United States v. Leon

44 Citing briefs

  1. USA v. Liew et al

    Memorandum In Opposition To Defendants Christina Liew's and Walter Liew's Motion to Suppress Evidence

    Filed July 15, 2013

    CR-11-0573-JSW 24 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 “[p]enalizing the officer for the magistrate’s error [if any], rather than his own, cannot logically contribute to the deterrence of Fourth Amendment violations.” Leon, 468 U.S. at 921. Defendants’ claims regarding Special Agent Ho’s bad faith are meritless.

  2. USA v. Wey et al

    MEMORANDUM in Support

    Filed May 27, 2016

    And no argument of good faith will stand here. See, e.g., Vilar, 2007 WL 1075041, at *2; Leon, 468 U.S. at 919-21. In fact, Judge Chin’s dissent in Ganias II (12-240, Doc.

  3. United States of America v. Millay

    MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO DISCOVERY REQUEST FOR THE DISCLOSURE OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT MATERIALS

    Filed February 15, 2013

    The Court's examination of the materials in the Sealed Appendix will also demonstrate that the Government's electronic surveillance, physical searches, or both, were lawfully conducted. Even if this Court were to determine that the acquisition of the FISA collection had not been lawfully authorized or lawfully conducted, the FISA-obtained or -derived evidence would nevertheless be admissible under the "good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule articulated in Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984). See also, Ning Wen, 477 F.3d at 897 (holding that the Leon good-faith exception applies to FISA orders); Mubayyid, 521 F. Supp. 2d at 140 n. 12 (noting that the Government could proceed in good-faith reliance on FISA orders even ifFISA were deemed unconstitutional); Ahmed, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 120007, at *25 n. 8; Nicholson, 2010 WL 1641167, at *6.

  4. USA v. Azano Matsura et al

    RESPONSE in Opposition

    Filed September 29, 2015

    The threat to the then-covert investigation—as well as the additional four reasons discussed above—amply justified his decision to permit delayed notice. D. MOREOVER, THE “GOOD FAITH” EXCEPTION TO THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE APPLIES, BASED ON THE AGENTS’ OBJECTIVELY REASONABLE RELIANCE ON THE FACIALLY VALID SEARCH WARRANTS FOR THE ACCOUNTING OFFICES AND FOR AZANO’S RESIDENCES The “good faith” exception under United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), discussed in section III.C above regarding the search of Singh’s ElectionMall office, applies with equal force to the searches conducted pursuant to the facially valid warrants for the accounting offices and for Azano’s residences. Case 3:14-cr-00388-MMA Document 200 Filed 09/29/15 Page 20 of 25 21 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 14CR0388-MMA In addition, it is not clear that a violation of the delayed-notice provisions of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(f)(3) and 18 U.S.C. § 3103a(b) would justify suppression of evidence, since these rules are creatures of statute, not of the Fourth Amendment.

  5. PEOPLE v. MACABEO

    Respondent’s Answer Brief on the Merits

    Filed August 13, 2015

    The United States Supreme Court has applied this “good faith” exception to the exclusionary rule in a range of cases. (Davis v. United States, supra, 131 S.Ct. at p. 2428; id. at p. 2434 [“The good-faith exception is a judicially created exception to this judicially created [exclusionary] rule”].) They include searches conducted in objectively reasonable reliance on: a warrantthat is later held invalid (United States v. Leon, supra, 468 U.S. 897); a statute that is subsequently invalidated (Illinois v. Krull (1987) 480 U.S. 340 [107 S.Ct. 1160, 94 L.Ed.2d 364}); erroneous information in a warrant database that is maintained by judicial employees (Arizona v. Evans (1995) 514 U.S. 1 [115 S.Ct. 1185, 131 L.Ed.2d 34]); and erroneous information in a warrant database that is maintained by police (Herring v. United States, supra, 555 U.S. 135). Most recently, in Davis v. United States, the Court held that “when the police conduct a search in compliance with binding precedent that is later overruled,” suppression of evidence “would do nothingto deter police misconduct” and “would comeat a high cost to both the truth and the public safety[.]” (Davis v. United States, supra, 131 S.Ct. at p. 2423.)

  6. USA v. Muhtorov et al

    RESPONSE to Motion

    Filed May 9, 2014

    Second, the agents also reasonably relied on orders issued by neutral magistrates - the judges of the FISC - who repeatedly have held that the applicable targeting and minimization procedures are reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 920; see also Duka, 671 F.3d at 347 n.12 ("[O]bjective ... reliance on the statute in this case is further bolstered by the fact that the particular provision at issue has been reviewed and declared constitutional by several courts."); United States v. Mubayyid, 521 F. Supp. 2d 125, 140 n.12 (D. Mass. 2007) (applying the good-faith exception because "there appears to be no issue as to whether the government proceeded in good faith and in reasonable reliance on the PISA orders").

  7. USA v. Graham

    RESPONSE to Motion

    Filed March 20, 2014

    ’” Id. (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 922). Courts have found an officer’s reliance on a warrant objectively unreasonable where: (1) the magistrate was misled by information in an affidavit that the officer knew was false or would have known was false except for the officer’s reckless disregard for the truth; (2) the magistrate wholly abandoned his detached and neutral judicial role; (3) the warrant was based on an affidavit that was so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable; and (4) the warrant was so facially deficient, by failing to particularize the place to be searched or the things to be seized, that the executing officers cannot reasonably presume it to be valid.

  8. USA v. Wang

    OPPOSITION to Defendant's Motion [48] to Suppress Fruits of Email and Premises Search Warrants [51]

    Filed November 12, 2013

    Indeed, suppression is appropriate only when the underlying affidavit is Aso lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable.@ Leon, 468 U.S. at 923. Put another way, suppression is proper only if the affidavit cannot establish even Aa colorable argument for probable cause.

  9. PEOPLE v. WESTERFIELD

    Appellant’s Reply Brief

    Filed May 14, 2013

    Respondent can use terms such as “evasive”or “self-serving”all he wants, but the totality of circumstances adducedin support of the issuance of the warrant in this case obviously rose no higher than the level of suspicion, and unless the goodfaith exception applies, or unless Judge Mudd’s finding of consentis tenable, then the evidence seized pursuant to the five warrants should have been suppressed. Good FaithException As appellant argued in his opening brief, the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule (United States v. Leon (1984) 468 U.S. 897) does not here save Judge Mudd’s ruling. Proving the exception wasnot a burden the prosecution carried in the trial court because of the court’s finding ofprobable cause to support the warrant, andit is therefore a burden the People must carry here. The record in this case showsthat the deficiency in the warrant wasso patent that it could not be relied upon despite the approval by a magistrate.

  10. USA v. Wang

    OPPOSITION to Defendant's Motions to Suppress Evidence [18],[19] and Motion to Dismiss Count Six of the Indictment [20]

    Filed December 21, 2012

    Indeed, suppression is appropriate only when the underlying affidavit is “so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable.” Leon, 468 U.S. at 923. Put another way, suppression is proper only if the affidavit cannot establish even “a colorable argument for probable cause.”