defendant had articulated a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for its decision to terminate plaintiff and whether the evidence revealed that such reason was pretextual). The Court is satisfied that Plaintiff has failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination based upon either race or age and, accordingly, Defendant's motion for summary judgment shall be granted with respect to all claims asserted in Plaintiff's complaint.

See note 3 supra. Counsel for Plaintiff again indicated his agreement during a later part of the hearing on October 18, 2000:
THE COURT: So if you haven't established a prima facie case, plaintiff is out, right?
MR. OSETEK: That's what the law says.
(10/18/00 Hr'g Tr.) (page 22 attached).

1. Discrimination Based Upon Race

In support of her claim for race discrimination, Plaintiff asserts that she was removed from Defendant's RTW program and subsequently not recalled to work by Defendant on account of her race. To establish a prima facie case of discrimination, Plaintiff was required to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that 1) she is a member of a protected class; 2) she was qualified for her job and performed it satisfactorily; 3) despite her qualifications and performance, she suffered an adverse employment action; and 4) that she was replaced by a person outside the protected class or was treated less favorably than a similarly situated individual outside the protected class. Johnson, F.3d at 572-73; see also Laderbach, 207 F.3d at 829.

There is no dispute that Plaintiff is a member of a protected class, that Plaintiff was qualified to perform her previous job in the Human Resources Department under the RTW program, or that she suffered an adverse employment action. Therefore, the only dispute that remains in regard to Plaintiff's prima facie case is whether Plaintiff has established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that she was replaced by a person outside the protected class or was treated less favorably than a similarly situated individual outside the protected class.

In her brief in response to Defendant's motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff asserts that she "was replaced by a member of the non-protected group" and that she has "established that the non-protected member who replaced her was similarly situated in all relevant aspects as required by law." (Pl.'s Resp. at 12). The evidence presented to this Court, however, does not support Plaintiff's assertions.

Plaintiff first cites her own deposition testimony in which she states her subjective belief that in 1998, Mark Moore, a younger white male employee, was hired by Defendant to replace her. (Wilson Dep. at 49). In the same deposition testimony, Plaintiff also states that the head of the Human Resources Department, Michael Wade, told her that Moore was not hired to replace her, but rather to "help [her] make [her] computer better" and to "show [her] different things." ( Id.). Co-worker Sharon Davis also stated her subjective understanding that Moore "was going to be brought in as a supervisor" and that "he would be doing what [Plaintiff] was doing and helping out Ozie." (Davis Dep. at 57). According to Davis, Wade had asked her to "make [Plaintiff] understand that it was the right thing to do." ( Id.).

Plaintiff also relies upon the deposition testimony of her prior immediate supervisor, Ozie Henderson. Henderson's testimony, however, establishes only that Henderson had "heard" that Moore had told Plaintiff he was hired to replace her. (Henderson Dep. at 53). In fact, when asked where Moore would have gotten such an idea, Henderson replied "I don't have a clue." ( Id.). According to Henderson, his instructions from Wade were only "to have [Plaintiff] instruct [Moore] on what she was doing so that he could make files and get the stuff into the computer." ( Id.).

At most, the evidence cited by Plaintiff establishes only that she trained Moore with respect to some of her job functions and that she subjectively believed that Moore had been hired to replace her. Defendant, however, contends, and the record clearly supports, that Moore did not, in fact, replace Plaintiff. Rather, Moore was brought into the Human Resources Department only temporarily to fill another employee's position who was assigned to computer training. (Wade Dep. at 182). Although Moore did work in the Human Resources Department for a brief period of time, he was ultimately moved to a different position in the plant. ( Id. at 186-87).

Furthermore, contrary to Plaintiff's assertions, Moore was not a "similarly situated individual." Although Plaintiff need not demonstrate an exact correlation with the employee allegedly receiving more favorable treatment, she must establish that they were similar "in all relevant aspects." Ercegovich v. Goodyear Tire Rubber Co., 154 F.3d 344, 352 (6th Cir. 1998) (citing Pierce v. Commonwealth Life Ins. Co., 40 F.3d 796, 802 (6th Cir. 1994)). To be similarly situated, the individual with whom Plaintiff seeks to compare herself "must have dealt with the same supervisor, have been subject to the same standards and have engaged in the same conduct without such differentiating or mitigating circumstances that would distinguish their conduct or the employer's treatment of them for it." Ercegovich, 154 F.3d at 352 (quoting Mitchell v. Toledo Hosp., 964 F.2d 577, 583 (6th Cir. 1992)).

Plaintiff has presented no evidence that Moore was subject to medical restrictions, placed on the RTW program, or removed from the RTW program and subsequently returned to work. Therefore, Moore is not a proper comparison for purposes of a "similarly situated" analysis.

As further evidence that she was treated differently than other similarly situated individuals not within the protected class, Plaintiff asserts that of all the employees removed from the RTW program, she was the only one not returned to work. In his deposition testimony, Henderson recalled that of all the employees who were removed from the RTW program, Sandra Rucker-Greer and Maria Tinzley were subsequently brought back to the Human Resources Department on an "on and off basis," leaving Plaintiff as the only one not recalled to the Human Resources Department. (Henderson Dep. at 70). Both of these employees, however, were African American and therefore provide no support for Plaintiff's assertion that similarly situated employees outside the protected class were treated more favorably.

Plaintiff also cites the deposition testimony of Larry Wahl, a prior plant manager for Defendant, in which Wahl stated that he was not aware "of any situation where people are just eliminated from the return to work program, and sent back on disability or comp, or whatever they are on." (Wahl Dep. at 27). In this Court's opinion, however, this statement provides no support for Plaintiff's assertion that all of the employees who were removed from the RTW program were subsequently returned to work except Plaintiff.

Counsel for Defendant acknowledged during oral argument that one other person was subsequently recalled to work. However, Sheila Moore was not called back to work in the Human Resources Department, but rather, the tool crib, in a job that Plaintiff could not perform because it involved lifting. (Henderson Dep. at 63). In fact, Plaintiff does not contend that she should have received the job Sheila Moore received. (Wilson Dep. at 37). It is undisputed that Sheila Moore never worked in the Human Resources Department, did not report to the same supervisors as Plaintiff, and at the time she was recalled to work, no longer had any medical restrictions. Therefore, in this Court's opinion, Plaintiff has failed to establish that she and Sheila Moore were similarly situated in all relevant aspects.

Plaintiff has failed to establish that she was either replaced by a person outside the protected class or treated less favorably than a similarly situated individual outside the protected class. Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting scheme and therefore, Defendant's motion for summary judgment shall be granted with respect to Plaintiff's race discrimination claims.

2. Discrimination Based Upon Age

Age discrimination claims under both the ADEA and the Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act are also analyzed using the same burden-shifting framework as other discrimination claims. See Godredson v. Hess Clark, Inc., 173 F.3d 365, 371 (6th Cir. 1999); Lytle v. Malady, 458 Mich. 153 (1998). Therefore, to establish a prima facie case of age discrimination under a theory of disparate treatment, Plaintiff must generally present evidence that she was either replaced by a younger employee or treated differently than similarly situated younger employees. Hollins v. Atlantic Co., Inc., 188 F.3d 652, 658 (6th Cir. 1999).

In support of her age discrimination claims, Plaintiff asserts that she was replaced by a member from outside the protected class, i.e. Mark Moore, who was twenty-something at the time, and that she was treated differently than a similarly situated individual outside the protected class, i.e., Sheila Moore, a thirty-something employee who was called back to work in the tool crib. (Pl.'s Resp. at 14). As discussed supra, however, the Court is satisfied that Mark Moore did not replace Plaintiff in the Human Resources Department, and that neither Mark Moore nor Sheila Moore were similarly situated to Plaintiff.

Moreover, Plaintiff has failed to present the Court with any direct evidence that age was a motivating factor in the decision to remove all employees from the RTW program or the decision not to recall Plaintiff. Therefore, the Court is satisfied that Plaintiff has also failed to establish a prima facie case of age discrimination and accordingly, Defendant's motion for summary judgment shall be granted with respect to Plaintiff's age discrimination claims also.

Conclusion

The Court is satisfied that Plaintiff has failed to establish a prima facie case of either race or age discrimination. Accordingly, Defendant's motion for summary judgment shall be granted with respect to all of Plaintiff's claims and the complaint shall be dismissed in its entirety.

A Judgment consistent with this Opinion shall issue forthwith.

both the fact that she was taken off it and not recalled when others were?

MR. OSETEK: Yes.

THE COURT: Fair enough?

Now, let me go a step further here. Again, on page nine, remember your second paragraph, you talk about the fact the courts have developed a burden of proof model and because intent is such an. elusive concept, we've got the McDonnell-Douglas proceeding and you say in there, quote,

"The prima facie case formula of McDonnell-Douglas was not intended to impose a difficult or an onerous task on the plaintiff, hence, it does not require direct proof of discrimination,"

fair enough?

MR. OSETEK: Yes.

THE COURT: Okay. So basically if I'm reading your brief correctly, you believe that you have established a prima facie case of discrimination in which case the burden then shifts to the defendant to at least articulate legitimate business reason?

MR. OSETEK: Yes.

THE COURT: And would you also agree that if you haven't met the four prongs of McDonnell-Douglas, defendant doesn't have to come forth and articulate a business reason?

MR. OSETEK: If we're sticking with McDonnell-Douglas, yeah, we go through the procedure, yes.

THE COURT: When you say, "If we're sticking withMcDonnell-Douglas," I haven't seen anything else in your brief.

MR. OSETEK: No. Under McDonnell-Douglas, if they have — if we have not established a prima facie case, we go home.

THE COURT: Fair enough. Defendant is entitled to summary judgment?

MR. OSETEK: Yes.

THE COURT: Now, let's go to the fourth prong, and tell me where the evidence is that the plaintiff was — and let's go back to the test that you agree is the law on page nine citing Talley — that she was replaced by a non-group member or that she was treated differently than similarly situated persons not in a protected class. Tell me where the evidence is to support that prong of the McDonnell-Douglas framework.

MR. OSETEK: What page are you on, Your Honor?

THE COURT: Page nine. I'm just reading the of that.

THE COURT: Okay. Anything else?

MR. OSETEK: Not at this point, Your Honor.

THE COURT: So if you haven't established a prima facie case, plaintiff is out, right?

MR. OSETEK: That's what the law says.

THE COURT: All right. Any response by the defendant?

MR. CATTEL: Briefly, Your Honor. And that is there is absolutely no evidence that there was any return to work employee that was brought back outside the protected classification into a job that she was qualified to perform. None at all. The white female in the tool crib, she acknowledged — plaintiff acknowledges she couldn't do that job.

The only people that were brought back, the return to work people that were brought back in human resources doing jobs that she could do some of the jobs, the clerical kinds of jobs, were two African Americans. He doesn't even have the scenario that he posed to the Court. He doesn't even have a White person, a person outside the protected class that was called back to the human resource department from the return to work program — into the return to work program. He can't even get that far.


Summaries of

Wilson v. the Budd Company

United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Southern Division
Dec 4, 2000
CASE NO.: 99-CV-75501-DT (E.D. Mich. Dec. 4, 2000)
Case details for

Wilson v. the Budd Company

Case Details

Full title:PAMELA J. WILSON, Plaintiff, v. THE BUDD COMPANY, a Michigan corporation…

Court:United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Southern Division

Date published: Dec 4, 2000

Citations

CASE NO.: 99-CV-75501-DT (E.D. Mich. Dec. 4, 2000)