Filed March 30, 2010
Roldan, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 682), counsel has the powerto pursue strategies that are inconsistent with the client’s wishes or even with the 127 client’s testimony. (See, e.g., Jones v. Barnes, supra, 463 U.S. at pp. 751- 752; People v. Welch (1999) 20 Cal.4th 701, 725-729; People v. McPeters (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1148, 1186-1187; Townsend v. Superior Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 774, 781; People v. Williams (1970) 2 Cal.3d 894, 905; Silva v. Woodford, supra, 279 F.3d at p. 847; United States v. McGill, supra, 11 F.3d at pp. 226-227.) Consistent with these principles, while this Court has held that defense counsel may not be required to present mitigation overhis or her competentclient’s objections (see, e.g., People v. Lang (1989) 49 Cal.3d 991, 1031), it has also held that counsel has the power to do so (People v. Deere (1985) 41 Cal.3d 353, 364-365; accord People v. Roldan, supra, 35 Cal.4th at pp. 678, 682, 722-723; People v. Welch, supra, 20 Cal.4th at pp. 727-728).
Filed February 6, 2015
A determination that counsel was ineffective for failure to produce a promised witness “is necessarily fact based. ‘[N]o particular set of rules can be established to define effective assistance....’ ” U.S. v. McGill, 11 F.3d 223, 227 (1st Cir. 1993) (quoting United States v. Natanel, 938 F.2d 302, 310 (1st Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1079 (1992)).
Filed July 27, 2005
Thus, counsel did notact deficiently in regards to his opening statement related to the aforementioned evidence. (See People v. Frye (1998) 18 Cal.4th 894, 984; see also Phoenix v. Matesanz (Ast Cir. 2000) 233 F.3d 77, 85; United States v. McGill (Ast Cir. 1993) 11 F.3d 223, 227-228.) Counsel also acted competently in regards to his statements that appellant would testify.