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Van Pelt v. McGraw

Court of Appeals of the State of New York
Oct 1, 1850
4 N.Y. 110 (N.Y. 1850)

Summary

In Van Pelt v. McGraw (4 N.Y. 110), in an action for wrongfully and fraudulently removing rails, timber, etc., from certain lands on which plaintiff held a mortgage, it was held: "Now this action is not based upon the assumption that the plaintiff's land has been injured, but that his mortgage as a security has been impaired.

Summary of this case from In re The City of New York

Opinion

October Term, 1850

S.B. Cushing, for appellant.

Walbridge and Ferris, for respondents.


There is no doubt but that an action on the case will lie for an injury of the character complained of in this case. It forms no objection to this action that the circumstances of the case are novel, and that no case precisely similar in all respects has previously arisen. The action is based upon very general principles, and is designed to afford relief in all cases where one man is injured by the wrongful act of another, where no other remedy is provided. This injury may result from some breach of positive law, or some violation of a right or duty growing out of the relations existing between the parties. (1 Cow. Treat. 3.)

The defendant McGraw, in this case, came into the possession of the land subject to the mortgage. The rights of the holder of the mortgage were therefore paramount to his rights, and any attempt on his part to impair the mortgage as a security, was a violation of the plaintiff's rights. But the case is not new in its circumstances. The case of Gates v. Joice, (11 John. 136,) was precisely like the case at bar in principle. That action was brought by the assignee of a judgment against a person for taking down and removing a building from the land upon which the judgment was a lien. The plaintiff's security was thereby impaired. The court in that case sustained the action. The decision in that case was referred to and approved in Lane v. Hitchcock, (14 John. 213,) and in Gardner v. Heartt, (3 Denio, 234.) Nor is there any thing in the case of Peterson v. Clark, (15 John. 205,) which conflicts with the principle of these cases. That was an action by a mortgagee in the usual form of an action for waste. The declaration alledged seisin in the plaintiff, upon which the defendant took issue. There was no allegation that the mortgagor was insolvent, or the judgment as a security impaired. The only issue to be passed upon, was that in relation to the seisin. It is quite clear that upon such an issue the mortgagee must fail. Now this action is not based upon the assumption that the plaintiff's land has been injured, but that his mortgage as a security has been impaired. His damages, therefore, would be limited to the amount of injury to the mortgage, however great the injury to the land might be. It could, therefore, be of no consequence whether the injury occurred before or after forfeiture of the mortgage. The action is clearly maintainable.

It only remains, therefore, to be considered whether there was any error in the charge of the court. In order to come to a correct conclusion upon this point, it becomes necessary to examine the exceptions to the charge in connection with the undisputed testimony in the cause, and the propositions upon which the court were required to charge. It had been proved that the defendants knew of the mortgage, that the mortgagors were insolvent, and that the property had been advertised for sale by virtue of the mortgage. They were forbid to remove the fences and timber, for the reason that the security would thereby be impaired. It was also proved that the value of the mortgage had been impaired by such removal. Under this state of facts the defendants' counsel asked the court to charge the jury, that McGraw having the fee of the land, and being in possession, had a right to take off the fences and timber; that the acts being lawful, could not be deemed to have been done wrongfully or fraudulently. The court charged that the acts were lawful if they did not prejudice the plaintiff's rights or impair his security, but that if they had impaired the security, knowing the plaintiff's lien, they were liable. As an answer to the propositions of the defendants' counsel, the charge was correct. Acts may be harmless in themselves, so long as they injure no one, but the consequences of acts often give character to the acts themselves. It is upon this distinction that the maxim is based, sic utere tuo est alienum non lædas. As I have before observed, the lien of the plaintiff upon the land was paramount to any interest which the defendants possessed therein, and any wilful injury of that lien by them was a violation of the plaintiff's rights, for which an action would lie.

The defendants' counsel also asked the court to charge that the plaintiff having alledged in his declaration that the defendants did the acts fraudulently and with a design to injure the plaintiff, he was bound to prove the allegations by evidence other than the mere act of removing the timber for the emolument of the defendants. The court refused so to charge, to which there was an exception. This proposition is somewhat obscure, but I understand it to mean that the plaintiff should prove that the primary motive of the defendants was to cheat the plaintiff. If the defendants knew that by taking off the timber the value of the plaintiff's mortgage as a security would be impaired, they would be legally chargeable with a design to effect that object, although their leading motive may have been their own gain. A man must be deemed to design the necessary consequences of his acts. If, therefore, he does a wrongful act, knowing that his neighbor will be thereby injured, he is liable. It is upon this principle that persons are often chargeable with the intent to defraud creditors, or to commit any other fraud. The immediate motive is oftentimes self-interest, but if the necessary consequence is a fraud upon his neighbor, the actor is legally chargeable with a design to effect that result. Upon the whole, therefore, although the charge is not quite so explicit as it should be, yet taken in connection with the propositions presented to the court, I think it was substantially correct. The judgment of the supreme court should be affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.


Summaries of

Van Pelt v. McGraw

Court of Appeals of the State of New York
Oct 1, 1850
4 N.Y. 110 (N.Y. 1850)

In Van Pelt v. McGraw (4 N.Y. 110), in an action for wrongfully and fraudulently removing rails, timber, etc., from certain lands on which plaintiff held a mortgage, it was held: "Now this action is not based upon the assumption that the plaintiff's land has been injured, but that his mortgage as a security has been impaired.

Summary of this case from In re The City of New York

In Van Pelt v. McGraw (supra) the action was by a mortgagee against the owner of the equity of redemption by conveyance from the mortgagors.

Summary of this case from Romanych v. Liverpool Ins. Co.
Case details for

Van Pelt v. McGraw

Case Details

Full title:VAN PELT v . McGRAW et al

Court:Court of Appeals of the State of New York

Date published: Oct 1, 1850

Citations

4 N.Y. 110 (N.Y. 1850)

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