Filed February 6, 2015
United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502, 511 (1954); see Carlisle v. United States, 517 U.S. 416, 429 (1996) (“‘[I]t is difficult to conceive of a situation in a federal criminal case today where [a writ of coram nobis] would be necessary or appropriate.’”) (quoting United States v. Smith, 331 U.S. 469, 475 n.4 (1947)). “[J]udgment finality is not to be lightly cast aside” and the use of coram nobis must be limited “so that finality is not at risk in a great number of cases.”
Filed May 20, 2013
Others involve a newtrial grant, but not a dismissal based upon legally insufficient evidence. (See, e.g., PFR 4, 9-10, 27, relying on United States v. Smith (1947) 331 U.S. 469; Porter v. Superior Court (2009) 47 Cal.4th 125.) Andstill others involve different procedural scenarios altogether.
Filed August 23, 2013
To support its waiver theory, Appellant relies on authority indicating that when a defendant movesfor a new trial, he impliedly waives any double jeopardy protections to the extent the trial court grants the motion and orders a retrial. (AOB 12, citing United States v. Smith (1947) 331 U.S. 469, 474 People v. Porter, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 16; United States v. Alvarez-Moreno (9th Cir. 2011) 657 F.3d 896, 900.) But none of the cases Appellant cites has anything to do with the situation where a trial court first granted an acquittal based on legal insufficiency, that acquittal got reversed on appeal, and the appellate court then remanded for the trial court to consider the defendant’s renewed motion for newtrial.
Filed May 20, 2013
By opting to move for a newtrial, Mr. Stern would, in effect, waive his Double Jeopardy rights. (See UnitedStates v. Alvarez-Moreno(9th Cir. 2011) 657 F.3d 896, 901 [“the defendant’s consent is the reason double jeopardyis not implicated when the court granted his motion for newtrial . . .”]; see also United States v. Smith (1947) 331 U.S. 469, 474 [“it is such request [for new trial] which obviates any later objection the defendant might make on the ground of double jeopardy”].) As the District Attorney suggests, the People are barred from retrial, not the defendant.
Filed July 16, 2010
Pennsylvania Bureau of Correction v. United States Marshals Service, 474 U.S. 34, 43 (1985). As we noted a few years after enactment of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, ‘it is difficult to conceive of a situation in a federal criminal case today where [a writ of coram nobis ] would be necessary or appropriate.’ United States v. Smith, 331 U.S. 469, 475, n. 4 (1947). Rule 29 provides the applicable law.”
Filed February 23, 2009
See, e.g., id. at 606 nn. 75, 76. Case 1:04-cv-01254-RCL Document 451 Filed 02/23/09 Page 6 of 20 7 1789 Judiciary Act that codified habeas corpus. 11 The use of the writ of coram nobis in the early republic, both “with and without statutory authority,” paralleled the scope of the English cases broadly construing custody under habeas corpus, with the writ being used, “for example, to inquire as to the imprisonment of a slave not subject to imprisonment, insanity of a defendant, [or] a conviction on a guilty plea through the coercion of fear of mob violence,” Morgan, 346 U.S. at 508, though it gradually fell into disuse in light of the availability of alternatives, including habeas corpus, see, e.g, United States v. Smith, 331 U.S. 469, 475 n.4 (1947). Indeed, modern federal courts have treated coram nobis writs as habeas petitions, see United States ex rel. Laughlin v. United States, 474 F.2d 444, 450-51 (D.C. Cir. 1972), or treated habeas petitions as motions for a writ of coram nobis, see Bogish v. Tees, 211 F.2d 69 (3d Cir. 1954).