Pullman-Standard v. Swint

4 Analyses of this case by attorneys

  1. Supreme Court Lakeridge Decision Clarifies the Standard of Review of Mixed Questions of Law and Fact

    Kramer Levin Naftalis & Frankel LLPAdam RogoffMarch 8, 2018

    . . satisfy the statutory standard, or to put it another way, whether the rule of law as applied to the established facts is or is not violated.” Lakeridge, at 7, citing Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 289 n. 19 (1982). The standard of review for this third question was the crux of the appeal to the Supreme Court.

  2. De Novo Review of Claim Construction No Longer the De Facto Standard

    Sutherland Asbill & Brennan LLPAnn FortJanuary 22, 2015

    As a starting point, the Court said that Rule 52(a)(6) of the Federal Rules sets forth a “clear command” that a reviewing court is to apply the “clearly erroneous” review standard to both subsidiary and ultimate facts. Citing Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 574 (1985); Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 287 (1982). No exceptions to the Rule are permissible, and the Court cited to the Rules Advisory Committee who explained exceptions would “tend to undermine the legitimacy of the district courts.”

  3. Teva v. Sandoz: The Dissent

    McDonnell Boehnen Hulbert & Berghoff LLPKevin E. NoonanJanuary 22, 2015

    Simply stated, in the Justice's opinion, Rule 52(a)(6) simply does not apply here. Justice Thomas believes that the majority did not "engage the 'vexing . . . distinction between questions of fact and questions of law,'" citing Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U. S. 273, 288 (1982), by going back to how the law made these distinctions when Rule 52 was adopted (1937). He notes that the Rules are based on the common law (citing Justice Scalia's concurring and dissenting opinion in Tome v. United States, 513 U. S. 150, 168 (1995)) but finds the pre-1937 law is "inconclusive" with regard to the fact/law dichotomy in claim construction (considering of course only the Court's jurisprudence in the matter).

  4. Supreme Court Rules that the “Clear Error” Standard Applies When Factual Determinations Underlying Claim Construction Are Reviewed on Appeal in Teva v. Sandoz

    Ropes & Gray LLPSona DeJanuary 22, 2015

    The majority of the Supreme Court sided with Teva, applying Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a)(6), which instructs that a court of appeals must not set aside a district court’s findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. Citing Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 287, (1982), the majority explained that Rule 52(a)(6) applies “to both subsidiary and ultimate facts” and explained why, even if the Rule permitted exceptions, no exception was warranted in the claim construction context. The majority then proceeded to explain how the Supreme Court’s decision in Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996), did not create an exception to Rule 52(a), but rather resolved a Seventh Amendment question – whether a judge or a jury should construe patent claims.