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Walker v. Unempl. Comp. Bd. of Review

Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania
Dec 13, 1976
27 Pa. Commw. 522 (Pa. Cmmw. Ct. 1976)

Summary

holding that hearsay evidence, admitted without objection, may only support a finding if it is corroborated by any competent evidence of record

Summary of this case from Smith v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review

Opinion

Argued October 8, 1976

December 13, 1976.

Unemployment compensation — Voluntary termination — Unemployment Compensation Law, Act 1936, December 5, P.L. (1937) 2897 — Withdrawn resignation — Burden of proof — Hearsay.

1. An employe voluntarily terminating employment without cause of a necessitous and compelling nature is ineligible for benefits under the Unemployment Compensation Law, Act 1936, December 5, P.L. (1937) 2897. [523]

2. A resignation revoked only after the employer has taken steps to replace the employe is a voluntary termination. [524]

3. An employe voluntarily terminating his employment has the burden of proving a right to unemployment compensation benefits. [525]

4. An employe who submits a resignation setting in motion a process for his replacement must prove that replacement arrangements had not been made when he withdrew the resignation to establish his right to unemployment compensation benefits. [525-6]

5. Hearsay evidence properly objected to is insufficient to support a finding of the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review. [526]

6. Hearsay evidence admitted without objection by the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review will be given its natural probation effect and may support a finding if it is corroborated by any competent evidence in the record, but a finding of fact by the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review based solely on hearsay will not stand. [527]

Argued October 8, 1976, before President Judge BOWMAN and Judges CRUMLISH, JR. and WILKINSON, JR., sitting as a panel of three.

Appeal, No. 156 C.D. 1976, from the Order of the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review in case of In Re: Claim of Raymond Walker, No. B-129006.

Application to Bureau of Employment Security for unemployment compensation benefits. Application denied. Applicant appealed to the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review. Denial affirmed. Applicant appealed to the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania. Held: Affirmed.

Carrie Menkel-Meadow, with her Ira Silverstein, for appellant.

Daniel R. Schuckers, Assistant Attorney General, with him Susan Shinkman, Assistant Attorney General, Sydney Reuben, Assistant Attorney General, and Robert P. Kane, Attorney General, for appellee.


This is an appeal filed by Raymond Walker from an order of the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review denying benefits for the period January 25, 1975 through April 5, 1975. Walker was denied unemployment compensation benefits pursuant to Section 402(b)(1) of the Unemployment Compensation Law, Act of December 5, 1936, Second Ex. Sess., P.L. (1937) 2897, as amended, 43 P. S. § 802(b)(1), which provides in pertinent part:

An employe shall be ineligible for compensation for any week —

. . . .

(b)(1) In which his unemployment is due to voluntarily leaving work without cause of a necessitous and compelling nature. . . .

Walker was employed by Spectrum, Inc., as a maintenance man for approximately 18 months prior to the severance of the employment relationship on December 19, 1974.

By a letter dated December 1, 1974, Walker submitted his resignation, effective December 31, 1974, citing a "conflict of interest in employment" as his reason for leaving. Never fully explained on the record, this "conflict of interest" revolved around domestic problems arising out of Walker's shift assignments and those of his wife at her job. On December 18, 1974, Walker met with his employer and attempted to rescind his resignation. The employer refused to allow the rescission because it had allegedly committed itself to a replacement for Walker.

It is the law of Pennsylvania that a resignation, later revoked, is a voluntary termination of employment if the employer has taken steps to replace the employee before revocation. Soyster v. Unemployment Compensation Board, 197 Pa. Super. 547, 180 A.2d 123 (1962). The appellant contends that Soyster, by implication, mandates that an employee be allowed to withdraw a resignation if the employer has not yet begun the process of choosing a replacement. In such a case, termination would be a discharge and not a voluntary quit. Walker further contends that, in this case, the only reason for refusing to allow rescission of the resignation was that he had filed a complaint against Spectrum with the Human Relations Commission. Finally, appellant argues that the Referee's finding that Spectrum was committed to the union for a replacement is based solely on hearsay, and, as such, cannot stand.

Walker has not argued that he left his job due to any cause of a necessitous and compelling nature. Moreover, the inconvenience of his shift assignment would not qualify as such a cause. Stalc v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 13 Pa. Commw. 131, 318 A.2d 398 (1974).

Assuming, without deciding, that Soyster, supra, requires by implication that an employee be allowed to withdraw a resignation unless the employer has relied on it to his detriment, we must still conclude that the appellant is disqualified for benefits.

Whether such a rule should be implied from the Soyster decision is doubtful because the Superior Court in another case in that term, Dykan Unemployment Compensation Case, 197 Pa. Super. 153, 177 A.2d 160 (1962), also written by President Judge RHODES, stated:

We do not decide as an abstract proposition whether or not a resignation once submitted voluntarily may be rescinded so as to compel the employer to initiate a dismissal proceeding. Id. at 157, 177 A.2d at 161.

Thus, the question appears to remain open. Although we need not, at this time, decide the issue, it may be noted that we would be predisposed to limit any such right of the employee to rescind a resignation by requiring that rescission take place no later than the date upon which the resignation was to become effective.

As a general rule, in a "voluntary quit" case, under Section 402(b)(1), the burden of proving a right to unemployment compensation rests with the claimant. Kanouse v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 9 Pa. Commw. 188, 305 A.2d 782 (1973); James v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 6 Pa. Commw. 489, 296 A.2d 288 (1972); Smith Unemployment Compensation Case. 167 Pa. Super. 242, 74 A.2d 523 (1950). Proof that an employee had cause of a necessitous and compelling nature for leaving a job is one way that an apparent voluntary quit may be shown to have not been voluntary. Section 402(b)(1) of the Act expressly sets forth this manner of avoiding ineligibility. The burden of showing compelling and necessitous cause is upon the claimant. Borman v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 12 Pa. Commw. 241, 316 A.2d 679 (1974); Pfafman v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 7 Pa. Commw. 197, 300 A.2d 295 (1973); Domico Unemployment Compensation Case, 198 Pa. Super. 327, 181 A.2d 731 (1962). In this case, the appellant contends that his severance from Spectrum was not a voluntary quit because he chose to rescind his resignation under circumstances which meet the "implied" rule of Soyster, supra. We conclude that the burden under Soyster, supra, of proving that an apparent voluntary quit was not such, should likewise rest with the claimant.

By contrast, in a discharge case based upon willful misconduct, the burden is placed upon the employer to prove willful misconduct pursuant to Section 402(e) of the Act, 43 P. S. § 802(e). See, e.g., Unemployment Compensation Board of Review v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 22 Pa. Commw. 511, 349 A.2d 496 (1975); Unemployment Compensation Board of Review v. Stiles, 19 Pa. Commw. 38, 340 A.2d 594 (1975).

Specifically, we conclude that where it is undisputed that the claimant has submitted a resignation which has set in motion the process for his replacement, the claimant has the burden of proving that such arrangements had not been made at the time of withdrawal of the resignation. Our review of the record discloses that Walker has failed to carry his burden.

Although our holding that the appellant failed to meet his burden of proof makes it unnecessary to consider Walker's challenge to the employer's evidence, we believe that some comment is warranted. Walker's contention is that a finding may not rest solely on hearsay evidence, even if admitted without objection — in this case a letter from Spectrum to the Board informing them of Spectrum's commitment to the union for a replacement laborer.

Our research has disclosed the development of two somewhat confusing, and, at times, inconsistent lines of authority on the general issue of the use of hearsay to support the findings of the Unemployment Compensation Board. Compare Owen v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 26 Pa. Commw. 278, 363 A.2d 852 (1976); Unemployment Compensation Board of Review v. Stiles, 19 Pa. Commw. 38, 340 A.2d 594 (1975); Covell v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 16 Pa. Commw. 637, 330 A.2d 319 (1975); Pelligrino v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 8 Pa. Commw. 486, 303 A.2d 875 (1973); Sledzianowski Unemployment Compensation Case, 168 Pa. Super. 37, 76 A.2d 666 (1950), with Unemployment Compensation Board of Review v. Cooper, 25 Pa. Commw. 256, 360 A.2d 293 (1976); Bickling v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 17 Pa. Commw. 619, 333 A.2d 519 (1975); Lipshutz v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 8 Pa. Commw. 257, 303 A.2d 231 (1973); Kozlowski Unemployment Compensation Case, 191 Pa. Super. 83, 155 A.2d 373 (1959).

In two cases, which are indistinguishable and which involved, as does the present case, the use of a hearsay letter from an employer as the sole support for a finding of voluntary termination, this Court has announced contrary rules. In Cooper, supra, we declared that a finding based solely on hearsay, even if that hearsay was admitted without objection, cannot stand, yet in Covell, supra, precisely the same contention was rebuffed by the statement that evidence, admitted without objection, may be given its natural and probative effect and may support the Board's findings. To remedy this apparent inconsistency and to lessen confusion regarding the use of hearsay to support the findings of the Board, we set forth the following guidelines: (1) Hearsay evidence, properly objected to, is not competent evidence to support a finding of the Board. Stiles, supra; Pelligrino, supra; Phillips v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 152 Pa. Super. 75, 30 A.2d 718 (1943); (2) Hearsay evidence, admitted without objection, will be given its natural probative effect and may support a finding of the Board, if it is corroborated by any competent evidence in the record, but a finding of fact based solely on hearsay will not stand. Cooper, supra; Bickling, supra.

Although we agree with the appellant that Spectrum's letter, in the absence of corroboration, does not support the Board's finding that Spectrum was committed to the union for a replacement laborer, the burden of proving that Spectrum was not so committed, as we have already stated, rested with the claimant, and we must affirm the decision of the Board.

ORDER

AND NOW, this 13th day of December, 1976, the order of the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, dated December 12, 1975, in the above-captioned matter, denying benefits to Raymond Walker, is affirmed.


Summaries of

Walker v. Unempl. Comp. Bd. of Review

Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania
Dec 13, 1976
27 Pa. Commw. 522 (Pa. Cmmw. Ct. 1976)

holding that hearsay evidence, admitted without objection, may only support a finding if it is corroborated by any competent evidence of record

Summary of this case from Smith v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review

holding hearsay evidence, admitted without objection, will be given its natural probative effect and may support a finding of the Board, if it is corroborated by any competent evidence in the record

Summary of this case from Silva v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review

holding that a finding of fact based solely on hearsay cannot stand

Summary of this case from DiSalvatore v. Police Officers' Com'n

holding that "hearsay evidence, properly objected to, is not competent evidence to support a finding of the Board"

Summary of this case from Pizor v. W.C.A.B

finding of Unemployment Compensation Board of Review cannot be based entirely upon hearsay evidence

Summary of this case from Vereen v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. Parole

In Walker, the Commonwealth Court held that in proceedings before the Unemployment Compensation Board, "(1) hearsay evidence, properly objected to, is not competent evidence to support a finding of the Board and (2) hearsay evidence, admitted without objection, will be given its natural probative effect and may support a finding of the Board, if it is corroborated by any competent evidence in the record, but a finding based solely on hearsay will not stand."

Summary of this case from City of Philadelphia v. Civil Serv. Com'n

stating that "[h]earsay evidence, properly objected to, is not competent evidence to support a finding"

Summary of this case from City of Philadelphia v. Civil Serv. Com'n

In Walker this court reconciled and clarified two seemingly conflicting lines of rulings regarding the use of hearsay evidence in administrative hearings.

Summary of this case from Dep't of Corr. v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review

In Walker v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 367 A.2d 366 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1976), this Court established a relaxed standard to apply to the use of hearsay evidence in administrative proceedings.

Summary of this case from Obst v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review

In Walker v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 367 A.2d 366, 370 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1976), addressing the effect of hearsay in an administrative hearing, this Court set forth the following rule: (1) hearsay evidence, properly objected to, is not competent evidence to support a finding of fact; (2) hearsay evidence admitted without objection will be given its natural probative effect and may support a finding of fact if it is corroborated by any competent evidence in the record, but a finding of fact based solely on hearsay will not stand.

Summary of this case from Cambria v. Bd. of Sch. Dirs. of Exeter Twp. Sch. Dist.

In Walker v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 367 A.2d 366 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1976), this Court established the following guidelines: (1) hearsay evidence, properly objected to, is not competent evidence to support a finding of the Board; and (2) hearsay evidence, admitted without objection, will be given its natural probative effect and may support a finding of the Board if it is corroborated by any competent evidence, but a finding of fact based solely on hearsay will not stand.

Summary of this case from Aqua Am., Inc. v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review

In Walker, this Court established the following guidelines: (1) hearsay evidence, properly objected to, is not competent evidence to support a finding of the Board; and (2) hearsay evidence, admitted without objection, will be given its natural probative effect and may support a finding of the Board if it is corroborated by any competent evidence, but a finding of fact based solely on hearsay will not stand. 367 A.2d at 370.

Summary of this case from Reg'l Cancer Ctr. v. Workers' Comp. Appeal Bd.

In Walker, this Court set forth the following guidelines for the use of hearsay to support findings of fact in unemployment compensation cases: (1) hearsay evidence, properly objected to, is not competent evidence to support a finding of the Board; (2) hearsay evidence, admitted without objection, will be given its natural and probative effect and may support a finding of the Board, if it is corroborated by any competent evidence in the record, but a finding of fact based solely on hearsay will not stand. 367 A.2d at 370.

Summary of this case from Smart Park Inc. v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review

stating that objected-to hearsay may not be used to support a finding of fact, but hearsay evidence, admitted without objection, will be given its natural probative effect if it is corroborated by any other competent evidence in the record

Summary of this case from Vaughn v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review

In Walker v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 367 A.2d 366, 370 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1976), this Court held that "[h]earsay evidence, properly objected to, is not competent evidence to support a finding of the Board," although "[h]earsay evidence, admitted without objection, will be given its natural probative effect and may support a finding of the Board, if it is corroborated by any competent evidence in the record, but a finding of fact based solely on hearsay will not stand."

Summary of this case from Greenway v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review

requiring hearsay to be corroborated by competent evidence in the record

Summary of this case from SULE v. PHILADELPHIA PARKING AUTHORITY

requiring hearsay to be corroborated by competent evidence in the record

Summary of this case from Sule v. Philadelphia Parking Auth.

stating that unobjected to hearsay evidence will be given its natural probative effect if it is corroborated by any competent evidence in the record.

Summary of this case from GNB v. W.C.A.B

In Walker v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 367 A.2d 366 (Pa.Cmwlth. 1976), we held that, "hearsay evidence, admitted without objection, will be given its natural probative effect and may support a finding of the Board, if it is corroborated by any competent evidence in the record, but a finding of fact based solely on hearsay will not stand."

Summary of this case from Iroquois Tool System v. W.C.A.B.

In Walker v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 367 A.2d 366 (Pa.Commw. 1976), this Court held that hearsay evidence which is properly objected to, is incompetent to support an agency finding.

Summary of this case from Campbell v. Civil Service Com'n

In Walker v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 27 Pa. Commw. 522, 367 A.2d 366 (1976), this Court gave direction as to the use of hearsay to support findings.

Summary of this case from Calcara v. W.C.A.B

In Walker v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 27 Pa. Commw. 522, 367 A.2d 366 (Pa.Commw. 1976), this Court stated that hearsay evidence, properly objected to, is not competent evidence to support a finding of the Board.

Summary of this case from Stop-N-Go v. Unemployment Compensation Bd.

In Walker v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 27 Pa. Commw. 522, 367 A.2d 366 (1976), we held that hearsay evidence which is properly objected to is incompetent to support an agency finding.

Summary of this case from Sweed v. City of Philadelphia

In Walker v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 27 Pa. Commw. 522, 367 A.2d 366 (1976), we held that hearsay evidence which is properly objected to is incompetent to support an agency finding.

Summary of this case from Sammons v. Civil Service Com'n of Phila

In Walker, we held that hearsay evidence admitted without objection may be used to support a finding if it is corroborated by any competent evidence in the record.

Summary of this case from Kondrat v. W.C.A.B
Case details for

Walker v. Unempl. Comp. Bd. of Review

Case Details

Full title:Raymond Walker v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review of the…

Court:Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania

Date published: Dec 13, 1976

Citations

27 Pa. Commw. 522 (Pa. Cmmw. Ct. 1976)
367 A.2d 366

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