Filed December 10, 2013
Under this reading, Defendants’ illegal conduct need only “involve[] a ‘facility in [foreign] commerce’; it [would not be] necessary for that facility to itself to be ‘used’ in [foreign] commerce.” Wright, 625 F.3d 583 at 594 (finding that because a telephone is a facility of interstate commerce, the statute would apply any time a telephone was used to commit the offense, whether intrastate or interstate.) Defendants also suggest that “foreign communications” and “communications affecting . . . foreign commerce” is “boilerplate” language “insufficient to support extraterritorial application of federal statutes
Filed June 17, 2013
By arguing that “the facts are being contorted by defense counsel and [that defense counsel is] attempting to distract you from the actual evidence,” the government further improperly “denigrate[d] the defense as a sham.” United States v. Wright, 625 F.3d 583, 610 (9th Cir. 2010). Using that argument to put into issue defense counsel’s subjective views of Valle’s guilt amounted to an egregiously improper argument.
Filed August 8, 2011
This Court should “reject the government's invitation to engage in revisionist history.” Wright, 625 F.3d at 594 n.8. 2.
Filed August 16, 2013
Is this what you would expect if you were on trial in this case?”) and United States v. Wright, 625 F.3d 583, 610 (9th Cir. 2010) (affirming and finding no prejudicial error where, among other improprieties, prosecutor improperly stated “Now, I’ve been handling these cases for a number of years and I've seen [three different child pornography defenses]. But never have I seen the trifecta, all three in this same place.
Filed November 1, 2012
Case 2:11-cv-02980-KJM-CKD Document 51 Filed 11/01/12 Page 17 of 27 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS Case No. 2:11-cv-02980-KJM-CKD- 11 - b. Plain Meaning Versus Legislative Intent Under the “standard tools of statutory analysis,” courts “start with the plain meaning of the statute’s text.” In re Roman Catholic Archbishop of Portland in Oregon, 661 F.3d 417, 432 (9th Cir. 2011), citing United States v. Wright, 625 F.3d 583, 591 (9th Cir. 2010); Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 56 (1987) (“the starting point for interpreting a statute is the language of the statute itself”). As the Supreme Court has repeatedly reminded the lower courts, “courts must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there.”