February 2, 2009.
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the appeal is DISMISSED as to the underlying judgment of the district court and that the district court's denial of the motion for reconsideration is AFFIRMED.
For Appellants: GARY R. WALL, pro se. WILLIAM COOKSEY, SR., pro se.
For Appellees: JOHN T. FUSSEL, ROBERT M. CHEVRIE, Robert M. Chevrie Assoc., 333 E. River Drive, East Hartford, Connecticut.
LISA J. PARIS, Murtha Cullina LLP, City Place I-185 Asylum Street, Hartford, Connecticut.
Plaintiffs-appellants Gary R. Wall and William Cooksey, Sr., pro se, appeal from the judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut (Hall, J.) and from the district court's denial of their motion for reconsideration of the denial of their motion for a new trial (the "Motion for Reconsideration"). We presume the parties' familiarity with the factual and procedural history of the case and the issues on appeal.
Although appellants claim to appeal only the denial of the Motion for Reconsideration, their brief challenges various rulings of the district court during trial. This is improper for two reasons. First, to the extent that appellants are appealing the underlying judgment, their challenge is untimely. Appellants' motion for a new trial was denied on January 24, 2006, but they did not file a notice of appeal until March 15, 2006. Appellants' subsequent motion for reconsideration did not toll the time for filing a notice of appeal. See Glinka v. Maytag Corp., 90 F.3d 72, 74 (2d Cir. 1996). Second, because the only order on appeal is the denial of the Motion for Reconsideration, we do not consider appellants' substantive arguments challenging the verdict and judgment. See "R" Best Produce, Inc. v. DiSapio, 540 F.3d 115, 122 n. 5 (2d Cir. 2008) (noting that an initial motion for reconsideration filed within ten days of the judgment should be "contrasted with a motion filed thereafter, which, when denied and appealed, brings up for review only the order denying the motion.").
Upon review of the trial transcripts and record on appeal, it is clear that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the Motion for Reconsideration because the motion simply reiterated earlier arguments and did not point to any new law or fact that created an exceptional circumstance mandating reconsideration of the district court's denial of the motion for a new trial. See Marrero Pichardo v. Aschcroft, 374 F.3d 46, 55 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding that a motion for relief from a judgment is granted only upon a showing of exceptional circumstances); Shrader v. CSX Transportation, 70 F.3d 255, 257 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that a motion to reconsider should not be granted where the moving party is attempting only to relitigate an issue that has already been decided). In any event, we find no error in the district court's rulings on the various issues raised by appellants, including alleged witness perjury, the sufficiency of evidence to support the jury's verdict and the purported influence on witnesses of union officers who attended the trial.
We have reviewed appellants' remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. The appeal as to the judgment of the district court is DISMISSED, and the district court's decision to deny the Motion for Reconsideration is AFFIRMED.