Filed June 15, 2011
Cohn argued on appeal that, even if he had “concealed information relevant and germane to the Grand Jury’s functions” by his false claim of a loss of memory, he could not be convicted of obstruction of justice under § 1503 because that statute applies only to “situations where the defendant interferes with other witnesses or documentary evidence.” 452 F.2d at 884. In affirming, the Second Circuit noted that “The blatantly evasive witness achieves this [obstructive] effect as surely by erecting a screen of feigned forgetfulness as one who burns files or induces a potential witness to absent himself.”
Filed January 28, 2013
The concealment of their now-proven fraud was the purpose of Defendants’ obstruction of justice, establishing their cor- rupt intent and the false and evasive nature of their conduct before U.S. courts. 18 U.S.C. § 1503; United States v. Cohn, 452 F.2d 881, 884 (2d Cir. 1971) (“false and evasive” testimony may constitute obstruction of justice). The facts proven here render Defendants’ numerous representa- tions of Cabrera’s independence and the judgment’s validity to be misrepresentations—including those made to the Ecuadorian criminal authorities, U.S. government officials, litigations financi- ers, and Chevron shareholders and market analysts—an element of Chevron’s fraud claim.