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U.S. v. Walton

United States District Court, E.D. Tennessee, at Chattanooga
Aug 30, 2001
No. 1:01-cr-90 (E.D. Tenn. Aug. 30, 2001)

Opinion

No. 1:01-cr-90.

August 30, 2001


MEMORANDUM AND ORDER


Defendant Christopher Shawn Walton ("Walton") moves to suppress evidence seized as a result of the search conducted by Chattanooga Police on the residence located at 714 Hooker Road in Chattanooga on May 18, 2001 [Court File No. 17]. The Court held an evidentiary hearing on August 28, 2001. After hearing the proof and oral argument from the parties, the Court concludes that the motion to suppress is without merit and is DENIED.

I. FACTS

James Hixson ("Hixson"), a police officer assigned to narcotics investigations for the City of Chattanooga Police Department, received information on March 27, 2001, from a confidential informant ("CI"). Hixson had known the CI for five years during which time the CI provided information to Hixson and other officers on numerous occasions that led to the arrest of individuals on narcotics violations. The CI informed Hixson that Walton was selling crack cocaine and marijuana from his residence at 714 Hooker Road and from his automobile, but that most of the narcotics were located at the residence.

The next day, March 28, 2001, Hixson made a traffic stop on Walton during which Hixson recovered a small amount of marijuana, confirmed Walton's identity, and confirmed that Walton was, in fact, residing at 714 Hooker Road. Sometime between March 28 and May 18, 2001, Hixson observed Walton coming and going from the residence at 714 Hooker Road and ascertained that Walton had a criminal record, including an arrest in 1998 for possession of crack cocaine for resale. Further, Hixson and Officer Hudgins received information from other informants that drug sales were occurring at the residence, and thereafter, the CI made a controlled buy from the residence.

On May 18, 2001, Hixson applied for a warrant to search 714 Hooker Road from a local state judicial commissioner ("state magistrate"). Although Hixson's affidavit asserted that the CI made a "controlled buy" from 714 Hooker Road and that the CI saw narcotics at the residence "within the last 72 hours," the affidavit failed to indicate the dates of these events. Hixson, however, communicated under oath to the state magistrate that the controlled buy occurred on, and the "72 hours" language referred to, that very day (i.e., May 18, 2001). Hixson also informed the state magistrate that he and two other officers surveilled the residence that afternoon while the CI purchased approximately 10 grams of crack cocaine from Walton. Moreover, Hixson announced the name of the CI to the state magistrate. After their discussion of the information contained in the affidavit and sworn testimony, the state magistrate issued the search warrant for 714 Hooker Road. Officers executed the warrant that evening and seized approximately one-half ounce of cocaine base, one kilogram of cocaine hydrochloride, thirty six thousand dollars ($36,000) in United States currency, and a loaded 10mm Glock semiautomatic pistol.

II. ANALYSIS

Defendant argues that (1) the affidavit is ambiguous on its face such that it is insufficient to support a finding of probable cause, and (2) Hixson's reliance on the search warrant was unreasonable, and therefore, is not subject to the Leon good faith exception to the exclusionary rule.

United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).

A. Sufficiency of Affidavit

The standard of review for the sufficiency of an affidavit is whether the magistrate had a substantial basis for finding that the affidavit established probable cause to believe that the evidence would be found at the place cited. United States v. Greene, 250 F.3d 471, 478 (6th Cir. 2001) (quotations omitted); United States v. Davidson, 936 F.2d 856, 859 (6th Cir. 1991). A magistrate's determination of probable cause is afforded great deference by the reviewing court. United States v. Allen, 211 F.3d 970, 973 (en banc), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 907 (2000); Greene, 250 F.3d at 478. As such, the state magistrate's exercise of discretion should not be set aside unless the discretion was arbitrarily exercised. Allen, 211 F.3d at 973; Greene, 250 F.3d at 478.

This Court reviews the sufficiency of Hixson's affidavit in a commonsense manner rather than in a hypertechnical manner. Allen, 211 F.3d 970; Greene, 250 F.3d at 478. Further, this review is determined by the "totality of the circumstances." Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236 (1983); Allen, 211 F.3d at 973. Probable cause exists when there is a fair probability, given the totality of the circumstances, that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place. Gates, 462 U.S. at 236; Greene, 250 F.3d at 479 (quotations omitted); Allen, 211 F.3d at 973. Information can be provided to the magistrate by both affidavit and oral testimony, so long as it is under oath. United States v. Shields, 978 F.2d 943, 945-56 (6th Cir. 1992); see United States v. Harris, 255 F.3d 288 (6th Cir. 2001).

When evaluating information supplied to the police by informants, the factors of the informant's credibility, reliability, and basis of knowledge are considered. Gates, 462 U.S. at 230; Allen, 211 F.3d at 972-73. These three factors are highly relevant in assessing the value of an informant's tip, but they should not be understood as being "entirely separate and independent requirements to be rigidly exacted in every case." Gates, 462 U.S. at 230. A deficiency in one of these factors may be compensated for by a strong showing as to another factor. Id. The overall credibility of an informant's tip may not even require police corroboration to support a finding of probable cause. Allen, 211 F.3d at 976 (holding that "where a known person, named to the magistrate, to whose reliability an officer attests with some detail, states that he has seen a particular crime and particular evidence, in the recent past, a neutral and detached magistrate may believe that evidence of a crime will be found." Id.); but cf. United States v. Williams, 224 F.3d 530, 532-33 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding that an informant need not be named to the magistrate in order to sustain a finding of probable cause where there is additional evidence that sufficiently corroborates the informant's information).

After reviewing Hixson's affidavit and applying the Gates totality of the circumstances test, this Court concludes that the state magistrate who issued the search warrant had a substantial basis for finding there was a fair probability that evidence of criminal activity would be found at the residence at 714 Hooker Road. The state magistrate did not arbitrarily exercise his discretion in issuing the search warrant.

Although the affidavit could be more clear, a reasonable interpretation of the affidavit would lead one to conclude that the CI had been at the residence within the last 72 hours of May 18, 2001, the date on which the application for the search warrant was sought. The CI's personal observation of narcotics at the residence that day, combined with Hixson's detailed attestation of the CI's reliability, indicate a fair probability that evidence of a crime would be found at the residence under the Allen standard. Hixson's independent police investigation, which included a controlled purchase of narcotics from Walton at the residence, corroborated the information furnished to the police. Unlike the officer in Allen, Hixson included details of the police corroboration in his affidavit. The affidavit, on its face, supports a finding of probable cause.

Moreover, this Court finds that Hixson did inform the state magistrate, while under oath, of all relevant facts and circumstances, including the date and details of the controlled buy and the CI's name. Hixson's oral testimony bolstered his affidavit in application for the search warrant such that the state magistrate was not presented with any ambiguities when he issued the warrant, and thus, had a substantial basis for finding probable cause. See Harris, 255 F.3d at 293. For these reasons, Walton's motion to suppress must be denied.

B. Leon Exception

Alternatively, Walton's motion to suppress fails because the execution of the search warrant falls within the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule. The exclusionary rule does not bar the admissibility of evidence obtained by officers acting in reasonable reliance on a search warrant that is subsequently held to be invalid. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984); Harris, 255 F.3d at 293. The Leon good faith exception is inappropriate where: (1) the issuing magistrate was misled by information in the affidavit that the affiant either knew was false or should have known was false except for the affiant's reckless disregard for the truth; (2) the issuing magistrate failed to act in a neutral and detached manner; (3) the affidavit is so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in the existence of probable cause entirely unreasonable; and (4) the search warrant was facially deficient in that it failed to describe with particularity the things to be seized and the place to be searched. Leon, 468 U.S. at 914-15; Harris, 255 F.3d at 293.

The Court finds that the Leon exception applies to the case at bar: There is no evidence of false information in the affidavit; no evidence that the state magistrate abandoned his neutral and detached role; and no evidence that the warrant failed to particularize the things to be seized and the place to be searched. Defendant argues that Hixson's reliance on the search warrant was unreasonable; however, this argument is not supported by the record. Hixson received information about drug-related activities at 714 Hooker Road from a CI he had known for five years and who had provided reliable information in the past. Hixson corroborated the informant's tip through investigation, surveillance, and ultimately, a controlled buy of narcotics from the defendant at the residence on the same date Hixson applied for the warrant. Hixson included most of this information in his affidavit and further clarified this information through sworn testimony at the hearing on the warrant before the state magistrate. Under these circumstances, a reasonable police officer would have concluded that there was probable cause to search the residence. Therefore, Hixson's execution of the search warrant falls within the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule.

III. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, Walton's motion to suppress [Court File No. 17] is DENIED.


Summaries of

U.S. v. Walton

United States District Court, E.D. Tennessee, at Chattanooga
Aug 30, 2001
No. 1:01-cr-90 (E.D. Tenn. Aug. 30, 2001)
Case details for

U.S. v. Walton

Case Details

Full title:UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. CHRISTOPHER SHAWN WALTON

Court:United States District Court, E.D. Tennessee, at Chattanooga

Date published: Aug 30, 2001

Citations

No. 1:01-cr-90 (E.D. Tenn. Aug. 30, 2001)