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United States v. Perez

U.S.
Mar 17, 1824
22 U.S. 579 (1824)

Summary

holding that a failure of the jury to agree on a verdict was an instance of "manifest necessity" which permitted a judge to terminate the first trial and retry the defendant because "the ends of justice would otherwise be defeated"

Summary of this case from U.S. v. Williams

Opinion

March 17, 1824.

The discharge of the jury from giving a verdict in a capital case, without the consent of the prisoner, the jury being unable to agree, is not a bar to a subsequent trial for the same offence. The Court is invested with the discretionary authority of discharging the jury from giving any verdict, in cases of this nature, whenever, in their opinion, there is a manifest necessity for such an act, or the ends of public justice would otherwise be defeated.


This cause comes up from the Circuit Court for the southern district of New-York, upon a certificate of division in the opinions of the Judges of that Court. The prisoner, Josef Perez, was put upon trial for a capital offence, and the jury, being unable to agree, were discharged by the Court from giving any verdict upon the indictment, without the consent of the prisoner, or of the Attorney for the United States. The prisoner's counsel, thereupon, claimed his discharge as of right, under these circumstances; and this forms the point upon which the Judges were divided. The question, therefore, arises, whether the discharge of the jury by the Court from giving any verdict upon the indictment, with which they were charged, without the consent of the prisoner, is a bar to any future trial for the same offence. If it be, then he is entitled to be discharged from custody; if not, then he ought to be held in imprisonment until such trial can be had. We are of opinion, that the facts constitute no legal bar to a future trial. The prisoner has not been convicted or acquitted, and may again be put upon his defence. We think, that in all cases of this nature, the law has invested Courts of justice with the authority to discharge a jury from giving any verdict, whenever, in their opinion, taking all the circumstances into consideration, there is a manifest necessity for the act, or the ends of public justice would otherwise be defeated. They are to exercise a sound discretion on the subject; and it is impossible to define all the circumstances, which would render it proper to interfere. To be sure, the power ought to be used with the greatest caution, under urgent circumstances, and for very plain and obvious causes; and, in capital cases especially, Courts should be extremely careful how they interfere with any of the chances of life, in favor of the prisoner. But, after all, they have the right to order the discharge; and the security which the public have for the faithful, sound, and conscientious exercise of this discretion, rests, in this, as in other cases, upon the responsibility of the Judges, under their oaths of office. We are aware that there is some diversity of opinion and practice on this subject, in the American Courts; but, after weighing the question with due deliberation, we are of opinion, that such a discharge constitutes no bar to further proceedings, and gives no right of exemption to the prisoner from being again put upon trial. A certificate is to be directed to the Circuit Court, in conformity to this opinion.

CERTIFICATE. This cause came on, c. On consideration whereof, it is ORDERED by the Court, that it be certified to the Circuit Court of the District of New-York, that, under the circumstances stated in the record, the prisoner, Josef Perez, is not entitled to be discharged from custody, and may again be put to trial, upon the indictment found against him, and pending in the said Court.


Summaries of

United States v. Perez

U.S.
Mar 17, 1824
22 U.S. 579 (1824)

holding that a failure of the jury to agree on a verdict was an instance of "manifest necessity" which permitted a judge to terminate the first trial and retry the defendant because "the ends of justice would otherwise be defeated"

Summary of this case from U.S. v. Williams

holding a trial court must use "the greatest caution" when exercising its "sound discretion" to declare a mistrial based on jury's inability to agree on verdict

Summary of this case from Fagan v. Dist. Attorney for Lawrence Cnty.

holding that the genuine inability of the jury to reach a unanimous verdict within a reasonable period constitutes "manifest necessity" for discharge of the jury and permits retrial of the accused

Summary of this case from United States v. Wright

holding that if the jury is unable to agree on a verdict and the trial court discharges the jury for "manifest necessity," double jeopardy does not bar retrial of the defendant for the "same offence"

Summary of this case from State v. Collier

holding that if the jury is unable to agree on a verdict and the trial court discharges the jury for “manifest necessity,” double jeopardy does not bar retrial of the defendant for the “same offence”

Summary of this case from State v. Collier

holding that the federal Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar the reprosecution of a defendant for a mistried offense when the jury is unable to reach a verdict

Summary of this case from Richardson v. State

determining “whether the discharge of the jury by the Court from giving any verdict upon the indictment, with which they were charged, without the consent of the prisoner, is a bar to any future trial for the same offence”

Summary of this case from Davidson v. United States

In Perez, this Court explained that "manifest necessity" is a high bar: "[T]he power ought to be used with the greatest caution, under urgent circumstances, and for very plain and obvious causes."

Summary of this case from Blueford v. Arkansas

In Perez, we held that when a judge discharges a jury on the grounds that the jury cannot reach a verdict, the Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar a new trial for the defendant before a new jury.

Summary of this case from Renico v. Lett

In Perez, the Court emphasized the limited scope of this exception by adding: "To be sure, the power [to declare a mistrial and subject the defendant to retrial] ought to be used with the greatest caution, under urgent circumstances, and for very plain and obvious causes."

Summary of this case from United States v. Wilson

In Perez, the Supreme Court held that a judge may declare a mistrial and discharge a jury only if "taking all the circumstances into consideration, there is a manifest necessity for the act, or the ends of public justice would otherwise be defeated."

Summary of this case from Colvin v. Sheets

In Perez the jury was unable to agree on a verdict in a capital case, and was accordingly discharged by order of the trial court.

Summary of this case from United States v. Gunter

In United States v. Perez, 9 Wheat. 579, 22 U.S. 579, 6 L.Ed. 165, the court said: "* * the power ought to be used with the greatest caution, under urgent circumstances, and for very plain and obvious causes; and in capital cases especially, courts should be extremely careful how they interfere with any of the chances of life, in favor of the prisoner."

Summary of this case from Hunter v. Wade

In Perez, the Supreme Court held that "the power [to declare a mistrial and discharge a jury] ought to be used with the greatest caution, under urgent circumstances, and for very plain and obvious causes.

Summary of this case from U.S. v. Mendoza-Navarro

In United States v. Perez, 9 Wheat. 579, 22 U.S. 579, 580, 6 L.Ed. 165 (1824), the Supreme Court held that the double jeopardy clause is not violated when the state retries a defendant after a mistrial is declared out of "manifest necessity.

Summary of this case from Kirby v. Senkowski

In United States v. Perez, 9 Wheat. 579, 6 L.Ed. 165 (1824), the Supreme Court (Story, J.) articulated the rule that the failure of the jury to agree on a verdict was an instance of "manifest necessity" that permitted the trial court to terminate the first trial and retry the defendant.

Summary of this case from United States v. Reed

In United States v. Perez, 9 Wheat. 579, 22 U.S. 579, 6 L.Ed. 165 (1824), the Supreme Court of the United States held that discharge of the jury after they were unable to reach a verdict did not bar a future trial for the same offense.

Summary of this case from United States v. LeMay

In Perez, the Supreme Court held that a defendant may be retried when the defendant "has not been convicted or acquitted."

Summary of this case from State v. Anderson

In United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. 579, 9 Wheat 579, 6 L.Ed. 165 (1824), in the first trial a mistrial was declared because of a hung jury.

Summary of this case from Jones v. State

establishing that trial courts have broad discretion in determining whether a manifest necessity exists due to jury deadlock

Summary of this case from State v. Paul

stating "the law has invested Courts * * * with the authority to discharge a jury from giving any verdict, whenever, in their opinion, taking all the circumstances into consideration, there is a manifest necessity for the act, or the ends of public justice would otherwise be defeated"

Summary of this case from People v. Palen

In United States v. Perez, 22 U. S. 579, (1824), and Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263 (1892), the United States Supreme Court held that manifest necessity justified the discharge of juries unable to reach verdicts, and, therefore, the double jeopardy clause did not bar retrial.

Summary of this case from Crunk v. State

In Perez, the trial judge discharged the jury, without the consent of the defendant or the government, because the jury members were unable to agree.

Summary of this case from Tyson v. State

In United States v. Perez, 9 Wheat. 579, 6 L.Ed. 165 (1824), the Court set forth the test for declaring a mistrial based on manifest necessity.

Summary of this case from Reemsnyder v. State
Case details for

United States v. Perez

Case Details

Full title:The UNITED STATES v. JOSEF PEREZ

Court:U.S.

Date published: Mar 17, 1824

Citations

22 U.S. 579 (1824)

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