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Vanderwall v. Peck

United States District Court, E.D. Louisiana
Apr 28, 2004
CIVIL ACTION NO. 03-3142, SECTION "K" (5) (E.D. La. Apr. 28, 2004)

Opinion

CIVIL ACTION NO. 03-3142, SECTION "K" (5)

April 28, 2004


MINUTE ENTRY


Before the Court is a Motion to Dismiss (Rec. Doc. No. 12) all claims against defendants Gary Q. Peck and Robert Boland. Having reviewed the pleadings, memoranda, and relevant law, the Court GRANTS defendant's motion as meritorious and DISMISSES Plaintiff's claims in their entirety.

I. BACKGROUND

Pro se plaintiff William R. Vanderwall is a retired former employee of the State of Louisiana, where he served in the following capacities: (1) "as the first Director of Louisiana's Medicaid program after it was removed from the Welfare Department;" (2) as the "writer of [Louisiana's] current State Medicaid Plan;" (3) as the former Chief Public Health Planner and developer of Louisiana's first Public Health State Plan;" and (4) as the developer of his own "Anti-terrorist Plan which mobilizes-trains-enables ALL persons, as able to detect/prevent/abort terrorism and to respond to and recover quickly-adequately from any attack." Rec. Doc. No. 1 at 8. (emphasis included in original). Following Plaintiff's retirement, the state again employed Vanderwall through a "personal service contract" for 544,000, to last for one year, whereby plaintiff would "develop and implement the Louisiana Office of Public Health Pharmacy's State Plan as required by the Federal Center for Disease Control and Prevention's National Pharmaceutical Stockpile to cope with terrorist's use of biological/chemical/nuclear Weapons of Mas Destruction." Id.

Plaintiff began work on October 21, 2002. Dr. Gary Q. Peck, the Director of the Louisiana Department of Health and Hospital's Office of Public Health, questioned Plaintiff's purpose and abilities from the outset of the personal service contract, ultimately requiring plaintiff to submit an outline of his proposed Plan to Peck. After Vanderwall submitted an outline to Peck, Plaintiff's superior informed him that his contract was cancelled and that he would soon receive a written letter notifying him of his removal. On November 13, 2002 plaintiff received a letter that notified him of his termination. He was not given cause for his termination in the letter.

Plaintiff Vanderwall filed the instant suit pro se against Peck and Robert Boland, General Counsel for the State of Louisiana Department of Civil Service, on November 7, 2003, alleging, inter alia, violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 1985, and 1986. Plaintiff's Complaint also included state law claims of breach of contract and malfeasance in office.

In his Complaint, Vanderwall claims to have prevailed in prior lawsuits against the state for (1) failing to employ properly qualified individuals, and (2) using "tricks" to keep those individuals in office after they were found to be under-qualified for their positions by a court of law. Plaintiff believes the instant lawsuit against the state will provide a forum for other disgruntled and abused former state employees to voice their grievances. He also claims that he notified Boland that his actions in aiding in and implementing the hiring and maintenance of Louisiana's civil service staff and in approving the "tricky `without cause'" provision in plaintiff's contract with the state constituted governmental wrongdoing. Vanderwall describes his allegations against Boland as claims of "self-entrapment," presumably making the claim that state policies approved by and put in place by Boland's legal services forced civil service employees into unfair labor contracts. Plaintiff states that he would "sacrifice ALL and willingly release either or both defendants from any financial liability i f they would, in truth and reality reveal how and by whom they were unduly pressured to make their `mistakes'." The Complaint also states: "if the [State Civil Service] Commission ("Commission") would acknowledge, in writing, their various `tricks' and state plans to correct those practices, our constitutional challenges would also be dropped."

Specifically, plaintiff Vanderwall makes the following claims in his Complaint:

• That Peck breached his contract with plaintiff;
• That a conspiracy existed to give Plaintiff's position to "a more favored person;"
• That Peck was coerced into participating in the conspiracy to give Plaintiff's job to "a more favored person;"
• That Boland purposefully included a "trick" "without cause" for cancellation clause in Plaintiff's contract, thereby allowing the conspiracy to replace plaintiff with a "more favored person" to succeed;
• That the government's use of a "without cause" clause in its employment contracts violates constitutional law because it violates both due process and equal protection, is arbitrary and capricious, and sets a dangerous precedent;
• That a public civil service lawyer may not represent the defendant(s) in the underlying claim;
• That Peck's treatment of plaintiff (a) nsulted and injured Plaintiff's reputation, and (b) may have discredited Plaintiff's copyrighted Anti-terrorist plan, thereby potentially disserving "our overall homeland security;" and
• That further investigation by the FBI is required.

Rec. Doc. No. 1 at 16-19 (emphasis in original).

Vanderwall's Complaint seeks full payment of his contractual salary,$44,000, plus damages for pain and suffering. Plaintiff states that he would relinquish all of his rights to damages if "legislative correction" or a cessation of the Louisiana Civil Service Commission's "tricks" took place. He has submitted his own proposal for reforming Louisiana's civil service system and stated that he will assist the FBI in investigating criminal violations by the Commission.

Boland filed the instant Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) on February 9, 2004 (Rec. Doc. No. 12). On March 3, 2004, the Court took the motion under submission on the papers.

II. LAW ANALYSIS

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) permits a defendant to seek dismissal of a complaint based on the "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." To determine whether a motion to dismiss has merit, Jefferson Parish v. Lead Ind. Ass'n. Inc., 106 F.3d 1245, 1250 (5th Cir. 1997) instructs that "[t]he standard to be applied to a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule 12(b)(6) is a familiar one." When considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), district courts should construe the complaint liberally in favor of the plaintiff, assuming all factual allegations to be true and resolving any ambiguities and doubts in favor of the plaintiff. Fernandez-Monies v. Allied Pilots Ass'n., 987 F.2d 27S, 284 (5th Cir. 1993); see Leleux v. United States, 178 F.3d 750, 754 (5th Cir. 1999). A complaint may not be dismissed "unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Id. (quoting Lowrey v. Texas A M Univ. Sys., 117 F.3d 242, 247 (5th Cir. 1997)); Leffall v. Dallas Independent School District, 28 F.3d 521, 524 (5th Cir. 1994); Fernandez-Monies, 987 F.2d at 284-85. However, conclusory allegations or legal conclusions masquerading as factual conclusions will not suffice to prevent a motion to dismiss. Fernandez-Montes, 987 F.2d at 284; Tuchman v. DSC Communications Corp., 14 F.3d 1061, 1067 (5th Cir. 1994).

In testing the sufficiency of a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint, at issue here, the suit should not be dismissed unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts which would entitle him to relief. Watts v. Graves, 720 F.2d 1416, 1418-19 (5th Cir. 1983) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957); Richardson v. Fleming, 651 F.2d 366 (5th Cir. 1981)).

Section 1983 provides in pertinent part:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or any person withing the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983(1976).

42 U.S.C. § 1983 Plaintiff's must allege facts indicating each defendant's personal involvement with the alleged wrong. Jacquez v. Procunier, 801 F.2d 789, 793 (5th Cir. 1986). There are two essential elements to a § 1983 claim: (1) that the conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under color of state law; and (2) that the conduct deprived a person of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981). Furthermore, there must be "a direct causal link between the alleged constitutional deprivations and the official conduct by defendants causing the deprivations." Bieros v. Nicola, et al, 839 F. Supp. 332 (E.D. Pa. 1993). A § 1983 plaintiff must allege the particular facts of the defendant's conduct in its complaint. Jacquez, 801 F.2d at 793; Rodriguez v. Avita, 871 F.2d 552, 554 (5th Cir. 1989); Mills v. Criminal District Court, 837 F.2d 677, 678(5th Cir. 1988). Conclusory allegations are insufficient for civil rights cases. Schultea v. Wood, 47 F.3d 1427, 1433 (5th Cir. 1995).

Although plaintiff sued the defendants in multiple capacities, the Court notes that the pro se Complaint fails to delineate what activities by the defendants were carried out in which different capacity. To eliminate confusion the Court has analyzed, based on the record before it, whether the federal claims as currently alleged can go forward against the defendants. To aid in this exercise a brief review over the relevant law is necessary. Because suits against state officials in their official capacity are essentially suits against the State, Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985), and States are not "persons" under the statutory language of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a state official sued in their official capacity is also not a "person" within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989). Therefore a state official cannot be sued in their official capacity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Will, 491 U.S. at 71.

However, personal-capacity suits which seek to impose individual liability upon a government officer for actions taken under color of state law are admissible under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991). Through enactment of § 1983, Congress sought to "give a remedy to parties deprived of constitutional rights, privileges and immunities by an official's abuse of his position." Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 172 (1961). Thus state officials can be sued in their individual capacities and be held personally liable under § 1983 if it can be shown that the official, acting under color of state law, caused the deprivation of a federal right. Hafer, 502 U.S. at 25-31. Officials sued in their personal capacities, unlike those sued in official capacities, may assert personal immunity defenses such as objectively reasonable reliance on existing law or, as in the instant case, qualified immunity. Id. at 25.

When enacting § 1983, Congress did not, however, intend to violate the Eleventh Amendment and override state immunity. Id. at 30. While the Eleventh Amendment bars suits in federal court "by private parties seeking to impose a liability which must be paid from public funds in the state treasury," Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974), it "provides no shield for a state official confronted by a claim that he had deprived another of a federal right under the color of state law." Hafer, 502 U.S. at 30 (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 237 (1974)); see also Ex pane Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). The Eleventh Amendment erects no barrier against suits to impose "individual and personal liability" on state officials under § 1983. Hafer, 502 U.S. at 30.

Upon review, Plaintiff's complaint reveals that defendants are being sued in their individual capacities under § 1983, and as such, under Ex parte Young, the Court finds no Eleventh Amendment bar as to Plaintiff's claims. However, as stated above, when sued individually under § 1983, defendants are entitled to assert certain affirmative defenses, including qualified immunity.

Public officials performing discretionary functions are generally shielded from suit unless it is shown by specific allegations that the officials violated clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which reasonable individuals would be aware. See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 800; Shultea, 47 F.3d at 1431; Mahrous, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5201 at *3. Thus in order to survive a qualified immunity defense the plaintiff must allege particularized facts that support his allegations. Baker v. Putnal, 75 F.3d 190, 195 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that when a defendant asserts qualified immunity, a plaintiff must respond by pleading "specific conduct and action giving rise to a constitutional violation") (emphasis added).

It is well settled that the qualified immunity analysis entails a two-step process. First, a court must determine whether plaintiff has alleged the violation of a constitutional right. Second, if the plaintiff has alleged a constitutional violation, the court must decide if the conduct was objectively reasonable in light of clearly established law at the time the challenged conduct occurred. Causey v. Parish of Tangipahoa, 167 F. Supp.2d 898, 908.

Peck and Boland are entitled to qualified immunity here. The foregoing standard is not met by Vanderwall for the following reasons: (1) Plaintiff's long, rambling Complaint fails to allege a violation of a clearly established constitutional or federal right; and (2) even if plaintiff alleges a violation of a clearly established constitutional or federal right, it has failed to allege that Peck's and Boland's actions were objectively unreasonable under the circumstances. The state merely exercised its contractual right to terminate plaintiff upon giving plaintiff thirty (30) days written notice. Vanderwall's suit is better characterized as a breach of contract dispute than a constitutional controversy. Thus, Peck and Boland are entitled to qualified immunity and the § 1983 claim is without merit.

Plaintiff Vanderwall's claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1985 and 1986 should also be dismissed. 1985(1) does not apply to the underlying claim because Vanderwall's claims do not address federal officers attempting to perform federal duties. Likewise, § 1985(2) is inapplicable because plaintiff does not claim interference with any state or federal court proceedings with the intent to deny equal protection. Finally, plaintiff has not pled sufficient facts to support a § 1985(3) claim because plaintiff has failed to state any facts regarding defendants' involvement in an alleged conspiracy. Since § 1986 claims are linked to the existence of a § 1985 claim, Plaintiff's Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted regarding both his § 1985 and 1986 claims.

42 U.S.C. § 1985 provides in full:

(1) Preventing officer from performing duties If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire to prevent, by force, intimidation, or threat, any person from accepting or holding any office, trust, or place of confidence under the United States, or from discharging any duties thereof; or to induce by like means any officer of the United States to leave any State, district, or place, where his duties as an officer are required to be performed, or to injure him in his person or property on account of his lawful discharge of the duties of his office, or while engaged in the lawful discharge thereof, or to injure his property so as to molest, interrupt, hinder, or impede him in the discharge of his official duties;
(2) Obstructing justice; intimidating party, witness, or juror If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire to deter, by force, intimidation, or threat, any party or witness in any court of the United States from attending such court, or from testifying to any matter pending therein, freely, fully, and truthfully, or to injure such party or witness in his person or property on account of his having so attended or testified, or to influence the verdict, presentment, or indictment of any grand or petit juror in any such court, or to injure such juror in his person or property on account of any verdict, presentment, or indictment lawfully assented to by him, or of his being or having been such juror; or if two or more persons conspire for the purpose of impeding, hindering, obstructing, or defeating, in any manner, the due course of justice in any State or Territory, with intent to deny to any citizen the equal protection of the laws, or to injure him or his property for lawfully enforcing, or attempting to enforce, the right of any person, or class of persons, to the equal protection of the laws;
(3) Depriving persons of rights or privileges If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire or go in disguise on the highway or on the premises of another, for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws; or for the purpose of preventing or hindering the constituted authorities of any State or Territory from giving or securing to all persons within such State or Territory the equal protection of the laws; or if two or more persons conspire to prevent by force, intimidation, or threat, any citizen who is lawfully entitled to vote, from giving his support or advocacy in a legal manner, toward or in favor of the election of any lawfully qualified person as an elector for President or Vice President, or as a Member of Congress of the United States; or to injure any citizen in person or property on account of such support or advocacy; in any case of conspiracy set forth in this section, if one or more persons engaged therein do, or cause to be done, any act in furtherance of the object of such conspiracy, whereby another is injured in his person or property, or deprived of having and exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States, the party so injured or deprived may have an action for the recovery of damages occasioned by such injury or deprivation, against any one or more of the conspirators.
42 U.S.C. § 1985(1980).

42 U.S.C. § 1986 provides in pertinent part:

Every person who, having knowledge that any of the wrongs conspired to be done, and mentioned in section 1985 of this title . . .
42 U.S.C. § 1986(1981).

Having determined that plaintiff Vanderwall's claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 1985, and 1986 should be dismissed, the Court is left with only Plaintiff's state law claims. Jurisdiction to hear those claims arises out of 28 U.S.C. § 1367 since diversity is lacking here. Supplemental jurisdiction may continue "even after the federal claims upon which jurisdiction is based have been dismissed or rendered moot." Baker v. Farmers Electric Cooperative, Inc., 34 F.3d 274, 283 (5th Cir. 1994). A district Court has broad discretion in deciding whether to retain jurisdiction. Newport Ltd. v. Sears. Roebuck Co., 941 F.2d 302, 307 (5th Cir. 1991).

28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) provides that district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim under subsection if the court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction. In the instant matter, the federal claims which gave rise to original jurisdiction have been dismissed herein. Therefore, the Court declines to exercise 28 U.S.C. § 1367 supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff Vanderwall's state law claims and they shall be dismissed without prejudice.

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that the Motion to Dismiss (Rec. Doc. No. 12) is hereby GRANTED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff Vanderwall's federal claims against defendants Peck and Boland are hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE and his state law claims are hereby DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.


Summaries of

Vanderwall v. Peck

United States District Court, E.D. Louisiana
Apr 28, 2004
CIVIL ACTION NO. 03-3142, SECTION "K" (5) (E.D. La. Apr. 28, 2004)
Case details for

Vanderwall v. Peck

Case Details

Full title:WILLIAM R. VANDERWALL VERSUS GARY Q. PECK, et al

Court:United States District Court, E.D. Louisiana

Date published: Apr 28, 2004

Citations

CIVIL ACTION NO. 03-3142, SECTION "K" (5) (E.D. La. Apr. 28, 2004)

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