Virginia v. American Booksellers Assn

44 Citing briefs

  1. Green et al v. U.S. Department of Justice, et al

    Memorandum in opposition to re MOTION to Dismiss

    Filed October 18, 2016

    Dr. Green thus has plausibly alleged that publishing his book would subject him to liability under the anti-trafficking provision’s broad ambit. See, e.g., Am. Booksellers, 484 U.S. at 392 (plaintiffs had standing where they risk criminal prosecution “if their interpretation of the statute is correct”). Contrary to the Government’s suggestion (Gov’t Br.

  2. Amarin Pharma, Inc. et al v. United States Food & Drug Administration et al

    MEMORANDUM OF LAW in Opposition re: 5 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction . . Document

    Filed June 23, 2015

    To show a credible threat of prosecution, there must be “an actual and well-founded fear” that the challenged statute or regulation will be enforced against the plaintiff in the manner anticipated. Am. Booksellers Ass’n, 484 U.S. at 393. Courts dismiss pre-enforcement First Amendment cases for lack of justiciability where the prosecuting authority has represented that it would not enforce the law against the plaintiff in the manner alleged.

  3. Colorado Outfitters Association et al v. Hickenlooper

    REPLY to Response to 64 MOTION to Dismiss Claims Two, Three, and Four, and to Dismiss Sheriffs as Plaintiffs Acting in their Official Capacities

    Filed September 5, 2013

    See Am. Booksellers Ass’n., 484 U.S. at 393; Babbit 442 U.S. at 303 (reasoning plaintiffs demonstrated an injury for standing purposes because “it is clear that appellees desire to engage at least in consumer publicity campaigns prohibited by the Act”). Accordingly, nothing in Babbit or Booksellers helps Plaintiffs establish standing.

  4. Briggs v. Borough of Norristown et al

    RESPONSE in Opposition re MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM /First Amended Complaint

    Filed June 3, 2013

    Indeed, because First Amendment rights are at stake, Ms. Briggs not only has standing on her own behalf, but if she wanted to pursue the claim on behalf of other tenants in Norristown, the broadened concepts of standing in First Amendment cases would permit her to do so. See, e.g., Am. Booksellers Ass’n, 484 U.S. at 392-93 (holding that “in the First Amendment context, litigants are permitted to challenge a statute . . . because . . . the statute’s very existence may cause [them or] others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or expression.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).

  5. Free Speech Coalition, Inc. et al v. the Honorable Eric H. Holder, Jr.

    Memorandum in Opposition to 92 MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction

    Filed September 14, 2012

    Importantly, the government has not suggested or represented that it will no longer enforce the statutes and regulations. See American Booksellers Association, Inc., 484 U.S. 383, 393 (1988) (“We are not troubled by the pre-enforcement nature of this suit. The State has not suggested that the newly enacted law will not be enforced, and we see no reason to assume otherwise.”)

  6. The American Civil Liberties Union of Illinois v. Alvarez

    REPLY

    Filed December 16, 2010

    After Boyle, the Court established the foregoing framework for pre-enforcement standing, where there is a credible threat of prosecution. See, e.g., Doe, 410 U.S. at 188; Babbitt, 442 U.S. at 298; Am. Booksellers Ass’n, 484 U.S. at 393; Holder, 130 S. Ct. at 2717. Contrary to Alvarez’s suggestion (Alv.

  7. The American Civil Liberties Union of Illinois v. Alvarez

    MEMORANDUM

    Filed November 18, 2010

    This is powerful evidence of the reasonableness of the ACLU's fear of prosecution. See Am. Booksellers Ass'n., 484 U.S. at 393; Babbitt, 442 U.S. at 302; Commodity Trend Service, Inc., 149 F.3d at 687. Further, the amended complaint would allege additional relevant prosecutions under the Act.

  8. Glenn et al v. Holder

    MOTION to Dismiss AND BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS

    Filed April 15, 2010

    Such plaintiffs “are permitted to challenge a statute not because their own rights of free expression are violated, but because of a judicial prediction or assumption that the statute’s very existence may cause others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or expression.” American Booksellers Ass’n, Inc., 484 U.S. at 392-393 (internal citations & quotation marks omitted). But this principle does not overcome the “irreducible minimum” requirement that a plaintiff allege a personal stake in the litigation.

  9. Malhan v. Porrino

    REPLY BRIEF to Opposition to Motion

    Filed February 14, 2017

    The Supreme Court made it clear that the injury in fact requirement was a necessary threshold to then reach the issue of prudential standing in the very first line of a block quotation contained in Malhan’s Opposition Brief, stating “[e]ven if an injury in fact Case 2:16-cv-08889-KM-JBC Document 11 Filed 02/14/17 Page 10 of 14 PageID: 298 8 is demonstrated, the usual rule is that a party may assert only a violation of its own rights.” Virginia v. Am. Booksellers Ass'n, Inc., 484 U.S. 383, 392–93, (1988) (emphasis added). Therefore, because Malhan has failed to establish an injury in fact because the restraining order against him has been terminated and he has not pled a credible threat of future enforcement, all of Malhan’s arguments regarding the “overbreadth” doctrine under the First Amendment should be disregarded as irrelevant.

  10. Malhan v. Porrino

    BRIEF in Opposition

    Filed January 27, 2017

    Further, the alleged danger of this statute is, in large measure, one of self-censorship; a harm that can be realized even without an actual prosecution. Virginia v. Am. Booksellers Ass'n, Inc., 484 U.S. 383, 392–93, (1988). All of the concerns expressed by the Court in American Booksellers apply here.