Filed July 25, 2016
Id. at 1384; see Whitcombe v. County of Yolo, 73 Cal.App.3d at 703 (1977) (holding that county's decision to release probationer was not proximate cause of probationer's attack on plaintiff, because even though county had provided information to the court and advised the court, the court ultimately made an independent determination about whether to release the probationer). Here, the chain of causation is too attenuated and speculative to establish proximate cause.
Filed June 23, 2014
These cases are distinguishable because none of them found a breach of mandatory duty, and where such a duty was alleged, no mandatory actions followed the fulfillment of that duty. (see POB p. 21; Fleming, 34 Cal.App.4th at 1383-84 [alleging that defendant failed to hold and arrest parolee who violated the terms of parole, without providing for any mandatory subsequentaction]; Perry, 150 Cal. App. 3d at 860 [noting that defendant only had a duty to investigate and was not required to take a specific action at the conclusion of the investigation]; Whitcombe, 73 Cal. App. 3d at 708 [holding that “while the court must consider a probation officer’s report, it is not bound by that report and recommendation....”].) The defendants in those cases had considerable discretion after they had fulfilled their initial duty, unlike the present case.
Filed March 13, 2014
Fleming, Perry, and Whitcombe all involved claims that the defendantsfailed to perform one requisite duty and there was no mandatory action required after that duty was fulfilled. (See Fleming, 34 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1383-84 [alleging that defendant failed to hold and arrest parolee whoviolated the terms of his parole, without providing for any mandatory subsequentaction]; Perry, 150 Cal.App.3d at p. 860 [noting that defendant only had a dutyto investigate and was not required to take a specific action at the conclusion of the investigation]; Whitcombe, 73 Cal.App.3d at p. 708 [holding that “[w]hile the court must consider a probation officer’s report,it is not bound bythat report and recommendation . . . .”].) The individuals in those cases were free to exercise considerable discretion after they had fulfilled their initial duty.