United States
v.
Harbin

This case is not covered by Casetext's citator
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUITJul 20, 2015
Case No. 14-3956 (6th Cir. 2015)
Case No. 14-3956610 Fed. Appx. 562

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Summaries

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Case No. 14-3956 Case No. 14-3964

07-20-2015

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DESEAN R. HARBIN, Defendant-Appellant.


NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
File Name: 15a0509n.06
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

ORDER

Before: SILER, COOK, and WHITE, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM. At Desean Harbin's sentencing, the district court applied the career offender enhancement, USSG § 4B1.1. The issue before this court is whether Harbin's prior burglary conviction constitutes a "crime of violence" under the residual clause of the career offender enhancement, USSG § 4B1.2(a)(2). In Johnson v. United States, No. 13-7120, 2015 WL 2473450, at *4-5 (U.S. June 26, 2015), the Supreme Court held that the identically worded residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) is void for vagueness. Compare USSG § 4B1.2(a)(2), with 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). We have interpreted both residual clauses identically. See United States v. Ford, 560 F.3d 420, 421 (6th Cir. 2009); United States v. Houston, 187 F.3d 593, 594-95 (6th Cir. 1999). Following Johnson, the Supreme Court has vacated the sentences of offenders who were sentenced under the residual clause of the Sentencing Guidelines. See United States v. Maldonado, 581 F. App'x 19, 22-23 (2d Cir. 2014), vacated, No. 14-7445, 2015 WL 2473524, at *1 (U.S. June 30, 2015); Beckles v. United States, 579 F. App'x 833, 833-34 (11th Cir. 2014), vacated, No. 14-7390, 2015 WL 2473527, at *1 (U.S. June 30, 2015); see also Wynn v. United States, No 14-9634, 2015 WL 2095652, at *1 (U.S. June 30, 2015) (vacating a Sixth Circuit order, which denied habeas relief based on a predicate offense qualifying under the residual clause of the career offender enhancement). Accordingly, Harbin is entitled to the same relief as offenders sentenced under the residual clause of the ACCA. See United States v. Darden, No. 14-5537 (6th Cir. Jul. 6, 2015) (per curiam).

For these reasons, we vacate the judgment of the district court and remand for reconsideration in light of Johnson.