Williamson Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank

32 Citing briefs

  1. Casser v. Township of Knowlton et al

    BRIEF in Opposition

    Filed May 11, 2017

    The state court dismissed plaintiff's state claims based primarily on its conclusion that Plaintiff was not entitled to bring her claims in state court because she failed first to file an action in lieu of prerogative writs contesting the conditions of her 2007 subdivision approval within forty-five days of its publication. -(Complaint paras. 56, 61, 79, 113, 122, 131-132,- 135-143, 145, 171-173; Smith Dec. Ex. E at pp. 19, 22) This final dismissal of her state claims for compensation satisfied the Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U. S. 172 (1985) preconditions for Plaintiff's federal claims regarding the deprivation of her real property under color of the Ordinance 7 Case 3:17-cv-01174-PGS-DEA Document 21 Filed 05/11/17 Page 13 of 46 PageID: 723 -..

  2. Slawson Exploration Company, Inc. v. United States Department of the Interior et al

    RESPONSE to Motion re MOTION to Dismiss

    Filed October 25, 2017

    This determination does not rest on whether any related agency proceeding is ongo- ing; rather the question of finality is “whether the initial decisionmaker has arrived at a definitive position on the issue that inflicts an actual, concrete injury.” Darby v. Cisneros, 509 U.S. 137, 144 (1993) (emphasis added) (quoting Williamson Cty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172, 193 (1985)). Here, the “initial decisionmaker”—the IBLA—“arrived at a definitive position”—entering the IBLA Stay Order—“that inflict[ed] an actual, concrete injury”—halting drilling well after the time for any such stay had passed causing Slawson to incur substantial and nonrecoverable losses.

  3. Rascoe et al v. Cody et al

    BRIEF IN OPPOSITION re MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM

    Filed April 7, 2017

    Accordingly, administrative actions must be final before they are judicially reviewable. See Williamson Cnty Regional Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172, 192 (1985). DPW mailed a letter dated April 23, 2013 stating that Rascoe Court’s license to operate would be revoked in eleven (11) days, or if Plaintiffs appealed, “upon issuance of a decision by the Bureau of Hearings and Appeals.”

  4. Hayes Oyster Company v. Oregon Department of Environmental Quality et al

    Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction , Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim . Oral Argument requested.

    Filed December 20, 2016

    The remedy for a Fifth Amendment taking is compensation, not injunctive relief. See Williamson County Regional Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172, 194 (1985) (“The Fifth Amendment does not proscribe the taking of property; it proscribes taking without just compensation. * * * If the government has provided an adequate process for obtaining compensation, and if resort to that process ‘yield[s] just compensation,’ then the property owner ‘has no claim against the Government’ for a taking.

  5. Delaware Riverkeeper Network et al v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission et al

    MOTION to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Complaint

    Filed May 17, 2016

    See Fed. Power Comm’n v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99, 120 (1960) (holding that a private company acts as a licensee of the federal government when exercising eminent domain authority pursuant to an identical provision in the Federal Power Act). Case 1:16-cv-00416-TSC Document 19 Filed 05/17/16 Page 26 of 59 14 entitled to any predeprivation hearing — only a right to just compensation.5 See Williamson Cty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172, 195 n.14 (1985) (“Unlike the Due Process Clause, however, the Just Compensation Clause has never been held to require pretaking process . . . .”); Presley, 464 F.3d at 489-90 (collecting “a century of precedent” for the proposition that a “physical taking” does not require a hearing or notice prior to the taking). And because a taking does not require any predeprivation process whatsoever, the property holder cannot claim a constitutional right to a predeprivation hearing in front of a neutral adjudicator (again, distinct from the later eminent domain proceeding itself).

  6. LYNCH v. CALIFORNIA COASTAL COMMISSION

    Amicus Curiae Brief of American Planning Association and American Planning Association California Chapter

    Filed August 11, 2015

    Plaintiffs contend that the durational permit condition constitutes a regulatory taking of their property (Opening Br. at pp. 29-34; Reply Br. at pp. 24-27), but all of their arguments fail becausetheir claim is not ripe for judicial review. In Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank (1985) 473 U.S. 172, the U.S. Supreme Court established a two-part ripeness requirement for regulatory takings. First, a claim that the application of governmentregulations constitutes a taking is not ripe until the agency has reacheda final decision as to how thoseregulations will be applied to the | property at issue.

  7. Oracle America, Inc. v. Oregon Health Insurance Exchange Corporation, et al

    Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings

    Filed June 22, 2015

    This is essential because the Takings Clause itself prohibits only takings without just compensation.” North Pacifica LLC v. City of Pacifica, 526 F.3d 478, 485 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Williamson County Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 194 & 195 (1985)). Case 3:14-cv-01279-BR Document 142 Filed 06/22/15 Page 30 of 34 Page 25 - OREGON DEPARTMENT OF CONSUMER AND BUSINESS SERVICES’ MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS Before Oracle can bring a Takings Claim, it must affirmatively establish that it will not receive just compensation, and to do that it must follow state-law procedures. For the claim to be ripe, Oracle “‘must have pursued compensation through state remedies unless doing so would be futile.

  8. Shotton v. Pitkin et al

    REPLY

    Filed May 1, 2015

    The Court held that the takings claim at issue was not ripe and based its decision, in part, on the plaintiff's failure to "seek compensation through the procedures the State has provided for doing so." Williamson, 473 U.S. at 194. That failure rendered the claim unripe because "[t]he Fifth Amendment does not proscribe the taking of property; it proscribes taking without just compensation" and such a taking would not exist unless and until the state failed to provide just compensation.

  9. Levin v. City and County of San Francisco

    MEMORANDUM OF FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW. Signed

    Filed October 21, 2014

    Importantly, the quoted maxim “rests on the principle that so long as compensation is available for those whose property is in fact taken, the governmental action is not unconstitutional.” United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 128 (1985) (citing Williamson Cnty., 473 U.S. at 190). This does not prevent Plaintiffs from seeking equitable relief under other circumstances, like those presented here, where the lump-sum payment from property owner to tenant that the Ordinance requires neither provides nor sensibly contemplates compensation.

  10. Levin v. City and County of San Francisco

    REPLY

    Filed August 19, 2014

    But the objections have no merit. Plaintiffs’ request for equitable relief from a violation of their constitutional rights is proper, and their claims are ripe—either because they are exempt from the state court requirement of Williamson Cnty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 192-94 (1985), or because prudential efficiency and fairness concerns warrant federal review now. Finally, tenants need not be joined to this suit because they are not necessary parties.