Warden v. Payton

13 Citing briefs

  1. PEOPLE v. RANGEL (PEDRO)

    Appellant’s Reply Brief

    Filed December 30, 2009

    “The judge is, after all, the one responsible for instructing the jury on the law, a responsibility that may not be abdicated to counsel.” (Brown v. Payton (2005) 544 U.S. 133, 146.) For these reasonsit was error to refuse the instruction on the treatment of mitigating evidence.

  2. PEOPLE v. NUNEZ & SATELE

    Respondent’s Brief

    Filed October 29, 2008

    As discussed (Argument V, ante), the jury received powerful proof to convict each appellant for the firing of their AK-47 rifle to benefit their gang's criminal purpose. Finally, as shown (footnote 62, ante), the guilty phase jury in this case "was not left without any judicial direction" (Payton, supra, 544 U.S. at p. 146). In short, assuming, without conceding, the alleged "miscon4uct" was error, there is overwhelming evidence in the record to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the prosecutor's penalty phase argument (that Satele was a shooter) "played no role in the penalty decision" as to appellants (see Sakarias, supra, 35 Ca1.4th at p. 166), and there is no. reasonable possibility there would have been any different result in the absence of the challenged remarks (see People v. Abilez (2007) 41 Ca1.4th 472, 526-527 (Abilez)).

  3. PEOPLE v. WILLIAMS (COREY)

    Appellant's Reply Brief

    Filed April 27, 2011

    ) “The judgeis, after all, the one responsible for instructing the jury on the law, a responsibility that may not be abdicated to counsel.” (Brown v. Payton, supra, 544 U.S. 133, 146 [trial judge should have advised jury that it could consider defendant’s religious conversion underfactor K after prosecutor arguedto the contrary].) If the trial court’s instructional duty may not be delegated to counsel, that duty should not devolve upon a 19- -9]- i e e 2 2 2 year-old layman appearing without counselat a penalty trial.

  4. PEOPLE v. SÁNCHEZ (EDGARDO)

    Appellant’s Reply Brief

    Filed October 16, 2014

    In addition, the error, and the prosecutor’s exploitationofit, distracted the jurors from the true question before them and playedto their potential biases. (See Brown v. Payton (2005) 544 U.S. 133, 157 (dis. opn. of Souter, J.) [noting skepticism of jurors toward postcrimereligious conversion evidence].) This in turn improperly undermined their 151 impartiality.

  5. PEOPLE v. PEOPLES (LOUIS JAMES)

    Appellant’s Reply Brief

    Filed September 17, 2013

    ° Respondent does not address the other significant decisions appellant relies upon to support his argumentthat the trial court abused its discretion and violated his constitutional rights. (Brown v. Payton (2005) 544 U.S. 133, 142-143 [post-crime character transformation through remorse can only be experiencedafter commission of the crime andis admissible mitigation to lessen or excuse culpability]; Bell v. Cone (2002) 535 U.S. 685, 690 [recognizes expressions of remorse through others testifyingat trial]; see also, Ayers v. Belmontes (2006) 549 U.S. 7, 15-17 [lack of remorse in prosecutor’s argument]. AOB 292-294.

  6. PEOPLE v. WILLIAMS (COREY)

    Appellant's Opening Brief

    Filed July 17, 2009

    Where a jury instruction defining a statutory mitigator is worded so as to permit the jury to give mitigating effect to all of the mitigating evidence, but the prosecutor's argument is to the contrary, the reviewing court must determine whether it is reasonably probable that the jury accepted the prosecutor's narrow view of what the law deemed potentially mitigating. (Brown v. Payton, supra, 544 U.S. 133,142.) On this record, there is surely a reasonable probability that the jury took the prosecutor at his word.

  7. PEOPLE v. RANGEL (PEDRO)

    Appellant’s Opening Brief

    Filed June 18, 2008

    ) that the jury was misled, or ignored the evidence of pre-offense background and character ot'f'ered in mitigation. In Brown v. Pavton (2005) 544 U . S . 133. the high court again reviewed a state death judgment. again under the pre-amendment language of factor (k) ("[alny other cir- cumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime.").

  8. PEOPLE v. EDWARDS (ROBERT)

    Appellant’s Reply Brief

    Filed November 12, 2008

    The ambiguous circumstance that he did not escape, despite an opportunity to do so, cannot be compared with affirmative evidence that he made a conscious decision to remain in custody as a concrete expression of remorse. 127 Evidence of Appellant's remorsefulness can constitute powerful mitigating evidence and give can a juror reason to spare a defendant's life. (See, e.g., Brown v. Payton (2005)544 U.S. 133, 144 - 143 [remorse ... is something commonly thought to lessen or excuse a defendant's culpability]; People v. Ghent (1987) 43 Ca1.3d 739, 771, cert. denied, (1988) 485 U.S. 929 ["the concept of remorse for past offenses is sometime warranting less severe punishment or condemnation is universal."]) Furthermore, the prosecutor emphasized Appellant's supposed lack of remorse and his closing argument.

  9. MANRIQUEZ

    Petitioner’s Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

    Filed January 10, 2008

    I Indeed, the question has proved so vexing it has reached the United States Supreme Court no less than three times since then. See Ayers v. Belmontes, 127 S.Ct. 469 (2006) (5 to 4 decision reversing for the second time a divided Ninth Circuit decision); Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133 (2005) (5 to 3 decision reversing 6 to 5 Ninth Circuit en banc decision); Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370 (1990) (5 to 4 decision affirming 4 to 3 decision by this Court). This Court should put an end to this ongoing confusion and controversy by declaring factor (k) unconstitutionally vague.

  10. The People, Respondent,v.Kaity Marshall, Appellant.

    Brief

    Filed November 17, 2015

    See Brandon L. Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 95 (2008). 223. Compare Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 148-49 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring) (“In my view, this is a case in which Congress’ instruction to defer to the reasonable conclusions of state-court judges makes a critical difference. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).